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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the reporting of the Soviet international broadcaster Radio Moscow, and 
how it represented to listeners worldwide the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
subsequent US-led boycott campaign against the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. In doing so, it 
builds on literature that has examined Cold War radio broadcasting, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the politics surrounding the Moscow Olympic Games. Specifically, this thesis 
sheds new light on the outputs of Soviet broadcasting, and on the ways the Soviet Union tried to 
justify their actions and condemn the actions of the US to different audiences worldwide. 
Using the BBC Monitoring Service material archived at Imperial War Museums, Duxford, and 
applying the concept of frame analysis, this thesis concentrates on six key moments after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the build-up to the Moscow Olympics. It provides not only 
examples of how Radio Moscow reported specific events, but how the reporting evolved over 
time. In addition, the use of transcripts from broadcasts to multiple target audiences provides 
evidence of how Soviet broadcasting was adapted to appeal to different listeners worldwide, 
allowing for a comparison of reporting between regions, as well as over time, and to build 
understanding of how the Soviet Union viewed the world in 1980. 
The thesis shows that Radio Moscow adapted its broadcasting to appeal to different audiences, 
and it highlights key examples of how this was achieved. The case studies demonstrate a series 
of particularly prominent frames used by Radio Moscow, to both suggest and create divisions 
between groups and as a way of attempting to reinforce previous Soviet claims about the world. 
The study also examines how these were localised to appeal to the targeted audience, for 
example focusing on religion in broadcasts to the Middle East and specific world leaders in 
broadcasts to North America and Europe. The thesis concludes by discussing what this radio 
material demonstrates of the Soviet view of the world. In doing this, the thesis also highlights 
the usefulness of the BBC Monitoring Service as a tool for researchers looking to further 
explore radio broadcasting and alternative state-to-state diplomacy in detail.  
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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
‘Freedom of speech in general means nothing. When meant to relate to the media it must 
be examined as whose freedom of speech? Freedom of speech for what interests? It is 
those interests that are important – are they the people’s or not? There cannot be non-
selective media. The issue is: selectivity for whom?’ 





This thesis examines how the Soviet Union international radio broadcaster, Radio Moscow, 
reported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant US-led campaign to boycott the 
1980 Moscow Olympic Games, and explores how the focus of this reporting shifted depending 
on the target audience. Using the Imperial War Museum’s BBC Monitoring Service archive, a 
unique and vast unexplored collection of radio transcripts, it incorporates the concept of frame 
analysis to investigate what Radio Moscow said, and why.
2
  
This thesis uniquely focuses on the Soviet broadcasts that were targeted on different audiences 
around the world. Despite Gary Rawnsley’s assertion that international radio broadcasting 
‘helped to sustain [the Cold War] as an endemic state by perpetuating tensions, attitudes and 
predispositions’, almost all research in the area has concentrated on broadcasts directed towards 
the Warsaw Pact states from the West, such as the works by A. Ross Johnson, Arch Puddington 
and Michael Nelson.
3
 There is a gap in the literature here that this thesis works towards bridging 
– Simo Mikkonen has examined Soviet broadcasting in a book chapter, Barak Hazan has 
incorporated some Soviet radio broadcasting into his book examining the Soviet propaganda 
build up to the Moscow Olympics, and a journal article by Don Smith examined how 
                                                     
1
 IWM/SU/C/216 RM N.Am 23
rd
 Jan 1980, 0030, section 2 
2
 Imperial War Museums Duxford holds BBC Monitoring transcripts of numerous radio broadcasters 
worldwide, including Soviet broadcasters, from 1939 to 1982. Furthermore, the archive contains material 
derived from these transcripts – The Daily Digest and Summary of World Broadcasts (dates 30th August 
1939 – 12th April 1947). 
3
 G. Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996). p.166,  A. Ross Johnson 
and R. Eugene Parta, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A 
Collection of Documents (Central European University Press, 2010); A. Puddington, Broadcasting 
Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (University Press, Kentucky, 
2003); M. Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War 
(Syracuse Press, 1997). 
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Americans perceived Soviet broadcasting in the 1960s.
4
 There has been no substantial text on 
Soviet broadcasting, and only Hazan has briefly explored Soviet media in the build up to the 
Olympics – analysis of the boycott campaign has also concentrated on western actions rather 
than Soviet reactions. This thesis joins Hazan’s work, and the work of Smith and Mikkonen, in 
being a rare analysis of the Soviet perspective. Studies have all rightly assumed the Soviet 
Union was firmly against the boycott, and have given some examples of Soviet attempts to 
break the campaign, but none have explored, as this thesis does, the daily campaign that echoed 
around the earth via radio shortwave, or indeed how the campaign was adapted to make it more 
appealing to specific audiences. 
This brief introduction provides the historical background to this study, introducing the context 
in which Radio Moscow was acting and explains why there is a need to explore Soviet 
broadcasting at this time. It then moves on to expand on the aims of the thesis and the thesis 
structure. Following this, the next chapter provides an overview of research that has been 
carried out in areas relevant to this thesis, namely shortwave radio broadcasting, Cold War radio 
broadcasting, the Soviet invasion, and the boycott campaign itself. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The Soviet Union’s military occupation of Afghanistan began on the 25th December 1979, with 
a coup that placed the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal in nominal charge – ‘another feckless ruler 
entirely dependent on the presence of foreign troops’.5 This started a war that lasted nine years 
and fifty-two days.
6
 Outside the Communist bloc, the world responded with near-universal 
condemnation of Soviet actions, and despite the Soviet use of their veto in the United Nations 
Security Council in early January 1980, the UN General Assembly managed to call for an 
‘immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan’ just a 
few days later.
7
 The United States led the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union, with far 
                                                     
4
 S. Mikkonen, “To Control the World’s Information Flows - Soviet Cold War Broadcasting,” in Airy 
Curtains in the European Ether, ed. A. Badenoch, A. Fickers, and C. Henrich-Franke (Nomos, 2013), 
241–269. B. Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 (Transaction Publishers, 
1982).D.D. Smith, “Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s North American Broadcasts,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 34, no. 4 (January 1970): 539. 
5
 T. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton Univ Pr, 2010).  p.237 
6
 R. Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Profile Books, 2011). p.8  
7
 J.J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Lexington Books, 1986)., p.86 – Even two socialist states seemingly went again the Soviet Union as 
Yugoslavia voted against the USSR, and Romania abstained from voting.  
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from universal support, and then, arguably most divisively of all, led the calls to boycott the 
22
nd
 Olympic Games, hosted by Moscow in July 1980.  
The campaign to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games became, and remains, the largest concerted 
use of a single international sporting event to air political grievances – but it did not remove 
Soviet Union forces from Afghanistan.
8
 Furthermore, between the invasion in December 1979 
and the opening of the Games in July 1980, the Olympic boycott was the cause of great debate 
within and between states. It was highly divisive, and this was added to by the nature of the 
Olympic movement (which required national Olympic committees to be independent of national 
politics), that meant in theory state governments had no control over Olympic attendance.
9
 
Ultimately, the United States did not gain the immediate and universal support they hoped for, 
or indeed expected, but, at the same time, the Soviet Union hosted an Olympics that was 
noticeably weakened in numbers by a boycott in response to its foreign policy.  Despite this, the 
same number of world records was set as at the previous, larger (and boycotted by ‘only’ 28 
states) 1976 Montreal Olympics.
10
 Whilst the Soviet military was involved in Afghanistan, 
Soviet media had to continually justify the invasion and, between December 1979 and July 
1980, counter the calls for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. This thesis argues that both were 
significant moments in the Cold War, and that the Olympic boycott campaign in particular 
highlighted the dynamics of international state relations in a manner that few other events 
during the Cold War could manage. By focusing on how the Soviet Union informed the world 
both about their actions in Afghanistan and the US-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics, this 
thesis opens up understanding of how the Soviet Union reported world events and builds upon 
the arguments that the Cold War was more complex than just an East versus West conflict.
11
  
Much has been written about how the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan panned out before the 
final Soviet troops withdrew in February 1989. The focus has been the military and political 
actions directly linked to Afghanistan, consequently little has been published concentrating on 
                                                     
8
 D. Kanin, A Political History of the Olympic Games (Westview Press, Colorado, 1981). p.145 – 146. Of 
those teams initially invited by the Soviet Olympic Committee, 65 states did not appear at the Olympic 
Games, of which 55 can be confirmed as boycotting due to the Afghanistan invasion. 
9
 International Olympic Committee, “The Olympic Charter,” accessed August 19, 2013, 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.p.31 
10
 N.E. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, The Olympic Boycott and the Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). p.232 and p.240 The Moscow Olympics had the smallest field of 
competitors since 1956 – Moscow 1980 Summer Olympics, Olympic.org - Official website of the 
Olympic Movement, http://www.olympic.org/moscow-1980-summer-olympics. 
11
O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007). p.4 
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the sanctions placed upon the Soviet Union because of the invasion.
12
 Away from the initial 
justifications put out by the Soviet leaders, little has appeared about how the Soviet Union 
represented the invasion to the world via its own media outlets.
13
 Similarly, research into the 
1980 Olympic Games, specifically that on the boycott campaign itself and not the actual 
sporting event, has not considered how the Soviet Union went about condemning the boycott 
worldwide.
14
 Rather, the focus has been on how the USA attempted to lead the campaign. How 
the Soviet Union defended the invasion of Afghanistan whilst also criticising the Olympic 
boycott campaign is an area that has not been studied before, despite the light it can shine on the 
Soviet perspective of international relations. This thesis will address these gaps by examining 
the variation between the reports used by the Soviet international radio broadcaster, Radio 
Moscow, in broadcasts to different audiences justifying the occupation of Afghanistan. Thus, it 
explores how Soviet media differentiated justifications for the invasion and condemnation for 
the subsequent boycott campaign depending on the audience.  
In addition, this thesis, based on research into BBC Monitoring archive material, investigates 
international radio in a way previous studies that have used Summary of World Broadcasts 
(SWB), or Daily Digest (DD) material, have not managed. The material accessed for this study 
was used by the BBC Monitoring Editorial division to produce the SWB and DD. As it has not 
been through the editorial process, the material is one step closer to that heard over the airwaves 
in a multitude of languages during late-1979 and early-1980. This allows for a more in-depth 
analysis of Soviet broadcasting and the frames they used than would be possible with previously 
used sources. In doing so, this thesis also demonstrates how this archive could be used for 
further historical research into the Cold War and radio broadcasting – specifically Soviet 
broadcasting to listeners within the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact states, and many others 
under a variety of regimes internationally. In addition, the archive contains records of 
                                                     
12
 The most recent [2011] examples being Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89; 
J. Steele, Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground (Counterpoint, 2011). 
13
 Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980. does cover this period, although is 
more focused on the Olympic Games. Also, B. Hazan, Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle 
East Conflict, 1976. is a further work in the field of Soviet propaganda. However, away from these two 
studies the field is limited. Most recently, the ‘Public Relations of the Cold War’ Conference held at the 
University of Cambridge (December 2011) a paper was presented titled ‘On the events in Afghanistan: 
Strategies to justify the invasion of Afghanistan to the Soviet public’ (Martin Deuerlein). This was not a 
consideration of Soviet radio, but an analysis of the Soviet newspaper Pravda.  
14
 See Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, The Olympic Boycott and the Cold War; D.L. Jr. 
Hulme, The Political Olympics: Moscow, Afghanistan and the 1980 U.S. Boycott (Praeger Publishers, 
1990). 
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broadcasts covering a range of topics, and so it will look to highlight the usefulness of using 
radio to explore further topics ranging from politics and war through to sport and everyday life.   
1.2 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis sets out to answer the following questions: Firstly, what were the frames used to 
shape broadcasts made by Radio Moscow? Secondly, did these frames differ by region and if so 
why did they differ? Thirdly, what methods did Radio Moscow use to create these frames and to 
incorporate events into existing frameworks?  
Several aims arise from these questions, the first of which is to explore the Soviet perception of 
the world in 1980. This will be achieved by examining the frames used by Radio Moscow to 
report these events and by exploring any differentiation that occurred between regions and/or 
states. An important part of effective framing involves analysing the background of the audience 
and the target state, so this thesis will also examine what Radio Moscow considered important 
values for target audiences.  
The second aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the differentiation of frames fit into the 
categories outlined by Paulu in his research into how Soviet broadcasting is divided into the 
following regions:  
‘the other socialist countries, North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Near and 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Africa.’15 
However, due to the limitations of the primary material, this thesis will not be able to comment 
on broadcasts to Latin America or the Far East. Despite this, the research will further highlight 
Radio Moscow’s perception of the Soviet relationship with many parts of the world.    
A third aim is to examine whether, in framing the invasion of Afghanistan and the boycott 
campaign, the Soviet broadcaster attempted to incorporate these events into wider narratives 
that the audiences were already primed to understand, such as a Cold War narrative, or whether 
they chose to focus on Afghanistan and the Olympics as isolated events.  
Fourthly, this thesis aims to examine what sources Radio Moscow used to support the 
arguments it put forward. Were they primarily Soviet or foreign sources, or did they vary 
depending on the target audience? Furthermore, if the latter is the case, this thesis aims to 
                                                     
15
 B. Paulu, “Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe” (1974). p.54 
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understand why. Lastly with regard to this, the thesis explores whether there were elements of 
deception and lying in the presentation of material used to build-up pro-Soviet frames? 
Fifthly, this research aims to investigate the suitability of using The Imperial War Museum’s 
BBC Monitoring Service archive for exploring international radio broadcasting and the Cold 
War. It will demonstrate how the archive can be used, and highlights any difficulties that may 
need to be overcome, so that future researchers can make better use of an underused source. 
Through answering these questions, this study contributes to our understanding of the Cold 
War, specifically to the following three strands: Firstly, this thesis will add to histories of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow Olympic Games boycott campaign, in both 
cases by expanding on the relatively ignored but important area of how the Soviet Union 
attempted to engage its arguments about both events, directly with foreign and domestic 
audiences, using shortwave radio. Secondly, this thesis will add to literature on the use of radio 
for broadcasting messages to foreign peoples, an area in which the main concern has been what 
was broadcast from West to East over the iron curtain rather than from East to West. Thirdly, 
through examining the broadcasting between the invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow 
Olympic Games, this thesis will add to the small field of research concentrating on Soviet radio. 
Using frame analysis as the basis for the method of research also means that this study will add 
to literature on the practical applications of that concept, as well as being an addition to the 
literature on the use of framing in radio broadcasting.  
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter 2 explores the historical context that this thesis sits in. Chapter 3 then discusses the 
BBC Monitoring Service archive, the key concept of frame analysis, how the two can be used to 
explore Soviet broadcasting in 1980, and presents the reasons behind the selection of the six 
case studies that make up the bulk of the research. These six key moments are outlined below. 
Chapter 4 explores the immediate portrayal of the invasion and the justifications that Radio 
Moscow broadcast in defence of Soviet actions. It highlights the frames used by Radio Moscow 
in the initial days after the invasion, and how they began to alter in the face of condemnation 
from states, regional bodies, and the United Nations. Chapter 5 examines how these frames 
developed as the world reaction became more forceful. It concentrates on analysing Radio 
Moscow broadcasts surrounding President Carter’s State of the Union address, significant not 
only for its reaffirmation of trade sanctions on the Soviet Union, but because it provided 
powerful messages regarding the Persian Gulf and the Moscow Olympic Games. Chapter 6 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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examines how Radio Moscow framed the trips made in February by members of President 
Carter’s boycott team in their attempts to build support for a boycott. It contrasts Muhammad 
Ali’s trip to Africa and Cyrus Vance’s visit to the Lake Placid Winter Olympics, alongside how 
Radio Moscow compared the problems of Lake Placid with the expected perfection of Moscow 
to show how the broadcaster was adept at manipulating similar events in a manner that 
projected positively on the Soviet Union. Chapter 7 concentrates on how Radio Moscow framed 
President Carter’s announcement that the US Olympic team would not be going to Moscow. 
This was the first real blow to the Games, changing what had previously been discussion and 
strong words into action. Not only did this affect how Radio Moscow framed the boycott 
campaign from this moment on, but it led to a spate of announcements, for and against, from 
numerous states around the world. Afghanistan, it seems, was not the primary news story 
anymore, the spin-off Olympic boycott was. Chapter 8 examines how Radio Moscow framed 
the International Olympic Committee announcement in May 1980 that only 81 teams would 
attend the Olympic Games – that the boycott had an effect. It was a significant time as the 
boycott was no longer just a threat, it was a reality that Radio Moscow had to deal with. Chapter 
9 concentrates on the opening ceremony of the Games and how Radio Moscow framed the 
effects of the boycott on the Olympic Games. Television images of the opening ceremony did 
their utmost to hide the extent of the boycott with clever photography and panning of the 
stadium.
16
 Radio Moscow addressed the boycott however, using not just the opening ceremony 
but the results, records, and athletes themselves, to emphasise just how badly the boycott had 
failed – Afghanistan was barely mentioned, with the exception of its Olympic team. 
Chapter 10 concludes this thesis, bringing together the analysis from each of the case studies 
and discussing how the frames used by Soviet radio varied over time and by region, and how 
this can inform on the Soviet perspective of international relations at the time. It evaluates the 
BBC Monitoring Service material stored at Duxford, commenting on the usefulness of using 
both translated and transcribed material for studying international radio broadcasting, and 
specifically for an examination of frame analysis. 
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 CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter explores the context in which this work sits. It begins with a brief history of 
shortwave radio broadcasting during the Cold War, before moving on to discuss where this 
thesis sits in relation to previous research into Cold War radio broadcasting, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, and previous studies of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games boycott.  
2.1 SHORTWAVE RADIO BROADCASTING AND THE COLD WAR 
The Voice of America (VOA), the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio 
Liberty (RL), Radio Moscow, Radio Peace & Progress, and many more; these were all major 
tools of public diplomacy during the Cold War. Using the medium of shortwave, which allows 
for a broadcast from one place to reach thousands of miles around the world, they gave states 
the opportunity to broadcast messages, both good and bad, directly to foreign peoples, in the 
process bypassing local governments, local media, and local laws. The effect radio had on the 
Cold War is debatable, and whether or not the constant battle to provide information sustained 
or reduced tensions is open to interpretation, but there are certainly examples of it both helping 
and hindering peaceful co-existence. Rawnsley has argued that,  
‘Radio propaganda certainly helped to sustain [the Cold War] as an endemic state by 
perpetuating tensions, attitudes and predispositions, and there is evidence of this, one 
example being the case of Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts arguably inciting and 
encouraging the Hungarian uprising in 1956.’17  
However, by supplying information and up-to-date news, radio can also be considered to have 
helped lower tensions and bring about changing attitudes. One line of argument, countering the 
call that RFE encouraged uprising, is that without Western radio broadcasting calling for 
restraint, the revolutions of 1956 would have in fact been bloodier.
18
 The use of radio during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis is a further example of its importance as a means to lessen tensions – the 
open-letter diplomacy used by Khrushchev and Kennedy over the radio waves may have been 
somewhat frightening to hear, but at least it was out in the open and not behind closed doors that 
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the fate of the world appeared to be decided.
19
 Rawnsley himself has described this as ‘the most 
dramatic example of international radio being used as a tool of diplomacy’20 Without the 
constant barrage of information flying from West to East and leading to a questioning of the 
Soviet regime, whether just peacefully remaining inside the mind of the listener or giving 
encouragement to uprising, who is to say what would have happened? International radio 
broadcasting can equally be said to have broken down the barriers between East and West that 
may have existed in people’s minds – breaking down cultural barriers, or trying to build them 
up, is certainly one reason why state broadcasting to foreign regions exists to this day.
21
 The 
Radio Moscow broadcasts examined in this study are the Soviet Union attempts to engage 
directly with foreign peoples and project their world view, to directly justify their invasion of 
Afghanistan and condemn the US-led Olympic boycott campaign. Previous research has 
examined the boycott campaign and the Afghanistan invasion – but none has considered the 
constant daily justification and condemnation that Radio Moscow beamed directly into the 
houses of people around the world via shortwave radio.  
Shortwave broadcasts can travel thousands of miles, making them a great medium for 
conducting an information invasion behind enemy lines. The ability to travel without 
consideration of borders, governments or iron curtains was, and still is, excellent for getting 
messages to people who might otherwise remain inaccessible. Cummings quotes one of the first 
scripts from RFE, in July 1950, containing the lines, ‘You are not forgotten’, and ‘To you, 
chained by tyranny, we will bring a consistent, reliable well of information.’22 Radio stations 
such as Voice of America, the BBC and Radio Free Europe verbally jousted with Radio 
Moscow to project their versions of facts and information, all with the aim of bypassing 
governments and domestic media sources in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of people in 
different parts of the world.  Television and newspapers could not hope to have the same reach – 
radio can be immediate, broadcast over shortwave it was (and is) capable of far outstripping 
other news media in terms of reach (except perhaps satellite systems which were not 
                                                     
19
 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda. p.110-119. 
20
 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda. p.175 
21
 The Voice of America broadcasts in 43 languages.“Voice of America,” accessed September 11, 2013, 
http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/voa/.  The BBC World Service broadcasts in 32 languages (including 
English), “BBC World Service” (British Broadcasting Corporation), accessed September 11, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/languages/index.shtml?survey=no&url=www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice
/languages/index.shtml&js=no&lang=11. Voice of Russia (formally Radio Moscow) currently broadcasts 
in 38 languages to 160 nations. “Voice of Russia,” accessed September 11, 2013, 
http://voiceofrussia.com/about/. 
22
 R.H. Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-
1989 (McFarland & Co Inc, 2009). p.10 
Chapter 2: Historical Context 
18 
 
commonplace in 1980). Only with extreme weather conditions can television or higher quality 
radio waves, such as FM, even come close to matching the distance shortwave can cover.
23
 It 
was also safe for the employees of the broadcaster, with a few notable exceptions such as the 
murder of the BBC and RFE broadcaster Georgei Markov, the Bulgarian dissident shot in spy-
thriller style by a ricin pellet fired from an umbrella gun on Waterloo Bridge in 1978, and the 
1981 bombing of the RFE headquarters by Carlos the Jackal under orders from Romanian 
President Ceausescu.
24
 Newspapers require a localised distribution network – clearly a danger if 
critical of an unaccommodating regime – and the same material can easily be broadcast over a 
radio anyway. Shortwave radio receivers were also readily available in many regions of the 
world, and many states used shortwave for their own internal means of communication.
25
  
For the broadcasting state shortwave had the safety of distance, for the receiving state it was 
difficult to prevent, and for receiving listeners it was easy to hide – just retune the radio. Within 
the Soviet Union there were attempts to control access to shortwave through means such as 
restricting the tuning mechanisms to only acceptable stations, but this merely boosted the black 
market in shortwave radios – either adjusting them to reach forbidden bands or supplying ones 
that could.
26
 Shortwave broadcasting was, and still is, a highly useful way for governments to 
communicate directly with foreign peoples, especially those viewed as living in war-torn or 
oppressive regions or states.  
2.2 COLD WAR RADIO 
Thousands of hours of shortwave broadcasting could be heard in a variety of languages each 
week during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union and the United States contributing the 
majority of this material. In comparison to the 1900 hours a week in 70 languages that the 
Soviet Union could produce by 1972, the USA broadcast over 2000 hours a week in 49 
languages – it would appear that the USA devoted more time to each language than the USSR. 27 
Along with broadcasting in the most languages, the Soviet Union was also the largest proponent 
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of radio ‘jamming’ – attempting to block incoming signals through a range of techniques such 
as signal interference or signal override.
28
 There were also general threats and reprisals against 
those who did manage to listen through the jamming.
29
 The Soviet Union was thought to have 
spent more on trying to jam Western radio broadcasts than was spent by the West producing and 
sending them, spending the equivalent of around $150 million a year, with one estimate 
suggesting a peak of around $900 million per annum.
30
  To compare these costs, Nelson cites 
one study that estimates the cost incurred by the Soviet Union in jamming the BBC for four 




The Soviet leaders considered ‘Western radio propaganda in the Russian language… part of a 
premeditated imperialist bourgeois psychological war against the USSR and socialist 
countries.’32 Yet, with 1900 hours output a week, shortwave radio was evidently an important 
tool of Soviet propaganda as well. However, Soviet media often reported news many days after 
the Western broadcasters, as it needed to fit with Soviet policy before it could be broadcast. The 
best example of this is the Chernobyl disaster – Soviet radio failed to report the explosion for at 
least two days, so for many the first source of information, safety advice, and presumably 
opinion on the causes, came from foreign broadcasters.
33
 The Soviet Union may have broadcast 
in more languages than any of its competitors, but delays caused by the need to fit information 
to state directives meant it often lost out in the race to report first, and therefore Soviet radio 
often lost the opportunity to be first to provide listeners with an interpretation of events.  
With the exception of a study by Smith published in 1970, and Mikkonen’s recent 2013 chapter, 
previous studies of radio broadcasting have tended to focus upon Cold War radio broadcasts 
from the USA and Western Europe into the Warsaw Pact states, looking predominantly at key 
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uprisings, such as Hungary 1956.
34
 The most recent research on Cold War radio has continued 
this approach – Ross Johnson has produced two works both focusing on Western broadcasting, 
and in particular Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America.
35
 Of particular note 
are two quotations from Parta in Ross Johnson’s edited collection, about Soviet attitudes to the 
Afghanistan war and the impact of external radio broadcasters – 
‘In 1988, a trend report tracing the evolution of attitudes toward the war, and the role 
that Western radio played in informing Soviet listeners (based on 6,059 data cases), 
showed that disapproval of the war had risen from one-quarter of the population in 1984 
to almost half in 1987… In the early years of the war, respondents tended either to 
minimise its importance and avoid expressing a viewpoint, or to recite stereotyped 
responses based on domestic Soviet propaganda. It was only after several years of 
involvement in Afghanistan that clearly-defined attitudes toward the war began to be 
expressed by a majority of respondents in the traveller survey.’36 
‘When attitudes toward the war were correlated with information sources in the war, it 
became apparent that those who received their information from Western radio or via 
word-of-mouth communication were considerably more critical of Soviet policy than 
those who relied on official sources.’37 
Comments such as these do not appear with regard to the effects of broadcasts originating from 
the Soviet Union, both because of the focus on Western broadcasting, and because, as Nelson 
claimed, when himself writing about Western broadcasting, ‘the Communists had few 
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listeners.’38 Whilst this may be true – there is little evidence to contradict the statement, but also 
little to support it – it does not detract from the importance of studying the messages that the 
Soviet Union were attempting to communicate to foreign peoples all around the world.  
Unlike Nelson, the British government were concerned that there were in fact many listeners, as 
one mid-1960s BBC survey into the listening habits of ages 15+ found roughly 2% of the 
British population had listened to Radio Moscow at one time or another – almost one million 
people!
39
 This was deemed to be ‘an oddity from the BBC’ and ‘a damned fool figure’, but the 
important point was made that, 
‘The key words seem to be ‘at one time or another’. What we need but cannot get are 
statistics on those who listen to Moscow regularly enough to be fairly sure to assimilate 
the Communist propaganda line on any major issue.’40 
Evidently there was enough concern in the British Foreign Office to merit investigation into 
how many regular listeners there were, regardless of how outrageous the number seemed – one 
comment even questioned the methodology used to produce such a seemingly high number, and 
whether the same method was potentially inflating BBC external service audience numbers.
41
  
As with overviews of Cold War broadcasting, English language works, examining specific 
broadcasters focus almost exclusively on western broadcasters, and within these again primarily 
on RFE and VOA, rather than the BBC.
42
 Very little has yet been produced examining Radio 
Moscow specifically and nothing has appeared, in the English language, considering the impact 
of the Soviet trade unions broadcaster Radio Peace & Progress. There are several reasons why 
this is the case, the main one being the difficulty in gathering detailed material of what was 
broadcast from the Soviet Union – something the BBC Monitoring archive can rectify. In 
addition, whilst the Soviet Union continued to throw money at international broadcasting, VOA, 
RFE, RL and the BBC constantly needed to justify their outputs – were they effective, was 
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anyone listening? These questions led to audience studies that, although very rough and basic, 
have been used as proof that broadcasting east was worthwhile.
43
 Demonstrating the difficulties 
of this research, the BBC Written Archives Centre holds several letters regarding Russian 
audience research – one writer wrote, ‘I can assure you that the BBC is listened to, respected, 
and indeed used as the ultimate source of reliable information by most educated people.’44 
Another said that the BBC news was part of the Soviet persons’ ‘life’s blood… Millions do 
depend on them.’45 Alongside interviewing defectors and visitors, this was the type of 
information used to understand audience numbers and make-up. It is not clear whether the 
reverse took place. Whilst Radio Moscow regularly asked listeners to write in, and, as with most 
radio stations, tried to judge the audience through the size of the mailbag, information on 
audience figures has not been reported.  
Knowing the audience for a radio station is key to framing news stories, as will be explained in 
the methodology section, but knowing the precise listening figures for shortwave broadcasting 
seems impossible. Radio Moscow was a vast enterprise, a seemingly ‘money-no-object’ station 
broadcasting out Soviet views. The framing of reporting to appeal to different groups may have 
been based on the letters sent in by listeners, but ultimately, like the audience figures, they will 
have been based on estimations – estimations about the background of the target audience, the 
current and residual political and economic climates, the current actions of the Soviet Union and 
the United States, and what the enemy was broadcasting to the same target audiences. Assessing 
the audience, as well as estimating its size, was by no means a perfect science.
46
  
Alongside a lack of research into listeners, Western governments did not ban listening or try to 
‘jam’ frequencies in the same manner as the Soviet Union. It would seem there was less 
concern, from both sides of the iron curtain, about broadcasts heading out of the USSR than 
those heading in. In terms of broadcast material, audience estimates and administrative papers, 
there is far more information available about the broadcasts that went east over the iron curtain 
than those that went west. However, Nelson raises an interesting point related to this that this 
thesis aims to dispel –  
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‘Literature on the Radios is surprisingly deficient in conveying what material they were 
actually transmitting. Apparently the Radios retained few materials in archives. One 
RFE/RL executive said, “We were not prepared to retain back files just in case some 
academic researcher turned up.”’47 
This may well be the reason why there are few studies that actually fully quote radio broadcasts, 
even from broadcasts originating from RFE, VOA or the BBC. When radio broadcasts are cited 
it is predominantly through the digests of monitoring services such as FBIS and the BBC 
Monitoring Service. However, even these lack the level of detail into what was transmitted that 
can be found in the Duxford BBC Monitoring Archive, discussed in chapter 3.1.  
There have been few academic studies of Soviet radio broadcasting, with limited studies of the 
different broadcasts and over limited periods of time. Of these, Bookmiller’s study of the 
history of Radio Moscow, along with the BBC and the Voice of America, is an insightful 
analysis of the thinking behind Soviet broadcasting.
48
 She concluded that Radio Moscow 
remained true to its original purpose, promoting ‘the virtues of the world’s first communist 
state, discrediting leading capitalist powers and [pressurising] other socialist countries which 
deviated from Moscow’s ideological course…’, but the intimate link between radio and state 
meant that it had to prop-up the Soviet Union for its own survival.
49
 Therefore regardless of 
what the Soviet Union did and how this may negatively affect an audience opinion, Radio 
Moscow needed to accentuate as many positives as possible to justify not only the existence and 
mission of the state, but also the existence and mission of the state broadcaster.  
A study into how Radio Moscow output was perceived by the North American public was 
conducted by Smith in the 1960s, and found that listeners had been led to believe by the 
domestic press that the Soviet broadcaster would be far more propagandistic in tone than it 
actually was.
50
 Another example of research into Soviet broadcasting, Robert Fortner’s ‘Public 
Diplomacy and International Politics’, examined both US and Soviet broadcasting with regard 
to the superpower summits in the late 1980s.
51
 It also used frame analysis techniques, although 
rather more statistically than will be used here, to ‘…compare and contrast the nature of the 
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reporting that characterised the broadcasts of the services.’52 Fortner’s work is unique in that it 
is also the only work that uses transcripts of Soviet radio to examine the messages broadcast, 
rather than just the overall themes, and considers how these messages evolved in the period 
under study. A more recent analysis of Radio Moscow has been undertaken by Simo Mikkonen, 
who highlights the lack of research into Soviet broadcasting whilst providing a general 
overview of Soviet broadcasting development in the 1950s and 1960s.
53
 Away from these 
studies, information and research into Radio Moscow broadcasting is rare, and Radio Peace & 
Progress almost non-existent. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to analyse the messages and themes broadcast by Radio 
Moscow, in the process not only expanding knowledge about Soviet radio messages during the 
Olympic boycott campaign, but also expanding understanding about how the Soviet radio 
broadcaster altered those messages to different audiences. Using the BBC Monitoring Service 
transcripts, this thesis studies Soviet radio broadcasts in more detail than any previous research, 
analysing how the radio broadcaster attempted to influence global opinion against the boycott 
whilst continuing normal lines of attack against the USA, Britain and anyone else they deemed 
a target. In 1950, President Eisenhower broadcast to the American people that Soviet Union 
radio broadcasting was ‘weaving a fantastic pattern of lies and twisted facts.’54 Using the Soviet 
reporting of the invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow Olympic Games boycott, this study 
will investigate how twisted the facts and how ‘fantastical’ the pattern of lies broadcast by 
Radio Moscow actually were. 
2.3 THE COLD WAR AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
 ‘The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the three most significant conflicts of the 
Cold War era, the others being the Korean War in the 1950s and the wars in Indochina 
and Vietnam from 1945 to 1975… It was also the only Cold War conflict in which the 
Soviet forces were directly engaged in full-scale combat outside – or at best on the 
periphery of – what was generally acknowledged to be the Soviet sphere of interest. The 
impact of Afghanistan upon the Soviet Union, its armed forces – the army in particular – 
and the outcome of the Cold War was significant.’55 
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Despite these assertions by Stone, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not gained the 
attention of the US equivalent, Vietnam. As Cold War ‘grand narrative’ histories tend to focus 
upon superpower relations over nearly 50 years, the specifics of individual confrontations and 
key moments can get lost within the overall story. For both the Afghanistan invasion and the 
Olympic boycott campaign, this is arguably the case.  
The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was indeed fateful, and whilst it was not the sole 
reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union twelve years later, the drain on resources and the 
inability to subdue the Afghan people played a significant part.
56
 Whilst Stone may argue that it 
was one of the three most significant Cold War conflicts, and Gaddis agrees, for many, other 
events take precedence.
57
 Despite being in Afghanistan for almost a decade, nearly a quarter of 
the Cold War, the Soviet suppression of uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia 
(1968) have had more analysis across the fields of International Relations, Soviet studies and 
even radio broadcasting studies. Furthermore, the two-weeks of the Cuban missile crisis (1962) 
are ‘universally recognised now as the closest the world came, during the second half of the 20th 
century, to a third world war…’.58 The invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent world 
reaction to it, has been left behind, despite President Carter asserting at the time that it was 
‘…the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.’59 There are definite 
parallels between Afghanistan and the suppressions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the 
forceful US reaction to the Cuban missiles, and, most significantly of all, the long drain of the 
Vietnam War.
60
 Far from being of less significance, Afghanistan was in many ways a 
quintessential Cold War conflict, and as Gaddis makes clear, it was one of only three occasions 
when a superpower went to war.
61
 
The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan has been described as a ‘…disastrous 
intervention…’, ‘…an ultimate show of misjudgement…’, and ‘by far the most striking use of 
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Soviet military power…’62 However, in terms of grand narratives of the Cold War, little has 
been written about the invasion itself. Instead, there has been analysis of how it affected the 
Cold War, with the most common conclusions being that Afghanistan shifted President Carter’s 
outlook, something the President himself has acknowledged, and that it was a symbol of the end 
of détente.
63
 The Olympic boycott campaign highlighted the dynamics of international political 
relations in a way that few other crises during the Cold War years managed, yet it gains even 
less mention than Afghanistan, suggesting that for many researchers, in terms of implications 




There are a number of specific studies on the Soviet war in Afghanistan, ranging from studies of 
the on-going conflict, such as Arnold’s 1981 ‘Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion in Perspective’, 
to post-conflict studies, such as Braithwaite’s 2011 ‘Afgantsy’.65 Works have also appeared 
from the perspectives of Soviet soldiers and journalists (Tamarov and Bocharov) and those 
comparing Afghanistan with Vietnam (Borer) and the 2001- US-led war in Afghanistan 
(Steele).
66
 Whatever the perspective of the research, the main concern has been documenting the 
military engagement, how the occupation panned out, and (in later books) the reasons for its 
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failure. However, there is either very little or no examination of the international reaction in 
1980. In histories of a decade-long conflict, neither the sanctions imposed upon the invader or 
the boycott of an international sporting event feature substantially. Furthermore, how the Soviet 
Union justified the occupation and condemned these sanctions has only been considered 
fleetingly, despite what it can tell us about international relations in 1980, in particular from the 
perspective of the Soviet Union. By expanding understanding of the international situation 
during the early months of the conflict, this thesis will add to the existing literature on the 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
Research on Afghanistan has very little analysis of the Olympic boycott campaign, despite it 
being central to the world reaction. Hammond commented that ‘the punitive measure that 
probably hurt Soviet pride the most was Carter’s campaign to boycott the Moscow Olympics’, 
whilst Braithwaite argued that ‘support for the Olympics boycott was more lukewarm … Soviet 
policy towards Afghanistan was unaffected … the Americans and British turned instead to more 
practical measures.’67 The Olympic Games boycott was a substantial part of the official reaction 
to the invasion of Afghanistan, yet whilst it was central to the reaction to the conflict in 1980, it 
has not received detailed historical examination.  
As early as 1981 Arnold described the reaction to Afghanistan as a ‘storm’, whilst in 1983 
Bradsher described the reaction to the invasion as ‘swift and strong’, and by 1986 Collins was 
describing it as ‘…one of the strongest series of actions ever taken by the US over any specific 
Soviet act.’68 However, these voices are in the minority. In 1985, Girardet argued that 
‘…Afghanistan’s predicament… has failed to arouse the righteous indignation, or imagination, 
of the international community…’, and since then the effects of the sanctions and the Olympic 
boycott have been overlooked.
69
  In more recent studies of the invasion of Afghanistan, 
Braithwaite (2011) mentions the sanctions and boycott in passing, and Maley (2009) covers 
them only briefly.
70
 Studies of Afghan history also lack coverage – Rasanayagam (2003) merely 
describes ‘…the somewhat lukewarm response…’ to sanctions, and whilst Barfield (2010) 
acknowledges the mass opposition against the invasion, he does not comment on the reaction to 
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the sanctions, instead preferring to focus on the other strand of US-led policy towards the 
conflict – funding the mujahideen against the Soviet-backed Afghan government.71 However, 
this neglects the fact that until the funding of the mujahideen was formally admitted, the official 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the economic sanctions, the political 
resolutions, and the Olympic Games boycott. They may not have affected the war in 
Afghanistan, but as a reaction at the time they were more significant than current literature on 
Afghanistan suggests. Official condemnation for the invasion came through political, economic 
and cultural channels – the only channel remaining to react to the invasion was perhaps publicly 
proposing military intervention. 
Rather than discuss the invasion itself, this study will examine its implications on Soviet 
relations with the world. This thesis, which aims to investigate how the Soviet Union framed its 
arguments about Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott to different regions of the world, will 
show the nature of how the Soviet Union perceived its relationships with other states at the time, 
and will highlight the varying reasons put forward to justify the occupation. The Soviet Union 
could not shy away from justifying the invasion of Afghanistan, in part because of the furore 
over the invasion, but perhaps more so because of the intense debate in some areas over whether 
to boycott the Olympic Games. They could, and did, absorb or circumvent economic or political 
reprisals, but international sports stars could not be replaced as easily. Debate dragged on from 
the invasion in December 1979 until the Moscow Games opened in July 1980, and therefore the 
reasons behind the boycott constantly needed addressing.  
However, whilst the literature on the war in Afghanistan stresses that Soviet justification for the 
invasion did not waiver, certainly in the first years, what it does not put across is that this 
justification varied in its specific details depending on the region or state to which they were 
justifying their actions. Soviet Union broadcasters did not just use the statements by Soviet 
Premier Leonid Brezhnev or Afghan President Babrak Karmal when discussing the war, they 
also used interviews with visitors to Kabul and the Afghan people, as well as favourable reports 
from foreign media sources in an attempt to justify their actions. Just as previous research has 
not considered Soviet public diplomacy, literature on the war has not studied radio broadcasts. 
Whilst material gathered from other Soviet sources, such as the newspapers Pravda and 
Izvestiya and the telegraph agency TASS, has been used by authors, Radio Moscow, often 
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appearing in citations for quotes by political figures such as Karmal or Brezhnev, has not been 
analysed in itself. 
In his memoir, Soviet journalist Gennady Bocharov, discussed how his newspaper articles on 
Afghanistan were produced and moderated to fit the official Soviet line.
72
 He explained how 
Soviet journalists produced their pieces about the Afghanistan war, but not what was actually 
said in them – articles were ‘edited mercilessly’ by both Glavlit and the military censor.73 With 
the exception of Bocharov, and Hazan (discussed below in The 1980 Olympic Boycott 
Campaign), analysis of the Soviet media and the messages it sent out regarding Afghanistan and 
the boycott campaign have not been studied. 
Instead of merely broadcasting pieces about how normal life was in Afghanistan, the long 
drawn out nature of the boycott campaign kept Afghanistan in the news for considerably longer 
than it may have been otherwise, even if only as of secondary importance to the Olympics. The 
sanctions and boycott may not have affected the war, but in terms of highlighting it to a wide 
audience, they made a more significant difference than studies have previously shown. That 
Soviet radio, as this thesis will show, devoted a considerable amount of time both rebuffing the 
boycott calls and justifying the intervention in Afghanistan, often citing foreign press stories, is 
testament to this.  
The majority of English language research on the Soviet war in Afghanistan has been by 
Western researchers; those produced by Soviet authors tend to be memoirs by soldiers or 
journalists, such as Bocharov and Tamarov.
74
 The source materials used in many of the English 
language works are memoirs or interviews, although recently there has been more Soviet 
archive material appearing. However, whilst using a vast amount of Russian sources for his own 
work, Rodric Braithwaite acknowledges that ‘there are no systematic or convenient sources for 
the Soviet war in Afghanistan to compare with those available for the Stalin period and the 
Great Patriotic War…’.75 Not only will this study contribute to understanding of the reaction 
around the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan, it will also contribute by further examining 
an underused source in the literature – Soviet radio. Radio broadcasting was an important means 
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for the Soviet Union to use in trying to justify their invasion of Afghanistan to different regions 
of the world, but it has been understudied in previous work on the war.  
2.4 THE 1980 OLYMPIC BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN 
Relatively few studies exist on the boycott campaign surrounding the Moscow Olympics, and 
there is only one analysis of the boycott from the Soviet perspective – Barach Hazan’s ‘Olympic 
Sports and Propaganda Games’.76 Hazan uses Soviet material from newspapers such as Pravda 
and Sovetskiy Sport, speeches and reports from senior Soviet figures, and also some television 
and radio, and discusses the various themes used to attack the boycott campaign, ranging from 
the boycott and the law through to the lack of support for the boycott and the argument that 
sport and politics should be kept separate.
77
 Incorporated within these themes are materials 
gathered from radio sources, however only very briefly does Hazan discuss ‘differentiation’ of 
arguments depending on the audience.
78
 He argues that ‘the frequent and refined use of 
differentiation illustrates the meticulous planning and coordination of the “boycott” counter-
campaign…’79 Whilst this thesis aims to investigate the different frames the Soviet radio 
broadcaster used when communicating with audiences around the world, conversely to Hazan, 
this thesis argues that it was reacting to events as they came about, and that any signs of 
meticulousness planning have come about from the well-drilled Soviet propaganda machine, 
one that allowed events to be communicated and simultaneously framed in ways that would 
appeal to specific audiences – it was not the boycott counter-campaign that was meticulously 
planned, rather the Radio Moscow system for framing events. 
Hazan’s study is very different from other works on the Moscow games, in both concept and 
resources. He uses material from TASS and, briefly, Radio Moscow, but how the radio 
broadcasts varied between regions and changed over time is not the focus of the analysis, and 
neither is the Olympic boycott campaign itself. Whilst he comments on differentiations and 
arguments used by the various means the Soviet Union had at their disposal, Hazan does not 
analyse the specifics of what was said over the radio waves nor how these specifics varied by 
audience. The overarching focus of Hazan’s study is on the many different ways the Soviet 
Union attempted to win the right to host, and then to promote, the Olympics through radio, 
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television, films, tourism, books and newspapers, quizzes and societies.
80
 However, Hazan is the 
exception in a field otherwise dominated by analysis of the Olympic boycott campaign focused 
around the United States and concentrated on the reasons why other states chose to boycott. Of 
the two most comprehensive studies, Sarantakes’ ‘Dropping the Torch’ focuses on the failings 
of Jimmy Carter and his administration, and Hulme’s ‘The Political Olympics’ provides a 
narrative of the campaign from a slightly more international perspective, but also concludes that 
it was an American self-made failure.
81
  
Hulme and Sarantakes undertake historical studies, but memoirs and more emotive pieces have 
also been produced on this topic. Christopher Booker’s ‘The Games War: A Moscow Journal’ is 
an example of the 1980 Games from the perspective of a British journalist who was there, but 
covers his personal experiences in Moscow as much as it discusses his opinions on the boycott 
campaign.
82
 The Caraccioli brothers approached the boycott from a human perspective with a 
narrative of interviews from United States athletes, who were unable to attend but clearly 
wanted to go and may have lost their only chance of Olympic glory in the process.
83
 It lacks the 
historical and political analysis supplied by Sarantakes and Hulme, but succeeds with the 
purpose of setting out the US athletes’ perspective, and again gives the impression of being very 
critical of the US Administration. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Lisa Forrest, captain of 
the Australian swimming team in 1980, tells of the difficulties of training and attending the 
Games in the face of hostility from government officials and fellow countrymen.
84
 Both books 
emphasise the human cost (in sport) of the political actions. 
In 1980, Soviet radio attempted to emphasise the plight of those denied the chance to attend, 
and it is interesting to note the criticism Soviet media targeted on the boycott campaign has not 
disappeared. With the exception of Barton, almost all reviews of the Moscow boycott campaign 
have been critical of the US-led actions.
85
 Barton commented –  
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‘If nothing else, then President Carter must be credited with having chosen a most 
appropriate response to the Afghanistan invasion by his choice of a boycott, for this 
option clearly brought forward little political damage and may have indeed generated 
some support from those conservative elements which had previously viewed the 
Administration as generally lethargic towards the USSR.’86 
Barton can be defended to some extent as he was writing in 1983, but even so other 
commentators of the time were far less sanguine about the campaign. Whether these other 
commentators are reflecting Soviet criticisms from 1980, or whether they merely highlight that 
Soviet broadcasters reflected foreign opinions, is open to debate. More in keeping with analysis 
of the Olympic boycott campaign, and with Soviet broadcasting opinion in 1980, Kanin labelled 
Olympic boycotts in general, ‘…the most public of sanctions, but also the most peripheral’.87 
Similarly, Hulme argued that ‘of a politically peripheral nature and capable of being utilised 
with little risk, international sport appeared as an ideal tool of national policy’.88 However, he 
also stated that, ‘the failure of Western Europe, with the exception of West Germany, to join the 
US boycott presented Washington with a serious threat to its already shaky self-confidence and 
to its world image.’89 This followed Allan Guttmann’s conclusion that it was a,  
‘…half-empty American bandwagon, it was clear that Carter’s power of persuasion was 
ineffective except where the government was militarily or economically dependent upon 
the United States, or where indigenous factors predisposed the regime to express 
solidarity with the Afghans.’90  
Sarantakes goes even further in his criticism of the boycott campaign. Firstly, he labelled the 
boycott ‘…an attempt to destroy the Olympic movement’, and, secondly, damningly, he 
claimed ‘it was the Olympic boycott, an American action, rather than the invasion of 
Afghanistan that killed détente…’.91 This is an interesting deviation from more typical claims, 
which are exemplified by historians such as Odd Arne Westad who argued that ‘by sending its 
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troops into Afghanistan the Soviet Union had pulled the plug on what remained of the detente 
process...’.92  
The suggestion that the Olympic Games had an effect on the international political situation has 
its roots in the burgeoning field studying the relationship between sport and politics. Whilst the 
Olympic Games’ held in Berlin, Munich and Moscow are perhaps the epitome of the collision 
between the sporting and political realms, there is a wide field of research that incorporates 
many other national and international events.
93
 There are two works within this field related 
closely to this thesis, by Schillinger & Jenswold and Garland & Rowe.
94
 Each analysed media 
reporting of major sporting events, with Garland & Rowe discussing the anti-foreigner approach 
of some British newspapers during football’s Euro ’96, and Schillinger & Jenswold comparing 
how The Washington Post and Pravda reported the 1976, 1980, and 1984 Olympic Games.
95
 
The approach of the latter is interesting as it compares the reporting of the same event to two 
separate audiences, so despite having a more quantitative method than this study, it has some 
relevance to the overall approach. 
Schillinger & Jenswold’s work is interesting as it cites a statement by a US International 
Olympic Committee member in 1976, who said, ‘what happens on our stage attracts more 
attention than what happens in the United Nations.’96 This idea is one that was also used against 
the 1936 Berlin Olympics – according to David Large a boycott would have been ‘a valuable 
opportunity to undermine the regime’s stature not only in the eyes of the world, but also – and 
ultimately more importantly – in the eyes of the Germans themselves’.97 Certainly, media 
attention was likely a key reason for the terrorist acts at Munich in 1972, the banning of 
apartheid South Africa from the Olympic movement from 1968 (and also in many other sports), 
and the boycott campaign of 1980. Indeed, in February 1980 the United States had the 
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opportunity to prevent Soviet athletes attending the Lake Placid Olympics, yet chose not to. 
According to the IOC, forty countries broadcast the 1980 Winter Olympics, dwarfed in 
comparison to the one hundred and eleven who broadcast the 1980 Summer Olympics (a 
number presumably reduced because of the boycott as it was less than the 124 who broadcast 
the 1976 Montreal Games and substantially less than the 156 who broadcast the 1984 Los 
Angeles Games).
98
 This was not the reason given by the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, for 
the peculiarity of allowing the Soviets to visit the US whilst trying to stop US athletes visiting 
Moscow though - 
‘This is not a question of whether a national team should be barred from competing on 
political grounds… It is whether the Games should be held in a country which is itself 
committing a serious breach of international peace.’99  
Contrarily, South African sportsmen were banned from the Olympics on the political grounds of 
the apartheid policy. The summer Olympic Games was a world stage with huge international 
audiences, and if the United States wanted to use a sporting event to make a political point, it 
cannot be faulted for trying to use the Moscow Games – in spite of criticism for the attempt. 
Rather than adding to the voices of criticism over the boycott campaign, this thesis instead 
examines the multitude of arguments Radio Moscow used to criticise the attempt, and what lay 
behind them. 
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 CHAPTER 3  
METHODS AND CONCEPTS 
That the Soviet media presented only one side of the story, effectively telling the 
audience what to think, is an argument that many Western broadcasters used to justify their own 
broadcasting into the USSR.
100
 Conversely, this is also what Soviet radio argued Western media 
did – Radio Moscow informed its North American audience that, using the example of 
Afghanistan,  
‘Any reasonable person must realise there are two sides, two views, concerning the 
Afghan situation. To what extent has the US media given the American public at large the 
chance to acquaint itself with the other side’s views. You have been given one view, it has 
been thrust upon you with all the Madison Avenue technique that so efficiently market a 
product… I don’t want to go into any details concerning the fact that people here are 
getting the US view, are being informed of who said what, in short they know what the 
other said even though we too are selective.’101 
Stations either side of the Iron Curtain claimed the other distorted facts and twisted the news to 
suit their own purposes – perhaps Eisenhower’s conclusion that Soviet radio ‘was weaving a 
fantastic pattern of lies and twisted facts’ was more widely applicable.102 To twist facts and to 
weave a fantastic pattern, whether of truth or lies, requires a report to be framed, that is to focus 
on certain sections of an event above others as a means to promote a particular argument.  
This chapter will discuss the methods, concepts and sources used for this research. The first 
section provides information on the main source of material for this research – the BBC 
Monitoring Service archive and its place within the output process of the Monitoring Service. It 
also highlights some issues that can arise when using this material. Following this, the chapter 
moves on to explain the key conceptual approach used in this study, frame analysis, how it can 
be used to analyse the broadcasting of the Moscow boycott campaign, and what it can tell us 
about the wider world in and around 1980. The third part of the chapter explains how frame 
analysis will be used with the BBC Monitoring material and any issues that need to be 
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considered when doing so. The final sections of this chapter will discuss the additional research 
material used and the structure of the case studies.  
3.1 THE BBC MONITORING SERVICE ARCHIVE 
The BBC Monitoring Service was set up in 1939 with the intention of listening to and recording 
foreign radio broadcasts for the purpose of government intelligence.
103
 Alongside this it was 
also a useful tool for the BBC World Service, created in 1932, as the Monitors could find out 
what foreign states were broadcasting to audiences the World Service targeted.
104
 By 1980 there 
were an estimated 1.3 billion wireless radios in existence – slightly less than one wireless radio 
for every three people on earth at the time.
105
 This figure does not account for all radios, as it 
does not count wired receivers that were used in some areas, such as on rural collective farms in 
the Soviet Union.
106
 However, shortwave broadcasting allowed access to potentially huge 
audiences worldwide, and knowledge of what these potential audiences heard from foreign, 
possibly enemy, states was considered vital.  
The BBC Monitoring Service exists to this day and the emphasis has not changed – ‘to gather 
news and information, assess forms of propaganda, and report the use of radio as a diplomatic 
tool.’107 It is not alone in this, with other states also using monitoring services to listen to the 
words floating about in the ether. One example is the US FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service), which works with the BBC Monitoring Service sharing information for better 
efficiency. The Soviet Union also had a monitoring service, set up in 1964, not only listening to 
foreign radio stations and producing a Bulletin of Foreign Broadcasting, but also trying to 
compile a ‘folder of lies’ that appeared in those broadcasts.108 
As British foreign policy changed so did the focus of the BBC Monitoring Service. The primary 
nature of the work was to listen to the broadcasts of both ‘enemy’ and friendly states, so in the 
late 1930s and during the Second World War the focus was on Germany and Italy, whilst during 
the Cold War the focus was, naturally, on Soviet broadcasting, and to a lesser extent, China. 
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More recently, a statement in the British Parliament in 2004 claimed that the Monitoring 
Service covered,  
‘…150 countries and 100 languages, it tracks more than 3,000 sources in the 
international media. Selecting and translating material, the unit publishes an average of 
1,000 reports daily, giving a comprehensive and well-judged portrayal of events 
worldwide.’109 
Foreign radio broadcasts to audiences worldwide were listened to, translated (if necessary) and 
transcribed, and then an editorial team would extract the key points for customer access through 
The Daily Digest and The Summary of World Broadcasts. The material accessed for this study, 
archived at Imperial War Museums Duxford, is the transcribed and, if necessary, translated 
material used to produce The Summary of World Broadcasts. It is the closest that can be got to 
the original broadcasting without having access to original scripts or recordings. A previous 
study using this collection, Laura Johnson’s PhD thesis, titled Establishing Broadcast 
Monitoring as Open Source Intelligence: The BBC Monitoring Service during the Second World 
War, examined the earliest material in the Duxford collection.
110
 This thesis concentrates on the 
last months of the material held in the archive, and examines the transcripts of material 
broadcast by the Soviet international radio broadcaster, Radio Moscow. 
The list of languages the Soviet station broadcast in was exhaustive (around 70), and the total 
output was vast (up to, if not over 1900 hours per week), but they did not broadcast 24 hours a 
day to all regions (that would require 168 hours per week per language, which with 70 
languages totals a potential 11,760 hours).
111
 The outputs per language in 1979/1980 are not 
known – although Vladimir Pozner, a commentator on the North American service, wrote in his 
memoirs that ‘the shortwave broadcast to America began at 2am Moscow time and ended at 
7am’ – which suggests a nightly five hour broadcast between 6pm-11pm Washington local time 
(Eastern Time Zone).
112
   
In 1980 the Monitoring Service listened to, recorded and transcribed Radio Moscow 
broadcasting to the following locations –  
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Language Group Target Audience 
English North America, Great Britain & Ireland, World Service, 
Africa, South East Asia. 
Russian  Soviet Home Service. 
French  Europe, Africa, Algeria. 
Western European  Spain, Italy, Portugal. 
Eastern European  Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Croatia. 
Other (including Arabic) Persia, Afghanistan, Africa, Turkey. 
This was by no means the complete output of Radio Moscow – it lacks any broadcasts FBIS 
recorded – but the list does showcase the breadth of coverage by the BBC Monitoring Service. 
The list also shows the focus of BBC Monitoring at the time – Europe, Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East. Interestingly, these sections also correlate with Paulu’s subdivisions.113 
From the quantity of material available, it would appear that the BBC Monitoring Service 
devoted significantly more resources to the English language North America and Britain & 
Ireland services, the English language World Service, the Soviet Home service, and the Arabic 
language service. Transcripts of these broadcasts make up the bulk of the archive material, and 
each has several news bulletins and various other features recorded daily. The quantity of 
material is lower for other languages and regions - some languages have only one recorded 
bulletin per day, others even less. This may be because Soviet radio devoted less time to these 
regions, but it can also be attributed to Radio Moscow reusing segments of its broadcasts for 
different regions – the Monitoring Service was integrated so that these were merely noted rather 
than re-transcribed, although any changes were noted. This reduced the physical space needed 
to record the information and thus can give the impression that Radio Moscow broadcasting was 
skewed towards certain regions, when in fact that was not necessarily the case.  
The sheer enormity of Soviet output required considerable devotion of time and resources if it 
was to be accurately recorded, translated and transcribed. In the BBC Monitoring Service’s ‘The 
Monitor’s Handbook’ there is a list, called ‘Mandatory Textings’, which defined what was 
deemed important and needed to be transcribed verbatim. Apart from this, what to transcribe 
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and how to transcribe became the consideration of the monitors and editors, the major 
consideration being the requirements of key consumers.
114
 The Editor’s Handbook records these 
consisted of BBC services, especially the external services (such as the World Service), 
government departments at home and abroad, the daily and periodical press, foreign embassies, 
research workers, the UN, copyright libraries, and the Houses of Commons and Lords.
115
 As 
regards notation practice for transcriptions, The Monitor’s Handbook stated,  
‘Monitors must be able, if necessary, to produce a clear and accurate picture of the 
contents of bulletins without recourse to recordings. The recorder must be regarded only 
as an aid to and not a substitute for listening. Bulletins must always be taken “live”, and 
only for good operational reasons are monitors permitted to have recordings made for 
them.’116 
How to record was also noted in The Monitor’s Handbook, and there were several formats used 
to record radio broadcasts - ‘text’, ‘text excerpt’, ‘summary’ and ‘slug’.117 These formats were 
on a sliding scale from full transcription – ‘text’ – through to just acknowledgement that there 
was a report on a topic – a ‘slug’. ‘Text excerpt’, as would be expected, describes an excerpt 
from the broadcast, a key passage worthy of note and considered necessary for others to see. A 
‘summary’ was a simple summing up, in the monitor’s words, of what the broadcast said.  
There was a fifth notation format, the ‘monitor’s report’. This was slightly separate, in that it 
differed from these by virtue of being a descriptive account of a broadcast, not what was said (as 
in a summary) but how it was said, or where it was said. Another part of the Monitor’s 
Handbook states the ‘Monitor’s Note’ ‘…must always be based on fact and not on personal 
opinion or unsupported impressions’.118 Three points were made clear about using these notes, 
they should;  
a. ‘provide background information on passages in the transmission’,  
b. ‘provide information on the delivery of the transmission as a whole or a particular 
passage… or in the case of an Outside Broadcast, report applause, booing, whistling, 
hecklers’ voices etc.’ 
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c. ‘provide information on technical aspects such as audibility, presentation’, or ‘deviation 
from the normal pattern’.119 
 
It was made clear to a monitor that ‘(i) users of their transcripts will not have heard the 
broadcast… and (ii) that they [the monitor] probably know more about the background of the 
material than most consumers…’.120 Therefore a ‘Monitor’s Report’ or ‘Monitor’s Note’ could 
be very useful in setting the context for other, less informed, users.  
With the exception of ‘Mandatory textings’, monitors had the difficult job of having to judge 
the importance of a piece of reporting and also having to judge the necessity of providing 
background information, information that it was vital to provide in a way that did not alter how 
a transcript may have been interpreted. The Monitor’s Handbook provided detail on what was 
necessary to transcribe and how to transcribe it in the most effective manner – it also made clear 
how to note down repetition and cross-referencing, to help avoid supplying editors with many 
repeats of the same report.
121
 This is an important point with regard to the make-up of the 
Duxford BBC Monitoring collection; because of monitors noting repetition, the quantity of 
material available for some broadcasts can be misleading, and at first glance can lead to a 
skewed opinion of how much material was actually transcribed in each language broadcast.  
From the material accessed it can be seen that BBC Monitoring noted reporting primarily from 
Radio Moscow’s Home and World Services, as these were the two services most regularly 
referenced in other broadcasts (and also make up the largest volume of language transcripts in 
the collection). Material from the Home service was most often noted as repeated on the 
airwaves to areas such as Eastern Europe and Asia. The English language World Service seems 
to have been the primary source for material in other English language and Western European 
broadcasts. However, there was also repetition between other Radio Moscow services – this can 
give the impression that Radio Moscow concentrated its broadcasting on the Home and World 
Services to the detriment of others, but is not necessarily the case.
122
   
Additionally, the Monitoring Service also recorded English and Russian language material from 
the Soviet wire service, TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union). TASS, under the old 
name of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, had become a part of the Soviet system within weeks 
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of the Bolshevik revolution.
123
 Renamed TASS in 1925, it had the ‘exclusive right to gather and 
distribute information outside the Soviet Union, as well as the right to distribute foreign and 
domestic information within the Soviet Union, and manage the news agencies of the Soviet 
republics’.124 TASS output, like that of Reuters or the Press Association, could be picked up and 
used by other media companies, so whilst the general audience did not read TASS, they could 
read a newspaper that reported TASS releases. TASS concerns this thesis because Radio Moscow 
regularly quoted it as a source of a story, even reading out statements from it verbatim when 
necessary – however as this thesis demonstrates, it was just one of the sources Radio Moscow 
used to justify reporting about the invasion of Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott campaign. 
3.2  FRAME ANALYSIS 
The Oxford English Dictionary supplies numerous definitions of the word ‘framing’. Most 
pertinent to this thesis is the definition, ‘the action, method, or process of constructing, making 
or fashioning something (material or immaterial)’.125 This definition will be expanded upon 
here, incorporating the understanding of previous scholars of frame analysis to build a 
description that can be applied to radio analysis and used to examine the broadcasting of the 
Soviet Union’s premier international broadcaster.  
There have been numerous studies of framing, both as a concept and in practice, the seminal 
work in the field being Goffman’s 1974 book Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of 
Experience.
126
 Frame analysis is often approached by focusing upon either the frame producer 
or the frame receiver, with few analyses seemingly combining the two.
127
 This study approaches 
frame analysis with the focus upon the frame producer, Radio Moscow. In addition, this study 
analyses framing through the medium of international shortwave radio broadcasting – very few 
studies have used international radio as the medium through which to look at framing either 
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from the producer or audience perspective.
128
 Frame analysis requires detailed evaluation of 
specific statements, without access to a source such as the Duxford BBC Monitoring archive 
this would previously have been very difficult for radio broadcasting.    
This section will begin by explaining why frame analysis has been chosen for this research. 
Following this, it outlines the idea of framing from the broadcaster’s perspective and then 
considers important aspects that affect the effectiveness of a frame upon the receiver. The media 
concepts of priming and agenda setting are both relevant and are also briefly discussed here. 
Finally, the definition of framing to be used for analysing the radio transcripts is suggested. 
3.2.1 Why Frame Analysis? 
This thesis has chosen to use frame analysis to explore the Soviet broadcasting as it has several 
advantages over other analytical processes. It explores how Soviet broadcasting reacted to the 
developing situation surrounding Afghanistan and the Olympic Games, and explores the 
differences in broadcasting to different audiences worldwide. Alternatively, this thesis could 
have explored the Soviet broadcasting by examining the ‘strategic narratives’. However, whilst 
this is achievable and would lead to similar conclusions, it is not designed to produce the same 
type of results. This thesis concentrates on exploring the differences in the broadcasts and why 
those differences existed, thus helping to examine the Soviet perspective on the world in 1980. 
It does not set out to explore how the Soviet hierarchy, using radio as one of many media tools, 
attempted to build a narrative to further the ambitions or control of the Kremlin. These 
differences no doubt make up a larger strategic narrative on the part of the Soviet broadcasting 
controllers, but for a true understanding of their approach, editorial and management records 
would need to be analysed to see what the narrative was meant to be. For a strategic narrative 
approach to the Soviet war in Afghanistan using government documents, albeit primarily 
focused on withdrawal, see Laura Roselle’s book ‘Media and the Politics of Failure’.129 As this 
thesis is exploring the output, and not the input, of radio broadcasting, it would not be right to 
make presumptions on what the Soviet strategic narrative was meant to be – however, by using 
frame analysis this thesis can explore what the Soviet broadcaster focused on in different areas 
of the world.    
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3.2.2 Theories of Framing – the Broadcaster Perspective 
As a starting point in an analysis of the theory of framing, we can take the following 
explanation by Druckman – 
‘…a framing effect is said to occur when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a 
speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals 
to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.’130 
The framing of the Olympic boycott, and Afghanistan intervention, is not merely an analysis of 
the boycott or invasion, but rather an analysis of the means by which these events were 
presented to the listener by the Soviet broadcaster. The key point Druckman makes is his 
emphasis on a ‘subset of potentially relevant considerations’.131 What this subset was, and how 
it differed from region to region, is a key part of understanding the different ways the Soviet 
Union framed the invasion of Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott campaign.  
Implicit within Druckman’s statement is the idea that a framed argument pushes the audience 
toward one way of thinking, that it is actually not a straight statement of fact but a biased 
interpretation of select elements that make up the overall issue. A further development of the 
concept of framing by Berinsky & Kinder states that ‘…frames are never neutral. By defining 
what the essential issue is and suggesting how to think about it, frames imply what, if anything, 
should be done.’132 Whilst partly agreeing with Druckman, this statement goes further than his 
idea that a framed argument is designed to help the audience consider, instead suggesting that 
frames define an issue in such a way that the audience do not have to consider – a framed 
argument suggests what to think. Research by Valkenburg et al highlighted four frames in 
which news tends to be placed – the conflict frame, the human-interest frame, the responsibility 
frame, and the economic consequences frame.
133
 The frame in which a news item was placed 
affected not only what the audience thought about an issue, but also how they thought about it, 
thus supporting the idea that frames are able to influence thought more than just by helping with 
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the construction of opinion.
134
 
Berinsky & Kinder present a critical view of framing, one that is not far off appearing as 
indoctrination. It is the approach that both sides of the Iron Curtain would have accused the 
other of, all the while claiming their own broadcasts were more in keeping with the Druckman 
frame – helping consider rather than forcibly telling. There is certainly justification in 
suggesting international radio broadcasting was by no means neutral. In 1953 the British 
Government commissioned a report that stated this fact rather bluntly: ‘Wireless has given to 
Government for the first time direct means of access to audiences overseas, which enables them 
to influence foreign Governments by and through direct contact with the masses.’135 One thing 
is for certain, ‘frames are never neutral’ – even the BBC, with its constant claim of impartial 
reporting, can never be neutral.
136
 Even-handedness itself can create a favourable impression of 
the BBC, and by implication Britain, even when the reporting appears critical of British actions 
(e.g. British actions in the Suez Crisis).
137
 Thus, a neutral approach can also be useful in 
creating a positive image of a broadcaster and broadcasting state in the minds of listeners. This 
is an essential part of framing, to get audiences to believe a report, they first need to believe in, 
and trust, the reporters. This in essence was, and remains, the ultimate purpose of international 
radio broadcasting.  
As an analysis of Soviet radio broadcasting, this study focuses on producer framing rather than 
how the audience interprets the frames. Berinsky & Kinder, Entman, Fortner, Huang and 
Ruigrok & Atteveldt, have all produced case studies focusing upon the frame producer.
138
 Only 
Fortner has investigated framing on the radio, but whilst the mediums of the other studies may 
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differ, the research methods and ideas remain broadly similar.
139
 Of particular note is Entman’s 
conclusion that ‘news frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, 
concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasised in a news narrative.’140 As this study is one of 
radio broadcasting, it is the keywords, metaphors and concepts used by the Soviets that will be 
important in analysing the frames used to attack the Moscow Olympic boycott campaign, and to 
defend the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Entman’s ideas will be further discussed below 
regarding the BBC Monitoring Service transcripts. 
Frames may be designed to make the audience think in a certain way, or consider some aspects 
above others, but whether they are effective or not is a different matter. How frames have been 
received has been analysed in works by Smith, Huang, Entman and Druckman – Smith’s work 
on how people considered Radio Moscow broadcasts in the USA being most pertinent to this 
study.
141
 However, as he concentrated on the ideological strength of the broadcasts to North 
America, not the frames used, even his work is of limited relevance.  
3.2.3 Theories of Framing – the Receiver Perspective 
Entman has argued that the ‘…frames that guide the receiver’s thinking and conclusion may or 
may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator.’142 As 
important as it may have been for Soviet radio broadcasting to highlight above others certain 
aspects of the boycott or invasion, to be truly influential they would have had to consider the 
audience. For example, it would have been no good telling an American, or broadly 
Westernised, audience about how the boycott campaign was part of an evil American imperialist 
plan, but this line of argument may have had more success in countries less aligned with 
American ideals. When framing an argument, the background of the target audience is perhaps 
the most important part of the overall process. Without consideration of the education, religion, 
upbringing, wealth or political ideology of the target audience, a framed argument may struggle 
to succeed. A successful frame needs to strike a chord with the target audience; it needs to be 
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grounded in their perception of the world, be rational and, ultimately, be believable. To have the 
utmost chance of success in their defence of the invasion of Afghanistan, and to encourage a 
disparaging view of the US-led boycott campaign, the Soviet Union broadcasters needed to 
recognise this and tailor their arguments appropriately.  
Goffman has argued ‘it seems that we can hardly glance at anything without applying a primary 
framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what occurred before and expectations of what is 
likely to happen now.’143 This further supports the idea that successful frames need to build on 
the background of the audience, their previous understanding and experience, but it also opens 
up the discussion to another related concept, the concept of priming. Priming refers ‘to the 
effect of some preceding stimulus or event on how we react, broadly defined, to some 
subsequent stimulus,’ and is an important part of considering the framing effects applied by the 
Soviet radio media to their broadcasts about the invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow 
Olympic boycott.
 144
 Putting forward an issue in such a way as to create a certain way of 
thinking is likely to be more successfully taken up by the target audience if they are already 
primed with some related knowledge or previous opinion. 
3.2.4 Priming and Agenda Setting 
The Cold War itself was both a frame and a priming tool. It was, and still is, a relatively simple 
and all-encompassing way of placing into a context any political, economic or social action 
between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most 
international actions between 1945 and 1991 can be placed within this rather broad context, 
which afterwards, in what effectively became a self-perpetuating cycle, became the priming 
agent for the next framed event. Norris et al argue that frames ‘provide contextual cues, giving 
meaning and order to complex problems, actions and events…slotting the new into familiar 
categories or storyline “pegs.’145 These familiar categories are a build-up of previous 
knowledge, so people are primed to accept what subsequently appears. Thus, the Soviet Union, 
when discussing the Olympic boycott (or the Western world in general), could link their 
criticism to audiences’ previous knowledge and understanding of such events as Vietnam, 
Watergate, Korea, or any of the supposed 215 times, according to Radio Moscow, that the USA 
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had threatened military action before 1980.
146
 The Western world could do the same when 
discussing the Soviet Union, and indeed did, with US President Carter relating the invasion of 
Afghanistan to the Second World War.
147
 The audience already had knowledge and opinions of 
these events, so linking back to old actions provided a pre-conceived platform of opinion on 
which to interpret new events.  
Linked to both the strength of frames and primes is the idea of agenda setting. As a concept 
agenda setting refers to the way the mass audience tends to judge the importance of an issue by 
the volume of media coverage, thus the more media coverage an issue gets the more the mass 
audience seems to deem it important.
148
 However, this can also distort news importance – the 
invasion of Afghanistan was a major event during the Cold War, yet rightly or wrongly it was 
swiftly eclipsed at the time by the US-led Olympic boycott campaign, so in this case it would 
seem the major issue was buried beneath an avalanche of sporting concern. Agenda setting can 
also be exploited by those wishing to distract attention, to ‘bury bad news’ when something else 
dominates the news.
149
 Cohen has argued that the agenda is arguably set by the media 
themselves, quoting Rosten’s claim that ‘the argument that giving the public what it wants is 
another way of saying what we [i.e. the editors] say the public wants.’150 Furthermore, and 
perhaps an explanation for the focus on the boycott campaign rather than Afghanistan, he 
provides some compelling evidence about foreign affairs coverage in the US domestic press – 
the basic premise being that people are not interested, editors perceive that people are not 
interested, and therefore concentrate coverage on domestic issues instead.
151
  
One reason Cohen gives for coverage of foreign news in the domestic US press was to give a 
superficial impression that the government was active on the international stage.
152
  Certainly, 
this was encouraged by the US government in early 1980, when the US administration tried to 
set the agenda so that it focused on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – perhaps trying to make 
the US reaction to it distract attention in an election year from the struggling campaign to 
resolve the on-going Iranian hostage crisis. Numerous pronouncements by Jimmy Carter, a 
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United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the invasion and the initial rumblings that led to 
the boycott campaign all gained media prominence and made the issues (whether Afghanistan 
or Olympic) seem important. This illustrates the importance of agenda setting to the reporting of 
an event or issue, however, because of limitations to the data set used, this study primarily 
focuses upon the frames used and not the frequency of the reporting.
153
 
3.2.5 Frame Analysis – Definition 
Framing is therefore about more than just presenting the facts of an issue or event in a certain 
way. As already stated, effective framing requires an understanding of how the target audience 
might perceive an event, which in turn requires an understanding of their background, ideology, 
political leanings and so forth. Analysis of how the Soviet Union framed reporting of the 
boycott campaign to different regions of the world, to different countries and in different 
languages provides an opportunity to investigate the Soviet perception of these different groups. 
How accurately the frames fit each audience will be judged through how the Soviet broadcasters 
communicated events – such communications can inform on regional aspects such as press 
freedom, Soviet influence, or foreign radio competition. In the case of the latter, one of the aims 
of the Western broadcasters was to tell a different version of events, ‘the truth’, to that the 
Soviets broadcasters were putting forth.
154
 The implication being that ‘friendly’ competition 
over the airwaves would reduce the supposed excesses and exaggerations of the Soviet frames, 
as people could go elsewhere (whether legally allowed to or not) to corroborate what they were 
hearing.  
This study will therefore look at the Soviet reporting on Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott 
from the perspective of studying the frame producer, not the frame receiver, using as a basis the 
definitions of framing supplied by Druckman and Berinsky & Kinder quoted above. However, 
in considering the concept of framing, this study will push these further, and incorporate the 
ideas of both Entman and Goffman in a broader definition. The frames used by the Soviet Union 
in broadcasting their messages around the world will be considered not just through the 
Druckman emphasis on a ‘subset of potentially relevant considerations’, but also through how 
this subset is portrayed to the listener – incorporating Entman’s ideas about keywords, 
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metaphors and concepts and the way in which each is used in an attempt to ‘sell’ the frame.155 In 
addition, the consideration taken of the knowledge and experience of the target audience will 
add to this definition of framing, as it brings in the very important consideration of why a frame 
exists.
156
 Through considering the frames used by the Soviet broadcasters in this manner, with 
regard to their content, language, and audience context, the discussion of framing becomes more 
than just an analysis of how the Soviet Union represented the intervention in Afghanistan and 
the Olympic boycott campaign, and instead becomes a prism through which to view and 
consider the world in 1980 as a whole. 
3.3 FRAME ANALYSIS AND THE BBC MONITORING SERVICE 
To use the BBC Monitoring material to investigate how Radio Moscow framed the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott campaign, this study will employ a qualitative approach, 
examining what was said about the events, how it was said (phrasing, keywords etc.), and then 
whether it was part of an individual event frame or a wider Cold War frame.
157
 By focusing on 
set periods and examining the material in this way, the study will compare and contrast the 
framing of the same event in broadcasts to different regions, to understand what listeners could 
be hearing. This is preferred to a quantitative approach which, whilst it would allow for analysis 
of how often mention of Afghanistan, the Olympic boycott, or other key words and themes were 
made, and would be valuable for a study of agenda setting, requires a blow-by-blow account of 
everything said over the radio, from Afghanistan to domestic farming.  As the BBC Monitoring 
Service transcripts of Radio Moscow are not always complete transcripts, it would be difficult 
to place the quantity of broadcasts about the invasion or the boycott in the necessary wider 
context. However, the incomplete nature of the record does not affect the ability to examine the 
frames used through a qualitative approach that examines the available broadcasts. 
Within the Monitoring Service material, this study will primarily focus on comparing the 
broadcasts of Radio Moscow to North America, Great Britain and Ireland, the Soviet Union, 
and the Arabic service to Persia. Additionally, the English language World Service is also 
analysed in depth for what it can tell us about the more general Soviet message – one that did 
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not target a specific regional audience. There is a practical reason for this, in that these are the 
broadcasts with the most depth in the collection, and can therefore give a more insightful 
analysis. Each region also had a distinctly different approach to the boycott campaign, and a 
preliminary analysis of the source material also suggested that broadcasts to these states were 
very distinct, and that they will be a good showcase of the dichotomy of frames used by the 
Soviet Union.  
When dealing with the transcript material, three issues arise that need examining before trying 
to interpret the frames Radio Moscow used: translation; the potential exclusion of material; and 
the abbreviation of material. The following paragraphs will outline each of these and discuss the 
effects they may have on the results. 
When commenting on how the Soviet Union framed the boycott to different audiences, 
consideration must be made of the fact that parts of the material under investigation have been 
translated by the Monitoring Service. The difficulties of translation are well known, what works 
in one language may not work in another, meanings may change, whole phrases may become 
lost in translation – no two languages are close enough in structure or vocabulary to switch 
seamlessly.
158
 One line of argument is that the translator often needs to translate what does not 
appear, the implicit and assumed cultural context and meaning that may be unknown to the 
eavesdropper – issues that would not appear in a straight verbatim translation.159  However, 
whilst frame analysis does involve the study of emotive words, key phrases and rhetorical 
hooks, each of which can disappear in a translated document (translated in terms of both 
language and medium), the overall frame will not so easily disappear. For example, the over-
arching frame that appears throughout Soviet broadcasting is the idea that America was in the 
wrong and the Soviet Union was in the right – the United States was aggressive and militaristic, 
the Soviet Union was peaceful and friendly. This very basic but easily understandable ‘Cold 
War frame’ is one in which the audience can easily place any piece of information they hear, 
read or see. The framing for this is not lost in translation; it is too broad a frame.  
Furthermore, the key aspect of this study is to investigate how the Soviet Union shifted the 
emphasis within these frames to fit the localised conditions of the audience – this does not 
always require access to the exact wording. Entman’s conclusion that ‘news frames are 
constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual 
images emphasised in a news narrative’ is particularly relevant with regard to this, as there is 
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more to a frame than just what exactly was said, it is the perspective it presents.
160
 Unlike the 
study by Entman, the material here does not all appear in its original language, therefore some 
of the keywords and metaphors may have unfortunately been lost in translation. However, 
whilst the individual nuances that Entman investigated in his study may be difficult to pick up 
here (although where a word has a dual meaning the monitor notes this), overall frames used in 
different regions should be broad enough to be noticeable whether or not the material is 
translated.  
This may be something to consider when analysing material broadcast to non-English language 
regions of the world, but the material broadcast to the United States, to Great Britain, and the 
World Service broadcasts are English language broadcasts – the only translation required was 
presumably by Radio Moscow translating from Russian to English. The Radio Moscow North 
American commentator, Vladimir Pozner, noted that in the North American service office, 
understanding of English ranged from extremely good to very poor, and very few ever wrote 
copy in English – a translation department took the Russian copy after it had been signed off by 
the editors and translated it into English.
161
 Thus it is unlikely to contain rhetorical flourishes a 
native speaker may insert.  
The other factor to consider is that there will always be some aspect of the broadcasts lost in 
transcription. The way statements are said can considerably change the meaning of a sentence – 
the blandest statements can fire the imagination when spoken in the right manner. The transcript 
materials under analysis here very rarely have Monitor Notes commenting on the way it was 
spoken, so it has to be taken at face value. However, this is not a major concern as the frames 
can still be gained from analysis of the material overall – the occasional sentence may have a 
different meaning when spoken over the radio, but transcription of a whole report, commentary 
or roundtable debate is unlikely to be affected by this. 
That the archive is not a complete verbatim copy of Radio Moscow broadcasting during this 
time could influence the analysis of the material, as briefly mentioned earlier. However, this 
does not necessarily mean analysis of the data will be inaccurate. One reason was that the 
invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow boycott campaign were important events, and 
information on both was important to record and pass on. Soviet radio may not have wanted to 
discuss the boycott campaign or the invasion, but because of the proliferation of media access in 
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areas they broadcast into, and indeed even subversive broadcasting into the USSR itself, they 
were forced to address the issue. Frame analysis surrounding specific events does not require 
access to every broadcast for an accurate conclusion to be made, and the vast amount of 
material available for the period between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the opening 
ceremony of the Moscow Olympic Games within the archive makes this a minor issue. 
3.4 OTHER SOURCES 
As this project is based in the UK, the majority of supplementary material used will be focused 
on the British reaction to the boycott campaign and other English language sources. This 
includes material from the US media, such as The Washington Post and the New York Times, 
and the former Soviet Union, with reports from Pravda and Izvestiya available via the Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press. The purpose of examining such material is that Radio Moscow was 
often prepared to quote from it – providing it supported the Soviet point of view. How 
accurately Radio Moscow quoted or cited foreign media sources needs to be investigated 
because often these quotes underlined a technique the broadcaster used when framing reports – 
using The Washington Post to suggest that President Carter was alone in his boycott quest is all 
very well, but does this represent the newspaper editorial line or is a comment taken out of 
context? It is not a surprise that Radio Moscow followed the same lines as the Soviet domestic 
press, especially Pravda, particularly as both ultimately reported to the Politburo. How they 
integrated foreign sources into their arguments leads to the question how far would they go in 
this? Would they distort or misrepresent the opinions of others to better present their own 
viewpoint? Using this source material helps with the aim of investigating Soviet methods of 
framing set out in the previous chapter. 
Due to the lack of referencing over the airwaves, exact quotations from such media may be 
difficult to pinpoint. These quotes may also have been translated by both the BBC Monitoring 
Service listening to Radio Moscow, and Radio Moscow when preparing broadcasts, potentially 
altering the original meaning. However, as this thesis focuses on key international events, in 
most cases the date range that a quote may have come from can be narrowed down to within a 
few days – even if an exact quotation is not found, how that news media framed the boycott 
campaign and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can still be discerned, and therefore the 
accuracy of Radio Moscow comments can still be considered. Whilst there may indeed be a 
sentence or column scorning the boycott or seemingly in praise of the occupation of 
Afghanistan, it may not reflect the overall message.  However, as Hazan has written – 
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‘It was not difficult for Moscow to present a case of worldwide support. In every country, 
without exception, there were athletes and officials who thought the games should go 
ahead in Moscow, even when their governments and Olympic committees held a different 
view.’162 
The journalist Christopher Booker backs up this viewpoint with a first-hand report of the 
conflict within the Daily Mail newsroom at the time – 
‘[T]here was a heated argument raging over the Olympics… On one side were the 
paper’s political writers, headed by editor David English, who were worked up over 
Afghanistan and strongly in favour of the boycott, on the other was the sports department, 
including the well-known columnist Ian Wooldridge, who took the view that sport and 
politics should be kept as far apart as possible, and were passionately opposed to the 
boycott.’163  
So even within a newspaper that may have been vehemently against the Soviet actions, there 
was potential to find a voice that may have appeared supportive when taken out of the wider 
context.  
The level of foreign press quotations broadcast over the radio is testament to the research 
undertaken to produce Soviet news stories, even if the quotes do not fully represent the opinion 
of the source from which they were cited. Whilst this thesis focuses its research on the radio 
transcripts produced by the BBC Monitoring Service, this additional material is necessary to 
fully appreciate how the Soviet broadcasters used the facts and other sources when framing 
arguments.    
3.5 TIME FRAMES 
Previous studies of framing have tended to focus on short periods of time, in part because the 
news cycle has been seen to be relatively short and the audience can quickly move onto 
something else.
164
 Fortner, for example, studied two-week blocks of radio broadcasting around 
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US-Soviet meetings in the late 1980s.
165
 The study of the invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Moscow Olympic boycott campaign does not fit into a small time frame – concerns were raised 
regularly over a seven-month period. Yet whilst this study researches the broadcasting from late 
December 1979 to July 1980, there is no need to analyse every single broadcast during this 
time. The campaign to boycott the 1980 Moscow Games, and the condemnation for the invasion 
of Afghanistan, ebbed and flowed over the seven months between December 1979 and July 
1980. There were not pronouncements, updates or criticisms every day from December to July. 
There were, however, times when coverage peaked, around key moments for the whole 
campaign and key moments for individual states or localised regions.  
Rather than analyse Soviet framing over the whole seven-month period, this study will instead 
analyse radio broadcasts surrounding six key moments: 
1. The invasion of Afghanistan 
2. Carter’s ‘State of the Union’ address 
3. Lake Placid and the Kabul Uprising  
4. Announcement of the American Boycott 
5. Deadline for accepting invitations 
6. The opening ceremony of the Olympic Games 
 
The reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan was led by the United States, and after following the 
typical economic and political lines it settled on a campaign to boycott the Olympics. This was 
the overarching factor when determining the six case study date ranges. The first and last are 
clear-cut – broadcasting surrounding both the invasion itself and the opening of the Olympic 
Games. The case studies in between have been selected based on the key moments of the 
Olympic boycott campaign, and relate to either American announcements and actions, or key 
moments in an Olympic year, such as the deadline for accepting an invite. With the exception of 
the broadcasts surrounding the invasion of Afghanistan and the State of the Union address, the 
dates have been picked predominantly for their significance upon the boycott campaign, as 
whilst Soviet radio could avoid discussing the Olympic boycott when focusing on Afghanistan, 
they struggled to avoid mentioning Afghanistan when having to condemn the Olympic boycott 
campaign. In the months before the Olympic Games, there was more debate over the boycott 
than over Afghanistan; world reaction to the invasion peaked around January 1980, with UN 
resolutions, the Islamic Conference condemnation, sanctions, and the initial proposal of the 
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boycott all coming within the first six weeks of the occupation. This reaction is covered within 
the first two case studies. The six chosen key moments do not cover all announcements about 
boycotts or condemnations by every state – it was a fluid campaign and therefore 
announcements and reaction times varied. However, discussion in the Soviet press, and 
announcements by states worldwide, peaked around the key dates selected, often because the 
United States had made an announcement or threat, and other states, including the Soviet Union, 
reacted accordingly.  
The important moments within each case study, and the date ranges covered, are as follows: 
23
rd
 December 1979 – 10th January 1980. The significant moment was the invasion of 
Afghanistan by Soviet troops on 26
th
 December 1979. Other important events include: The UN 
Security Council meeting over the New Year; 2
nd
January – West German ambassador to NATO 
mentions boycott possibility; 4
th
 January – President Carter address the United States people on 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
15
th – 31st January 1980. This case study is based around the 23rd January 1980 State of the 
Union address by President Carter. Other events that were significant for the Soviet radio when 
framing their arguments at this time include: 14
th
 January 1980 – United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution ES-6/2 condemns the invasion. 17
th
 January – British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher endorses moving the Olympics. 19
th
 January – President Carter announces 
possible boycott on NBC television program ‘Meet the Press’. 27th-29th January – the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers condemns the invasion.  
5
th
 – 28th February 1980. The key moments for the boycott campaign in this chapter were 





 February, including Cyrus Vance’s speech calling for a Summer Olympic 
boycott at an IOC meeting before the Winter Olympics opened.   
19
th
 March – 5th April 1980. President Carter officially announced the US Olympic team 
would not be going to Moscow in an announcement on 21
st
 March 1980. Other significant 
moments included in this case study include reaction to the British House of Commons voting 
in favour of a boycott on 18
th
 March, the British Olympic Association rejecting the boycott on 
25
th
 March and a meeting of European National Olympic Committees on 22
nd
 March.  
17
th 
May – 3rd June 1980. 24th May 1980 was the deadline for accepting invitations to the 
Olympics. In the following days it finally became clear who the boycotting states were. The 
days preceding this saw a flurry of announcements from governments and Olympic Committees 
who had waited to determine the best option for their states, for example the Irish, Greek, Italian 







 – 26th July 1980. The significant date here is 19th July 1980, the opening ceremony of the 
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XXII Olympic Games in Moscow. This case study analyses the frames used to discuss the 
Olympics in the build-up to and during the opening ceremony and initial Olympic events, and 
considers how the Soviet Union framed the non-attendance of 65 state teams, many of them 
directly because of the invasion of Afghanistan.  
By examining the broadcasting surrounding these dates, the frames used specifically to 
condemn the boycott and justify the invasion are highlighted. Furthermore, because Soviet 
media could be slow at reporting up to date news, study of Radio Moscow broadcasts will take 
place over a period of around two-weeks directly surrounding each of the six major events, to 
minimise the chances of missing any important Soviet responses.
166
 The exception to this is 
Chapter 6 which covers closer to 3-weeks. 
Due to the fragmented and drawn-out nature of the boycott campaign itself, focusing on these 
dates means potentially excluding relevant information from other times, such as when some 
states or Olympic Committees announced their boycott intentions. However, the majority of 
states and Olympic Committees announced a decision regarding boycotting, or a deferral to a 
later date, fairly quickly in response to US calls/pressure – so the issues regarding missing key 
moments in a frame are minimal. Even though the announcements and discussion of the boycott 
campaign and Afghanistan invasion were on-going throughout the time under study here, it 
remains the case that the radio broadcasting surrounding the six key dates given above will give 
the most insight into how the Soviet Union attempted to frame the Olympic boycott and the 
Afghanistan invasion. These six events were central to when the majority of reactions were 
made, and give more than enough insight into the various ways the boycott and invasion were 
framed – nothing occurring outside of the case studies is likely to add anything new.  
3.6 SUMMARY 
Through the use of frame analysis, combined with the extra source material discussed in this 
chapter, this study intends to discover the frames Radio Moscow used at a time of heightened 
international tension, thus adding to research and debate on framing, Cold War radio and Soviet 
radio broadcasting, and of the Soviet perspective on international relations in 1980. Frame 
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analysis of the broadcasts will also importantly highlight the use of different ways to portray 
two events, the invasion and the subsequent boycott. How these were discussed showed that the 
world in 1980 was far more diverse than just those who supported the USA and those who 
supported the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the methods used in this thesis will explore the 
specifics of what was said and why, giving an account not only of the broad themes but also of 
the specific sentences used in many cases, and of the different programs used by Soviet radio to 
put over their messages. By looking in detail at what was said, it shall also comment on the 
accuracy of the broadcasts, something other studies have only briefly summarised. Finally, 
focusing on six key dates will further allow this study to examine specific radio broadcasts more 
closely, rather than just being an overview of the entire seven-month period. This method of 
research will allow for detailed study of the key moments, and thus more detailed study of what 
the radio broadcasters actually broadcast.  
From the literature on framing, there are some expectations of the type of frames that might be 
expected. As mentioned in section 3.2.2, Valkenburg et al highlighted four news frames based 
around conflict, human-interest, responsibility, and economic consequences.
167
 It can be 
anticipated that the invasion of Afghanistan will be framed in a manner that could fit into the 
first three, whilst the reaction, including the boycott campaign, will likely have frames based 
around economics and human-interest. Whilst this thesis will show that the broadcasting was 
more complex than merely framing events through an east-west perspective, it is still a 
perspective that defines Radio Moscow output, and indeed wider Cold War radio broadcasting 
as a whole. Therefore it can be expected that a ‘Cold War frame’ will become apparent, one that 
clearly concerns itself with portraying the US negatively whilst promoting the Soviet Union. 
Within these wider frames it is expected there will be sub-frames linked to specific people, to 
religion, to sport, and to domestic and international politics. This is by no means an exhaustive 
list, and it is one that will be expanded upon in the case study chapters and conclusion. 
This study will also help with research and understanding of the Imperial War Museum BBC 
Monitoring Service material. Using the Soviet material surrounding the invasion and the boycott 
campaign as examples, this thesis will discuss the accuracy of material transcribed and 
translated, in both language and medium, and its usefulness in opening up other avenues for 
historical research, primarily into Soviet broadcasting during the Cold War, but as the archive 
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holds material from all over the world from 1939 onward, also research on other areas of 20
th
 
Century radio broadcasting.  
As yet, only Robert Fortner has used radio broadcasts as the primary focus of frame analysis. 
However he was involved in gathering the broadcast material initially, dictating what broadcasts 
needed recording, and this is where his work significantly differs from this study.
168
 By using 
material recorded and transcribed previously, this thesis will have to overcome any gaps that 
may have appeared between what those requesting monitored material needed, and what the 
academic researcher of the future would require. Thus this thesis not only builds on a small 
body of literature, but also has to adapt the methodology to incorporate using an archive of 
recorded, and transcribed, material. Through this, it gives a good idea of the depth of detail and 
the ease of cross-referencing with other source material that can be achieved using the BBC 
Monitoring archive at Duxford. 
Through the methodology described above, this thesis will achieve two overarching aims: 
firstly, to research how the Soviet Union framed the issues of sport, war and politics that arose 
with the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent campaign to boycott the Olympic Games; 
and secondly, to demonstrate the opportunities the BBC Monitoring Service transcripts offer as 
a primary source material for examining international radio broadcasting during the twentieth 
century. 
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 CHAPTER 4  
REPORTING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND 
EXPLAINING AWAY THE WORLD REACTION 
The world awoke on the 27
th
 December 1979 to hear news of a ‘Large Russian Force in 
Afghanistan’ – the Soviet invasion had begun.169 By the 28th, The Times was reporting that 
‘President Hafizullah Amin of Afghanistan was ousted from power and executed today [report 
written on 27
th
] in a coup strongly backed by Soviet troops in Kabul,’ and that ‘the radio 
broadcast announcing Mr Amin’s execution also said that the new administration had received a 
Soviet pledge for urgent assistance, including military aid.’170 Similarly, The Washington Post 
reported that ‘an Afghan exile leader who had been living under Soviet protection… overthrew 
the Marxist government… according to radio reports’ – this was two days after the newspaper 
had reported an increase in Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan, designed to make it a Soviet 
client state, under the headline ‘Moscow versus Islam’.171  
This chapter will examine how Radio Moscow joined this reporting rush, discussed the reasons 
behind Hafizullah Amin’s death, explained the change in Afghan government, and used 
different arguments to justify Soviet troop movements. It focuses on the broadcasts Radio 
Moscow sent around the world between the first announcement of the change of Afghan 
government, 27
th
 December 1979, and the 10
th
 January 1980, the eve of the United Nations 
General Assembly Emergency Session meeting that called for foreign troops to be removed 
from Afghanistan (discussed in Chapter 5, Boycott rumours become reality: How Soviet radio 
framed the State of the Union address).
172
 
4.1 THE INVASION AND THE RESPONSE 
International condemnation for what the Soviet Union was perceived to have done was swift. In 
addition to complaints from state leaders such as President Carter and Prime Minister Thatcher, 
the United Nations Security Council met over the New Year to discuss the invasion – although 
this can mostly be put down to a Western engineered plot designed to force the Soviet Union to 
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veto a motion put forward by members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
173
 It took a further 
meeting of the UN General Assembly to produce a resolution condemning the appearance of 
foreign troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet hierarchy may have expected this, after all there was a 
similar reaction over the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in 1968. What was different this time 
though, and led to a defensive attitude that showed itself in a number of different ways over the 
Radio Moscow network, was President Carter’s 4th January ‘Address to the Nation on 
Afghanistan’, in which he attempted to lead the world response by imposing sanctions upon the 
Soviet Union.
174
 These sanctions included restricting Soviet rights to fish in US coastal waters, 
the prevention of high technology or ‘other strategic items’ transfers to the Soviet Union, and, 
most significantly of all at this time (in terms of press coverage), a restriction on the amount of 
grain the US was willing to supply the Soviet Union –  
‘The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which 
we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human 
consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.’175 
The Presidential announcement was the first time that the invasion of Afghanistan was put 
forward officially by the US for not attending the Olympic Games -   
‘…the Soviet Union must realize that it’s continued aggressive actions will endanger both 
the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally 
wish to attend the Olympic Games.’176 
Previously, talk of a boycott had centred on the Soviet human rights record.
177
 For those 
favouring a boycott, this had achieved nothing. Whilst the global consensus was to join in 
verbal condemnation of Soviet actions, there was by no means a consensus to restrict grain or 
technology sales to the Soviet Union at this time, to the extent that the US Department of 
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Agriculture estimated the Soviet Union imported 31 million tonnes of grain from June 1979-
June 1980 – more than ever before.178  
The first part of this chapter will examine the frames used by Radio Moscow to tell the world of 
the early stages of the intervention in Afghanistan. The latter sections present an examination of 
the different frames used to report the US-led world reaction depending upon the region to 
which they were broadcasting. Thus the chapter becomes an example of how the frames used by 
Radio Moscow shifted from initially defending Soviet actions to attacking the reactions of 
foreign states.  
4.2 FRAMING THE INVASION  
4.2.1 The Death of Hafizullah Amin 
The first reports defending Soviet actions in Afghanistan were heard before the invasion had 
even taken place. Throughout the world on the 23
rd
 December 1979, Radio Moscow 
commentators were reported as quoting from a Pravda article that condemned western media 
reports of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, countering with the complaint that CIA and 





, when, alongside informing of a change of Afghan government, the announcement 
about Soviet assistance to combat insurgency was made, listeners were already primed to 
understand who the insurgents were. 
The rise of Babrak Karmal to Afghan President, and the Soviet assistance he immediately 
requested, was broadcast to the world by Radio Moscow on 27
th
 December. Initially, Radio 
Moscow reported the same message around the world. World Service listeners were informed 
Babrak Karmal was the new President, but the focus was on the previous President, Hafizullah 
Amin –  
‘…the anti-people and dictatorial regime of Hafizullah Amin has been crushed. Karmal 
has confirmed loyalty to the ideals of the 1978 April revolution and says that the state 
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will adhere to general democracy and justice, respect for national traditions and religion, 
for progress and wellbeing, for equality and fraternity, of all peoples of Afghanistan.’180 
Variations of this announcement appeared in broadcasts worldwide, although not all 
immediately.
181
 For listeners within the Soviet Union, the Radio Moscow Home service 
informed listeners about Amin’s demise on 27th December, also calling him ‘…anti-people and 
dictatorial…’, and placed emphasis on Karmal’s expressed loyalty to the April revolution, 
religion and national traditions.
182
 Rather than primarily frame the problems around the CIA, 
China, or foreign interference, Radio Moscow initially used a ‘personification’ frame – one that 
focused the causes on the actions of one man. Hafizullah Amin represented all that was wrong 
in Afghanistan, problems the Soviet backed Karmal was working to correct. 
There is a further point to highlight in this area with regard to how Amin’s demise was reported, 
one that is also an example of frame localisation. Home service listeners also heard that Babrak 
Karmal would be working for, ‘…true democratic justice… our people… will in future continue 
to favour peace and freedom, independence and democracy.’183 This differed from the version 
heard on the World Service, and significantly from the version heard on the North American 
service. The important difference was the April revolution. Very clearly emphasised on the 
Home service, North American listeners instead heard reference to ‘…the final victory of the 
revolution’, but this seemed to be an afterthought in a statement that said the regime would 
adhere to ‘…the ideals of the 1978 revolution and… the state will work for genuine democracy 
and justice…’.184 Soviet listeners heard that the regime would support true democratic justice, 
and the people would favour democracy, North American listeners heard the regime would 
work for genuine democracy – it would seem that there was more emphasis on a commitment to 
democracy in broadcasts to listeners in North America.  
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The same democratic boost also seems to have been applied to reports of the change of regime 
broadcast to listeners in Britain & Ireland. In fact, the demise of Amin was not considered 
relevant for these listeners; they were merely informed that Babrak Karmal had been,  
‘elected to top party and government posts in the republic… Kabul Radio has announced 
the formation of a new Cabinet… It has asked the Soviet Union for urgent political, 
economic and military aid and moral support.’185  
The word ‘election’ conjures up images of the democratic process in Britain – mentioning that 
the previous leader had been executed by the new regime would destroy this illusion. The 
chronology of events is also consistent – a new leader asked for Soviet assistance, not just 
military but also political and economic. However, it was clear within weeks that much of this 
statement was misleading - if Karmal was elected by anyone, it was the Politburo in Moscow, 
and Kabul radio did not broadcast any message, it was a Soviet station saturating Kabul radio 
frequencies. In addition, the ‘political, economic, military and moral support’ downplayed the 
scale of the Soviet military intervention, changing how it would be perceived. Radio Moscow 
was using an ‘assistance’ frame to get listeners to think of the Soviet intervention as more than 
just troops and tanks. 
World Service listeners were provided with more information on the 28
th
, including the 
revelation that,  
‘According to news agencies, there has been a revolutionary trial of Hafizullah Amin. 
The court found him guilty and sentenced him to death. The sentence has been carried 
out.’186  
Whereas North American and Soviet listeners heard the Amin regime had been crushed, and 
British listeners heard nothing, the World Service broadcast a lie. Amin had been murdered in a 
gun battle with Soviet commandos, and may have also been suffering the after effects of poison 
administered by Soviet assassins.
187
 There was no ‘revolutionary trial’. However, adding the 
words ‘according to news agencies’ was also an interesting way of distancing Soviet 
involvement in his demise, and if necessary a way of hiding behind the lie. This implied Radio 
Moscow was relaying the events through the reporting of foreign media, which suggests there 
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was a concern that Radio Moscow reporters would not be believed had they said the same thing. 
Equally, one of the ‘news agencies’ could have been TASS. It was also an interesting method for 
the reporting of Radio Moscow itself – it emphasised that Radio Moscow was relaying 
information, preferring to imply a use of sources from foreign media rather than the media of 
the government involved in Afghanistan and implicit in the murder of Amin and his family.  
Later that day, the World Service added the following to its reporting of Karmal’s statement – 
‘Hafizullah Amin and his supporters are described in the appeal as agents of American 
imperialism.’188 This neatly linked the two frames of personification and foreign involvement, 
supplying listeners not only with a reason for the claimed actions of Amin, US backing, but one 
that could contrast with the words of the Soviet backed Karmal. It also further emphasised US 
involvement in the region. This was not repeated to listeners of the North American or British 
services, it did however make an appearance via the airwaves of the English language South 
East Asian service, as an attempt to tap into any anti-US feelings lingering from the Korean or 
Vietnam wars, and associated incidents. This was an early example of localisation, in which 
Radio Moscow tried to frame events around an audience perception. On the other hand, listeners 
in North America or Britain & Ireland may have been disillusioned with Radio Moscow 
reporting on Afghanistan if it started to move into anti-US rhetoric too quickly, thus requiring a 
different approach in framing the previous Afghan leader.  
When broadcasting to the European mainland, either east or west, Radio Moscow stuck to the 
chronology that Amin had been removed, the Karmal government had formed, and the new 
regime had immediately asked for help from the Soviet Union.
189
 The same applied to 
broadcasts in Arabic, although these straightaway personified the situation around ‘the anti-
people Amin regime’.190 It is clear that initially Radio Moscow was broadcasting the same basic 
line, with some minor variations, all over the world. Reporting the invasion, Radio Moscow had 
managed to avoid mentioning the actions of the Soviet troops, and had instead framed the 
reporting around why the situation had occurred. Reporting foreign involvement in Afghanistan 
in the days before the Soviet invasion took place primed the audience to be ready for 
justifications that based themselves around non-Afghan subversives. Personifying Afghan 
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problems in the actions of the previous Afghan leader, one who Radio Moscow claimed was 
backed by US imperialism, supplied the station with a means to justify its actions, and built 
upon the priming that had taken place. It also juxtaposed nicely against the coverage of Babrak 
Karmal and the assistance he asked for from the Soviet Union.  
Therefore, altering the reporting of how Amin died and the ways the station shifted how 
‘democracy’ appeared in broadcasts was an excellent example of how Radio Moscow localised 
a frame depending on the audience background. Clearly, it was not acceptable to tell the world 
exactly how Amin died, but some of the reports of the change of government point more 
towards trying to relate events back to the target listeners – suggesting elections or 
revolutionary trials depending on the broadcast. This way of adjusting the frame placed events 
in a more localised context for the target audience, helping the listener interpret them in the 
manner Radio Moscow wanted.  
4.2.2 Reporting the Reaction 
Rather than focusing on what was happening on the ground, it appears the first reports of the 
invasion of Afghanistan were structured around the personification frame. The only mention of 
the invasion itself came through the citing of international law as a justification for Soviet 
involvement – again using the ‘assistance’ frame to help portray legitimacy. The World Service, 
on 28
th 
December, issued the first of a much repeated justification for the Soviet soldiers 
walking around Kabul -–  
‘…[the Afghan] government has asked the USSR for urgent political, moral, economic 
and military aid, based on the treaty of friendship signed on 5
th
 December last year. The 
Soviet government has met the request.’191  
This downplayed the extent of the occupation by burying the military component of the 
invasion in amongst claimed economic and political assistance. This was contrasted with the 
reporting by foreign press groups, and marked a shift in Radio Moscow reporting. Rather than 
concentrate on Amin, the Soviet broadcaster began to focus on analysing foreign press reports 
of the situation. This was phase two in the initial reporting of the Soviet reporting on 
Afghanistan – criticising and trying to undermine negative comments made by foreign groups – 
the ‘misrepresentation’ frame.  
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Increasingly, emphasis began to be placed on supposed provocations within Afghanistan caused 
by the US and other states. These were not only used to justify Soviet intervention, under the 
‘Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation’, and the United 
Nations Charter, but also to highlight the ‘hypocrisy’ of foreign governments. The Soviet Union 
was legally helping a neighbour in distress; the states that were encouraging upheaval in 
Afghanistan were using their presses to distort the Soviet actions. Home service listeners were 
told that the United States and ‘the enemies of democratic Afghanistan’ had been against the 
April revolution from the beginning, with the result that –  
‘foreign imperialistic forces entered into a direct deal with internal counter-revolutionary 
forces… [with] virtually unlimited support from the part of imperialistic circles in the 
United States, Peking… and governments of certain other countries…’192  
The word ‘imperialistic’ was quickly associated here with the enemies of Afghanistan, thus 
setting a distinctive and long running frame in motion. The target audience, Soviet listeners, will 
have fully understood the importance of this word. Following on from this, listeners were told in 
no uncertain terms about US reasons for being in Afghanistan –  
‘Within the notorious “strategic arc”, which the Americans have for decades been 
building near the Southern borders of the Soviet Union, flaws have been discovered, and 
in order to repair them, they like to encompass the Afghan people in this arc, and with it 
the peoples of other countries in this region.’193 
After the initial statement that the Afghan regime had changed, now Radio Moscow was 
retrospectively explaining the reasons behind this upheaval – and at the core of these reasons 
was the United States. 
Listeners to other services heard reports that concentrated on attacking imperialist and 
reactionary propaganda, rather than focusing on the great Soviet fear of being encircled by the 
US. This was not done through the condemnation of foreign sources by Radio Moscow, but 
through reporting the Soviet-supporting words of others. It began with the World Service 
broadcasting comment by ‘a Foreign Ministry spokesman’ in Delhi, presumably part of the 
Soviet-favouring Indian government, that ‘…the Soviet military aid to Afghanistan cannot be 
regarded as a violation of the principles of nonalignment because it is being given at the request 
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of the Afghan leaders.’194 This followed some reporting of denouncements in Czechoslovakia 
and the GDR (from Rude Pravo and Neues Deutschland) of foreign periodicals raising a ‘hue 
and cry in connection with the events in Afghanistan’.195 Rather than directly criticise foreign 
media comments on Afghanistan, Radio Moscow had chosen to report that others, still within 
the Warsaw Pact, had denounced these comments.   
Pravda was a key source of information for Radio Moscow’s broadcasts on the invasion. 
Versions of one article were broadcast via the Warsaw Pact Radio Moscow services of 
Bulgarian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Macedonian, Polish and Serbo-Croat, and also the 
‘neutral’ state Finland.196 Another Pravda article was broadcast via the English and French 
language African services, and the English service to Asia.
197
 North American audiences heard 
comments critical of their own government from a Pravda article titled ‘The Duplicity of 
Imperialist Propaganda’.198 British and Irish audiences heard a Pravda report as a source used to 
explain events in Afghanistan.
199
 There was very little differentiation here, as Pravda supplied 
the frame and Radio Moscow reproduced it. Even the Arabic language service to Persia stuck 
with Pravda, although one broadcast also highlighted L’Humanite and the Lebanese news 
source al-Qa’id on the US reaction.200 For Radio Moscow, Pravda, literally meaning truth, was 
worth repeating worldwide. 
Other non-Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact sources were also cited. In broadcasts to the Western 
European states with strong socialist or communist parties, the French communist newspaper 
L’Humanite was cited as denouncing ‘…the hypocritical anti-Afghan campaign launched by the 
USA and western countries.’201 This was more than just an attack on ‘foreign periodicals’. 
French listeners also heard a Pravda report on the situation, as did listeners to the Radio 
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 However, Italians, whose Communist Party disagreed with the 
invasion of Afghanistan, did not hear the L’Humanite denouncement of those condemning the 
Afghan invasion, they only heard the Pravda report. Rather than discuss the situation in 
Afghanistan, at this point Radio Moscow was focusing on reporting how others had criticised 
foreign reporting of the situation.  
On the 31
st
 December, World Service listeners heard that the Afghan government had joined the 
chorus condemning foreign press reports, with a statement that ‘…condemned [the] propaganda 
campaign of imperialist and reactionary forces over Soviet aid…’.203 The condemnation by the 
Afghan government was repeated on the North American service, however there was a lack of 
criticism of media reporting that portrayed Soviet actions negatively.
204
 The same applied for 
listeners in Britain & Ireland, there were no comments from press services criticising 
unfavourable press reports – the sole mention of any imperialist or reactionary propaganda came 
via the words of the Afghan government.
205
 Notably, nowhere were there specific mentions of 
the broadcasts or articles that were reactionary or imperialist – listeners were just told they 
existed.  
Epitomising not only the view Radio Moscow was trying to put across, but also the threadbare 
nature of the iron curtain through its clear understanding that Soviet people were listening to 
western broadcasts, Home service listeners were told that,   
‘The inventions being spread currently by imperialist propaganda media about the 
“occupation” of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, about the involvement of Soviet military 
personnel in internal events in that country, and about the Soviet Union’s interference in 
its internal affairs creating a threat to international peace have nothing in common with 
reality.’206 
Again, the reporting of foreign media concentrated around the imperialism and 
misrepresentation frames, but again Radio Moscow did not provide specific examples. 
However, the broadcaster was specific in finding foreign sources that appeared to praise the 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The Home service reported that - 
                                                     
202
 IWM/SU/D/213 RM Fre Europe 31
st
 December 1979, 1730,  2.1; IWM/SU/D/212 RM Italian 30
th
 
December 1979, 2100,  1.1 
203
 IWM/SU/C/ RM WSE 31
st
 December 1979, 2100,  1.2 
204
 IWM/SU/C/234 RM  N.AM 31
st
 December 1979, 2300,  1.2 
205
 IWM/SU/C/234 RM GBI 31
st
 December 1979, 2000,  1.1 and 30
th
 December 1979,   9.1 
206
 IWM/SU/B/521/ RM Home 30
th
 December 1979, 1900, part 2, p.3 
Chapter 4: Reporting the Soviet Invasion 
69 
 
‘The London Times stresses the statement of Karmal Babrak that had not the genuine 
patriotic forces taken the creative revolutionary initiative into their hands, then things 
would have turned into such a way that national sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Afghanistan and peace in this region would find themselves under 
serious threat [sic].’207 
It is quite true that The Times reported Karmal’s statement, under the title ‘Soviet action 
‘prevented a bloodbath’, says Kabul’, however this was a small column on page six, hardly a 
place to stress a news story.
208
 Radio Moscow was implying that The Times supported the 
Soviet action, or at least was not against it – it failed to report that the same page of the 
newspaper also had the headline ‘China likens Afghan coup to rape of Prague’, and ‘Why the 
Russians must win the ‘Great Game’ at all costs’.209 However, it was unlikely that many Soviet 
listeners would have access to a London newspaper, and this story was not reported in 
broadcasts to Britain & Ireland, so Radio Moscow, in being selective in their reporting, could 
give the impression that the newspaper supported the Soviet actions without being shown to 
have distorted the facts. 
This instance of cherry-picking select reports to imply support for, or some understanding of, 
the Soviet action calls into question the support claimed to be had from other sources. For 
example, Home service listeners were also reassured about foreign support for Soviet actions 
from Nhan Dan, a Vietnamese communist newspaper, cited as saying ‘the revolution in 
Afghanistan has won a glorious victory’.210 They also heard a Japanese newspaper cited as 
saying ‘…events in Afghanistan stem from imperialist interference’.211 A Czech newspaper, 
Rude Pravo, was quoted as complaining imperialism and Maoism had conducted anti-Afghan 
activities for a long time.
212
 It is not clear who the ‘Japanese newspaper’ was, but it is clear that 
the other two sources were from communist states. The sources Radio Moscow used to help 
frame the argument that the Soviet Union were acting with world support appear either to have 
been communist or misquoted – conveniently to areas that would have struggled to get hold of 
the original source. The same applied for those news sources Radio Moscow labelled imperialist 
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– vague references rather than solid examples were used so the broadcaster could not easily be 
proved wrong.  
4.3 THE SPEECH 
4.3.1 SALT-2 and Grain 
Before US President Carter made his television address on the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, 
Radio Moscow had not mentioned any specific criticisms of the action. Listeners had heard 
about the propaganda of imperialist and reactionary forces, and the hypocrisy of the US and the 
West. Nowhere had there been specific statements addressing the various announcements of 
Margaret Thatcher, Jimmy Carter, Malcolm Fraser (Australian Prime Minister) and Joe Clark 
(Canadian Prime Minister), or any of the rumours about the Olympics that began to surface. It 
was as if Radio Moscow was trying to ride the tide of disapproval, reporting everything through 
vagueness or silence, except the statements by Afghan or Soviet sources, hoping it would all 
soon end. Carter’s 4th January 1980 ‘address to the Nation on Afghanistan’ changed this.  
The first Radio Moscow report of Carter’s speech appeared on 5th January 1980, for listeners to 
the World Service –  
‘Carter has made a TV address to the nation on the South West Asian situation. TASS 
says that the President tried to create a false impression of Soviet help to Afghanistan.’213  
The immediate reaction was to frame this as misrepresenting Soviet actions – Carter was wrong 
about the Soviet ‘help’. The claim of creating a ‘false impression’ was also reiterated to those 
listening to the North American service – this followed a report stating that the UN Ambassador 
for the Soviet Union, Oleg Troyanovsky, had complained that the UN debate on Afghanistan 
was ‘tantamount to interference’. 214 Thus the speech was placed in a context of interference and 
deceit, further heightened by a report from Pravda describing the US as ‘two-faced and 
hypocritical’ over Afghanistan, and a claim that The Daily Telegraph had reported Chinese 
weaponry pouring into Afghanistan.
215
 To help frame the event, Radio Moscow again used the 
tactic of backing it up with external sources – admittedly Pravda is not that far removed from 
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Radio Moscow, but The Daily Telegraph appears to have been quoted to add some foundation 
to the interference claim.  
North American listeners heard statements from TASS on the speech, but there were no initial 
comments on the specifics, such as the implications of the grain or fishing embargoes.
216
 
Broadcasts to Britain & Ireland also lacked any specifics about the address, with only an 
Izvestiya article, accusing Carter of undermining détente, broadcast to listeners a full five days 
after the televised speech.
217
 In the days immediately after the speech there were no comments 
on specifics, just vague dismissals and explanations of the reasons behind it. 
These were also the methods and frames used to report the speech to Home service listeners, in 
which Carter was accused of - 
‘… [striving] to create the false impression as if the USSR, in giving aid to Afghanistan, 
were pursuing some kind of aims other than lending support to the rebuttal of foreign 
aggression which is taking place with the direct participation of the United States and 
China.’218 
However, another broadcast to Soviet listeners went further, discussing one of the specifics of 
the speech. President Carter explained the deferral of the ratification of SALT-2 (the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty) was necessary ‘…so that Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and 
intentions… as circumstances change in the future, we will, of course, keep the ratification of 
SALT-2 under active review…’.219 This was the first part of the speech Radio Moscow pounced 
upon. A few hours after initially being told about the false impression being created by the 
USA, Home service listeners heard that SALT-2 was, 
‘…contrary to the national interests of the USA. Indeed in this regard the President chose 
as a pretext for this postponement the Soviet Union’s aid for Afghanistan.’220 
This statement introduced the ‘pretext’ frame, designed to give listeners the impression that the 
US Administration had planned a specific action and was waiting for an opportunity to act; 
Afghanistan was used as that opportunity. A statement made earlier in the roundtable debate 
explained why:  
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‘…the endless dragging out of the ratification of SALT-2, and in the setting up of the 
quick reaction forces, which are to secure the strategic interests of the United States in 
the Near East and other regions in crisis.’221 
As all that was required on the American side for the SALT-2 Treaty was Congress ratification, 
under international law this still prevented the US from acts that could defeat the object and 
purpose of the Treaty.
222
 So to some extent President Carter’s remark about delaying the 
ratification was merely political posturing to look strong domestically, and Radio Moscow’s 
claims about the treaty were redundant. However, placed alongside the quick reaction force, a 
group Carter spoke of in defensive terms, yet Radio Moscow reported in a frame couched in 
aggressive terms, listeners were presented with a speech that did not set out to punish the Soviet 
Union for acting in Afghanistan, but propel US aggressive desires upon the world.  
Coverage of another Pravda article preceded this debate in Home service broadcasts, explaining 
that there was no substance to the ‘imaginary Soviet threat’, and that Carter’s TV speech was 
merely exploiting ‘the hysteria, being artificially whipped up in the United States of 
America…’.223 Carter had used this to ‘…again set in motion the rusty weapon of intimidation 
and blackmail which in the past has always been unsuccessfully used many times by the United 
States against the land of the Soviets.’224 Soviet listeners also heard the current (Soviet-
installed) Afghan President, Babrak Karmal, condemn the United States as well – 
‘The vicious fabrications of western circles concerning the latest events in Afghanistan 
and attacks on the Soviet Union…are nothing new. Imperialism is always active against 
national independence of peoples and their close co-operation with socialist countries, 
above all the Soviet Union.’225  
Interestingly this source cannot be found in any other broadcast region. Alongside the Pravda 
comments, Radio Moscow again reported using the frames of imperialism and 
misrepresentation. Importantly though, there was also an ‘historical’ frame introduced to this 
situation – it was just another act of imperialist aggression against ‘the land of the Soviets’. This 
completely bypassed the fact it was Soviet troops who invaded Afghanistan and murdered the 
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incumbent president. Rather than being a defence of Soviet actions, the reporting of the United 
States Administration’s reaction was aggressive – Radio Moscow was on the attack. 
This attack had limits though. Initially there appeared no desire to press home on the specifics 
of President Carter’s address on Afghanistan to certain audiences – i.e. those who may have 
heard it, or read about it in a free/less-restrictive press. With the exception of debates about the 
delay to the SALT-2 Treaty, there seems to have been a slight pause between the initial flurries 
of anti-Carter reporting and the reporting that actually discussed his policies, such as the grain 
embargo. Having had several days to develop a response though, Radio Moscow began to turn 
its ire away from SALT-2 and denouncing Carter’s ‘false impressions’, and listeners began to 
hear more about the specifics of the speech and the trade restrictions – foremost amongst these 
was the grain embargo. President Carter argued that the three areas – grain, high technology and 
fishing - were ‘particularly important’ to the Soviet Union.226 He also announced that the US 
would remove the grain from the market using price support programs, so as not to cause 
suffering to the US farmer, and the US would ‘…increase amounts of grain devoted to the 
alleviation of hunger in poor countries, and we’ll have a massive increase of the use of grain for 
gasohol production here at home.’227 While the speech tried to focus attention on Afghanistan 
and began a concerted effort to punish the Soviet Union for this infraction of international 
politics, Radio Moscow chose to tell listeners about the implications of the grain embargo, not 
upon the Soviet Union, but upon the United States farmer and the world’s poor.  
The delay to SALT-2 had been reported with the frames of aggression and history. The grain 
embargo reports highlighted the damage President Carter’s policy would do to the typical 
person – this was the ‘people harming’ frame. Unsurprisingly, the North American service 
chose to focus on the implications for the domestic farmer. Quotes from the Wall Street Journal, 
Christian Science Monitor, and The National Corn Growers’ Association, were used in 
Vladimir Pozner’s daily talk to North American listeners, stating that ‘this move was anything 
but popular’, and, furthermore, questioned how the US Administration was going to afford to 
buy back the excess grain.
228
 The senior editor of Milling and Baking News was quoted as 
saying the decision, ‘can be described as one that could virtually destroy an industry’.229 A later 
commentary informed listeners that the White House was spending $2.5 billion buying up the 
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grain now not being sold to the Soviet Union – money supplied by the American taxpayer.230 
The message was clear – the US citizen would suffer due to the actions of the US 
administration. 
Continuing to focus on the implications of the grain embargo, an observer piece on the situation 
on 10
th
 January created an image in the minds of the North American listener – ‘Carter has 
trained a double-barrelled gun on the Soviet Union, pressed the trigger and hit the American 
farmer.’231 Not only did this visually encapsulate what Radio Moscow wanted listeners to think, 
but it also linked Carter with weaponry and aggression. Furthermore, this same unnamed 
observer argued that not only would farmers lose an export source, but the excess would lower 
the grain price by up to 30%, and the taxes the farmers pay would be used to pay the $2.25 
billion  the White House had set aside for grain purchase anyway (down $.25 billion in a 
day).
232
 US farmers would pay doubly for an initiative meant to harm the Soviet Union. Radio 
Moscow failed to inform, or remind those who had seen the speech, that the President had 
addressed this though, when he said that ‘the undelivered grain will be removed from the 
market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices.’233 
Not once did the North American service imply that these measures would not be taken if the 
Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan – it just made sure that listeners knew that there was 
resentment towards the policies within the US itself.  
Listeners to the World Service heard a different stance towards the embargoes. This service 
created an air of doubt about the measures, announcing on 9
th
 January that Congress was not 
unanimous in supporting them, and that the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture 




 Not only did this suggest the embargoes caused 
divisions within the US government, but it also suggested to a worldwide listener base that they 
may not happen at all. Additionally, it also implied that President Carter was not in complete 
control of policy, that his words did not always mean actions.  This was not repeated via the 
North American service. 
Home service listeners were also subject to direct comment on the grain embargo. Alongside 
condemnation of the United States, reports about such issues as the dangerous consequences of 
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US actions or US subversive activity in Afghanistan, the grain embargo was criticised not for its 
effect on the Soviet Union, but for the anger it had generated within the United States. 
Supporting this claim, Radio Moscow reported that ‘farmers in Colorado State staged a 
demonstration’, and quoted the US Senator Ted Kennedy, The Wall Street Journal, the National 
Corn Growers Association, and Governor Edmund Brown.
235
 These all helped frame the 
embargo as not having popular support within the US. 
To give the impression of international disapproval, there was also a report on the immediate 
French rejection of the embargoes, claiming the US actions could ‘…void all the achievements 
of détente.’236 However, unlike the North American service, which seemed to report discussion 
of the grain embargo above all else at this point, the Home service continued to prefer to inform 
listeners about criticism of President Carter’s speech, not about the specifics of it. Radio 
Moscow was attempting to get listeners to believe that it was part of one big anti-Soviet 
conspiracy, condemned around the world, and in the process ignoring the need to address the 
implications of the embargoes. One report claimed the ‘democratic public in various countries 
condemns the dirty campaign unleashed by imperialist circles over events in Afghanistan’, 
quoting sources from Ecuador, Turkey and Guyana in the process.
237
 Another report on the 
same day explained the ‘…truly hysterical reaction by the USA and other Western powers…’ to 
Afghanistan in terms of a failure of imperialist and reactionary policy in the area.
238
 
Listeners in North America were not only exposed to claims the White House was harming the 
American public through the grain embargo, but that it was also using food as a foreign policy 
weapon. Withholding 17 million tons of grain from the Soviet Union was an, ‘unfriendly 
decision… [that] has been taken [and] indicates that Washington wants to continue to cash in on 
food deliveries for pressuring other countries in the interests of its foreign policy objectives.’239 
Unsurprisingly, this argument also appeared in broadcasts to Africa.
240
 Emphasising the harm to 
ordinary people, the commentator claimed that President Carter, in announcing he would turn 
grain into fuel at a time when ‘almost two-thirds of mankind goes hungry or has insufficient 
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food’ was making a ‘mockery of [the] principles of humanism, morals and justice about which 
Washington likes so much to talk about.’241 Linking this to the past, the broadcast claimed,  
‘It must be said that in Asia, Africa and Latin America the people are finding out by far 
not for the first time that the Americans prefer to destroy food products rather than sell 
them on the world market at cheaper prices or to supply them to countries that refuse to 
submit to Washington’s political and economic dictate.’242 
Rather than consider Afghanistan as a reason for the embargo, the commentary informed 
listeners that it was due to US political and economic dictate. In pursuing the embargo, the US 
was being framed as the aggressor, and by shifting the topic onto starvation levels in the third 
world, and not problems that might be caused by the restrictions on grain going into the Soviet 
Union, it carefully shifted discussion away from a plan to counter Soviet actions in Afghanistan 
and made the policy look aggressive towards the third world. Listeners to the French African 
service were even given a history lesson on US foreign policy exploitation and developing 
countries -  
‘After Vietnam, the USA now put economic and ideological pressure on the developing 
countries in order to preserve the positions of imperialism… hoping that détente would 
weaken liberation movements. But the latter intensified, and the US gunboat had 
failed.’243 
Whether trying to impose its ideology through gunboat diplomacy or trying to control food 
supplies, Radio Moscow was portraying the United States as a country single-mindedly focused 
on furthering itself at the expense of others - even if the claims made by the Soviet broadcaster 
were directly opposed to the claims made by the United States leadership. To take food as the 
example, Radio Moscow made clear the US embargo would harm developing countries, 
whereas President Carter actually made clear in his speech that the embargoed grain ‘…was not 
intended for human consumption… We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the 
alleviation of hunger in poor countries.’244 His words and the words of Radio Moscow seem to 
directly conflict with one another – but as Radio Moscow did not quote him verbatim, it was not 
necessarily so important for areas of the world that lacked direct access to his statement. 
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Further, Radio Moscow seemed to suggest the US was embargoing all grain to the Soviet 
Union. Yet, this was not an outright ban on grain sales, as contractual commitments were to be 
honoured. Nor was it, Carter claimed, a restriction on grain for human consumption (although 
presumably human consumption would be involved later in the food chain). However, the 
Soviet broadcasters claimed otherwise, and used non-Soviet sources to support their argument. 
African listeners were told that The Washington Post had claimed,  
‘Carter’s decision to reduce the sale of grain to the Soviet Union is aimed also at limiting 
our [Soviet Union] country’s extension of aid to the developing countries with which we 
have long term agreements on co-operation.’245 
Whilst the idea that the Soviet Union imported grain to then redistribute to developing countries 
seems strange, it has to be considered against a backdrop of economic and trade warfare 
between the Soviet Union and the United States in the third world.
246
 The grain embargo frame 
was clear – it would harm the people. Localisation of the frame meant that US listeners heard 
about how it would harm producers, whilst listeners in developing countries, such as in Africa, 
heard how it would cause hunger to consumers.  
Radio Moscow did not just omit key phrases from Carter’s speech; World Service listeners 
heard statements that were factually incorrect. President Carter was, it was claimed, embargoing 
‘40 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union’.247 Radio Moscow did concede the embargo was 
an attempt to force the Soviet Union ‘to alter its stand on the question of help to Afghanistan’, 
however the broadcaster swiftly moved attention away from Afghanistan to focus listeners on 
the grain that was to be turned into gasohol, at a time of ‘famine on vast spaces of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America,… poor crops in dozens of developing countries and… children dying from 
hunger.’248 In addition, arguments about the cost of the embargo to the American farmer and the 
use of food as a weapon of policy were both reiterated.
249
 Listeners all around the world were 
left in no doubt what Carter was causing - 
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‘It’s difficult to estimate at once the lives of how many starving people could be 
prolonged… the moral damage America will suffer will be immense…cars that will be 
soon zooming down American highways will be filled with fuel made out of grain needed 
desperately by millions of people.’250   
Again, the specifics of what President Carter said were set-aside, Radio Moscow wanted people 
all around the world to understand that President Carter was condemning millions to their doom 
with his embargo action. There was no suggestion here that the reason Carter may have refused 
to supply other regions with this grain was a fear that it would get to the Soviet Union anyway 
through an intermediary – thus bypassing all the millions who desperately needed it. By 
focusing on the third world, Radio Moscow shifted the grain embargo away from being a 
punishment to the Soviet Union and instead made it seem a dangerous policy that would cause 
harm elsewhere. There was no mention of how the embargo could hurt the Soviet Union; 
instead there was a focus on how the policy would damage US farmers, US taxpayers, and those 
starving in the third world.   
4.3.2 Arming Pakistan, threatening the Olympics? 
Writing in his memoirs about the actions taken against the Soviet Union at this time, Jimmy 
Carter said, ‘To be effective, punitive action had to be broadly supported and clearly defined.’251 
Yet the measures put in place in January actually detracted from the reason behind them – 
Afghanistan. Via Radio Moscow certainly, the repercussions of the invasion were reported more 
than the invasion itself. Furthermore, the station did all it could to give listeners the impression 
that the punitive actions lacked any support, and were quick to clearly define how the actions 
would damage the USA, those who supported them, and  innocent developing countries. Not the 
Soviet Union.  
There was more to the speech than SALT-2 and grain though. Fishing and technology 
restrictions were announced by Carter but ignored by Radio Moscow; however, two other 
important points were made:  
‘Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic Games 
scheduled in Moscow…the Soviet Union must realise that its continued aggressive 
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actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by 
spectators…’252  
‘Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other 
assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the 
seriously increased threat it now faces from the north.’253 
In his memoirs Carter claimed that a boycott ‘…would cause me the most trouble, and also 
would be the most severe blow to the Soviet Union.’254 As true as that was to become, his first 
flurry into the world of sporting boycotts was tame, it was more a suggestion than an actual 
threat, and it was overshadowed by the uproar over arming Pakistan and the grain embargo. 
Only the English language World and North American services carried any mention of the 
boycott, as mentioned in the speech. The North American service reported that, ‘Olympic 
committees of over 120 countries have told the preparatory committee of the summer Olympics 
of their willingness to participate in the Moscow games.’255 The World Service carried slightly 
more, re-iterating the above but adding that in addition to the Mexican and Venezuelan Olympic 
Chairmen even the United States Olympic Committee President opposed the boycott, one that 
could ‘destroy the Olympic movement’.256 US athletes and sports officials were also cited as 
‘almost unanimously’ rejecting the suggestion of a boycott, whilst listeners heard that the 
Canadian Olympic Committee was willing to challenge its government in the event of a 
boycott.
257
 Within these announcements were the seeds of frames that would later be used to 
construct arguments against the boycott campaign, such as the ‘quantity’ frame and the 
‘divisive’ frame, but at that moment the boycott was casually dismissed by Radio Moscow – it 
seems the Soviet broadcaster either considered the idea unlikely, or it was genuinely frightened 
into silence hoping any fuss made would quickly die down. The State of the Union speech just 
two weeks later swiftly changed this approach (4.3, The Speech).  
Of more consequence initially was the military funding President Carter announced would be 
given to Afghanistan’s neighbour, Pakistan. This supplied Radio Moscow with another 
opportunity to broadcast accusations of aggression although with questionable accuracy on the 
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specifics. North American audiences were informed on 5
th
 January that the Pakistan leadership 
had rejected the offer of $100,000,000 worth of military equipment, not because Pakistan’s 
leader, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, called this amount ‘peanuts’ and wanted more, but, in Radio 
Moscow’s words, 
‘Washington’s offer should turn out to be a Greek gift…The Pakistani authorities realize 
that accepting the offer may well prompt neighbouring countries to doubt Pakistan’s 
peaceful intentions and could start off a new spiral of the arms race in the region.’258 
This was a different version of events to that presented to Home service listeners. They were not 
informed that there had been an initial rejection, only that ‘the President announced the granting 
of big allocations to Pakistan, for the purpose of encouraging incursion into Afghanistan from 
abroad.’259 This was the opposite of what Jimmy Carter had actually said. The arms were given, 
the station claimed, based on the President’s, 
‘false-impression that in giving aid to Afghanistan the Soviet Union is allegedly pursuing 
some other aims besides giving it support in repulsing the foreign aggression which is 
being carried out with the immediate involvement of the USA and China. Instead of 
halting the foreign aggression, the President has announced the allocation to Pakistan of 
large-scale appropriations intended to encourage the invasion of Afghanistan from 
outside.’260  
There was no mention to Soviet listeners of the haggling over the exact amount the US aid to 
Pakistan would total, merely that the military funding was designed for attack and not defence, 
and that President Carter was misrepresenting the situation in Afghanistan. 
The English language service directed at Asian audiences also highlighted the dangers of this 
funding, but rather than consider the implications for Afghanistan, it localised it further by 
concentrating on Pakistan-India tensions. A BBC Monitor recorded a news report on the 6
th
 
January that firstly claimed $150 million worth of weapons would be going to Pakistan, and 
secondly cited the Indian newspaper ‘Financial Express’ as saying ‘Washington’s decision on 
additional supplies of sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan is aimed against India’s national 
interests and security.’261 One could surmise that the supplying of any US armaments to 
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Pakistan may well have been seen as passing on sophisticated technology to a less advanced 
military, but it is likely the word sophisticated was added to this statement only to make it seem 
more menacing. Localising the speech, Radio Moscow had portrayed President Carter’s 
statement of defence as an aggressive act that would raise tension in the region – but not tension 
involving the Soviet Union.  
The dangers of arming Pakistan were emphasised in broadcasts to listeners of the Arabic and 
Pashto language services immediately after the speech, on 5
th
 January, and the Turkish service 
carried a report from Pravda about the dangers of US aid to Pakistan on 9
th
 January – claiming 
Pakistan was very close to developing nuclear weapons.
262
 However, whilst broadcasts in the 
vicinity of Pakistan told listeners of a state becoming dangerously armed, Radio Moscow used a 
different frame elsewhere – Pakistan was a launch pad for foreign subversives to attack the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan. This was the beginning of the use of the ‘subversion‘ 
frame, one which concentrated on informing listeners which states were really behind the 
aggression in Afghanistan. The United States was always cast as a foreign subversive in these 
broadcasts; however who they were working with did vary depending on the target audience. 
For example, the Home service reported that it was the US and China providing ‘…constant 
military and financial assistance… to train the insurgents in special camps on Pakistani 
territory.’263 This was all part of the ‘Pentagon’s global strategic calculations…towards stepping 
up Chinese-American cooperation…’.264 The same statement, linked to a meeting between the 
US Secretary of Defence and Chinese leaders at this time, was also broadcast to listeners of the 
English language Asian service.
265
 The meeting was also noted by the North American service, 
who claimed China was actively involving itself in Afghanistan so it could profit from any 
potential collision between the Soviet Union and United States.
266
 Events were being placed in a 
wider context than just as a reaction to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  
Localisation of these insurgents occurred in broadcasts via the Radio Moscow Arabic service – 
Egypt became a regular fixture at the side of the United States, and Israel was accused of 
intending to help the USA ‘…reinforce their positions in the Arab world in particular and the 
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Islamic world in general…’267 That Pakistan was the base for these insurgencies was not 
mentioned via the Arabic service – perhaps to avoid suggestions that a primarily Islamic state 
was acting against the Soviet Union. British & Irish service listeners were told of British 
involvement several times, and not only after the Soviet invasion. On 9
th
 January listeners were 
told the US broadcaster NBC had filmed ‘Afghan counter-revolutionaries being trained in 
Pakistan… Their leaders have appealed for arms shipments to Britain’.268 This was also reported 
on the World Service. Before then though, on the 6
th
, listeners to the British service heard that, 
‘it was common knowledge that the CIA of the United States and the special services of Britain 
and China were arming terrorist gangs and military units and sending them into Afghanistan to 
crush the revolutionary government.’269 Radio Moscow’s Britain & Ireland service had 
previously claimed that ‘now that we know the facts about United States and British 
interference in Afghanistan… we can say in full confidence that had it not been for the 
interference, the young republic would be enjoying peace and order… and would not have had 
to seek Soviet military aid.’270 Not only were the British involved, but their involvement 
precipitated the request for Soviet assistance. Radio Moscow wanted listeners to understand that 
the US arms assistance to Pakistan was part of a long running saga, with partners local to the 
target audience – not because of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  
4.3.3 Domestic Discontent, International Aggression, and the United Nations 
Radio Moscow initially focused Home service broadcasts on the decision to delay ratifying 
SALT-2; it took several days, and discussion about the grain embargo to take place, before other 
regional broadcasts followed suit. However, the frame used was much the same – US 
imperialism. The broadcaster argued the delay in ratification was ultimately part of a desire by 
the US Administration for US superiority and the need to look powerful in an election year. 
North American listeners were told that the delay, 
‘bears no relation to Afghanistan or Iran… it was borrowed from those who have long 
remained the opponents of SALT-2 talks and the treaty… at the bottom of their tactics 
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always lay and still lies the same old objective, the need to secure American 
superiority.’271 
Home service listeners were likewise informed that Carter had capitulated to the hawks in the 
American administration, was appealing to the US electorate in an election year, and had been 
condemned by the foreign press.
272
 Listeners in Britain & Ireland heard Izvestiya accuse Carter 
of undermining détente, but, as with the claim that the US were acting up in an election year, 
they had also been told that Afghanistan was being exploited to hide British discontent at 
‘…unpopular social and economic policies…’.273 Radio Moscow was trying to frame domestic 
issues, from electioneering to distracting from discontent, as the cause for the reaction to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   
Elsewhere, Asian audiences were informed that Carter was ‘torpedoing the easing of tension’, 
and that the US and China were ‘…strikingly unanimous in trying to prevent by force the 
development of the movement for national independence in the region [Asia and the Far 
East].
274
 Additionally, the English language Asian service claimed - 
‘The two countries have switched over from instigating the enemies of the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan behind the scenes to open military support for these enemies. 
This fact shows once more where the real threat to the independence and freedom of the 
Afghan people comes from.’275 
US aggression, albeit without the explanation of domestic unrest, was also put to Arabic service 
listeners as a reason for the anti-Soviet actions - 
‘For some days now cries full of the spirit of aggression have been rising from 
Washington, President Carter and members of his Administration have turned on the 
apparatus of anti-Soviet propaganda and have lost all sense of reality and have begun to 
threaten the USSR and other socialist countries. The White House interferes in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan and strives to impose on it what regime it should have and 
with whom it should deal and from whom it should seek help…’276 
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Linking this to US military actions in the Persian Gulf and the on-going Iranian hostage crisis, 
the same commentary claimed that,  
‘The Afghani people had foiled those plans, as is known, with Soviet aid. In these 
circumstances in particular official Washington is trying to accuse the USSR of creating 
a tense situation in the Middle East, laying the blame thus on the innocent.’277 
Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union were not alone in suffering the forces of US 
imperialism, according to Radio Moscow. The broadcaster made sure listeners were also aware 
of the problems surrounding potential deployment of US nuclear missiles in Turkey, West 
Germany and Britain. Reports labelled NATO and the missiles as, variously, ‘for strategic use 
against the socialist countries…was an obvious move to counteract the easing of tensions’, was 
a ‘dangerous path’ for NATO to follow, and ‘anti-détente’.278 In a West European-wide 
broadcast that appears to have concentrated on the 8
th
 January, the dangers of NATO missiles 
were further mentioned in broadcasts in Greek, Swedish, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French 
and English.
279
 Eastern Europe also heard about the missile threat, but not as comprehensively 
as across Western Europe at this time. The cynicism of NATO (‘that aggressive bloc’) was 
discussed in a Serb-Croat broadcast on 8
th
 January, but other comment on the NATO missile 
threat appeared on various days – roundups of international protests appeared in Hungarian on 
10
th
 January, but most of all on or around 28
th
 December 1979, when comments appeared in 
Polish, Macedonian, Finnish, Bulgarian and Czech-Slovak.
280
 These all portrayed an aggression 
on the part of the United States and her allies, helpfully juxtaposing the Soviet Union actions in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, for example with ‘the Soviet policy of peace reflected in… the 
latest disarmament proposals made by Brezhnev in Berlin.’281  
Clearly, Radio Moscow perceived NATO as being dominated by the United States, and this 
may have encouraged the body to be reported via an aggressive frame. The United Nations was 
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a different matter though. The UN Security Council meeting to discuss Afghanistan ended in a 
Soviet veto, but Radio Moscow offered no criticism of it meeting. The upcoming UN General 
Assembly meeting, in which the Soviet Union held no veto, was described to Home Service 
listeners as wishing to discuss ‘the so-called Afghan question’.282 All this audience had heard of 
the previous Security Council meeting was from a review of Pravda on 9
th
 January, mentioning 
how representatives including those from Zaire, Panama, Bangladesh and Yugoslavia had voted 
‘in support of the US position and attacked the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan…’.283 
Radio Moscow reported this not as an attack upon Soviet actions, but upon Afghanistan itself – 
luckily, listeners heard, the Soviet Union used its veto to provide neighbourly assistance and 
defend Afghanistan. Listeners in North America were informed just as simply, and with no talk 
of a further meeting – the Security Council had ‘completed discussion on Afghanistan’.284 
Troyanovskiy, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, was also quoted as saying that ‘the Security 
Council… discussion… means interference in Afghanistan affairs.’285 This was repeated via the 
World Service, the Britain & Ireland service, and in various European broadcasts.
286
 Away from 
Europe, Troyanovskiy’s speech was also used to promote the Soviet view about Afghan 
interference, being heard via the Arabic, Turkish and even Pashto services.
287
 The Swahili, 
Arabic and Finnish services also carried negative comment on the UN meeting, citing the 
Afghan Foreign Ministers ‘castigation of the US for raising the question of Afghanistan at the 
UN’.288 Radio Moscow accused the UN of interfering, but it did not go into detail over the 
reasons the UN put for this ‘interference’. 
4.4 FRAMES USED TO REPORT THE INITIAL EXCHANGES  
Radio Moscow was very particular in what and how it reported the initial international 
exchanges in the weeks after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet international 
broadcasting wanted to concentrate attention not on the invasion itself, or troop movements, but 
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on alternative reasons for the international reaction. Radio Moscow used a range of frames and 
methods to achieve this, whilst also hinting at frames that become more prominent in later 
chapters as the Olympic boycott campaign slowly dominated the airwaves. 
The first frame to appear was personification, highlighting what Radio Moscow perceived to be 
the former Afghan President Amin’s role in causing disorder in the state. This helped to justify 
the Soviet intervention, whilst also neatly juxtaposing against the personification of the Soviet-
installed Babrak Karmal as a saviour of Afghanistan. The assistance frame also quickly 
appeared, supported with references to the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and the UN 
Charter. These initial frames suggested a localised event, it was only with the full introduction 
of the imperialism frame, and the related historical and aggression frames that a more 
international approach, one focused on the United States as a major cause of problems in the 
region, began to be emphasised in broadcasts. As has been shown in this case study, these 
developed through a gradual shift in the reporting, from concentrating on Amin and 
Afghanistan, to criticism of foreign coverage (the misrepresentation frame) until Radio Moscow 
began to focus on the reasons behind the foreign coverage and foreign reaction.  
Whilst the personification, assistance, or misrepresentation frames were prominent at particular 
times here, it is worth noting that there was an underlying and persistent use of the imperialism 
frame throughout – the commentaries before the actual invasion took place show pre-existing 
links between problems in Afghanistan and the United States and China. This suggests that 
Radio Moscow was already priming listeners, building a base on which to put forward later 
claims about Hafizullah Amin and to help justify the Soviet assistance. This also helped place 
the Afghanistan war, and the reaction to it, within a longer running theme – that of the Cold 
War itself. Concentrating on the ‘real’ reasons behind the reaction, by linking the reaction to 
domestic concerns, was a clear attempt to dissuade listeners from blaming the Soviet Union. 
Placing events within a wider historical frame was also used as a means to achieve this. In 
addition, the broadcaster used the ‘people harm’ frame to show how the US actions would harm 
ordinary people, thus bringing what many may have seen as a political battle of words down to 
a more human level. It appears that the goal of Radio Moscow was not to report the situation in 
Afghanistan, but to work on convincing listeners that the Soviet Union was blameless and had 
acted within the law – the situation was being misrepresented by foreign groups as a pretext to 
unleash or distract attention from other areas or actions. 
Already in the broadcasting on Afghanistan, there were distinct differences in how Radio 
Moscow portrayed events to different target audiences. The grain embargo reporting most 
clearly demonstrated this, with a clear differentiation between broadcasts to those the Soviet 
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broadcaster evidently considered producers and those considered consumers. Broadcasts to 
‘producers’, such as North America, concentrated on reporting how the grain embargo would 
harm profits, to ‘consumers’, such as listeners in Africa, the frame was on starvation. There was 
no mention of any possible harm to listeners within the Soviet Union. The other key parts of 
President Carter’s speech were also localised, be it concentrating on the Persian Gulf in Arabic 
broadcasts, considering the harm arming Pakistan would do to India-Pakistan relations for 
listeners in Asia, or implying to Home service listeners that it was all part of the long standing 
US goal of encircling the Soviet Union. The main theme was to condemn the foreign reaction to 
the Soviet intervention, but it is clear Radio Moscow approached this differently depending on 
the target audience.      
This case study has introduced several of the methods that Radio Moscow used to help develop 
and reinforce the frames used. Chief amongst these was the method of reporting on sources that 
would unlikely be available to the target audience. This does not necessarily mean the citations 
were false, but it does raise questions as to why this was the case. Pravda was the exception, 
being quoted across the network including to Home service listeners. The other key method was 
to avoid direct quotations from foreign statements, such as those by President Carter. This 
meant that unless the target audience had direct access to the original statement, Radio Moscow 
was free to frame these statements in almost any manner it chose. Linked to this, the broadcaster 
also exaggerated certain facts, such as the amounts involved in the grain embargo, helping to 
reinforce the frames it was using to portray the situation to listeners.   
Alongside the frames outlined here, Radio Moscow also introduced the ‘quantity’ and ‘divisive’ 
frames, both with regard to the Olympic boycott suggestion. These emerging frames will 
become more prominent in later chapters, but they are worth noting here because the 
comparable lack of their use emphasises the focus of Radio Moscow on other frames at this 
time. There was more concentration on deflecting attention from Afghanistan and the damage 
the immediate embargoes could do rather than on the potential harm the boycott of a sporting 
event to be held in seven months’ time. 
 
 CHAPTER 5  
BOYCOTT RUMOURS BECOME REALITY: HOW SOVIET 
RADIO FRAMED THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 
Throughout January 1980, criticism of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan continued to appear 
worldwide. However, there was a lack of action, as states did not want to act alone and were 
concerned about possible repercussions. To take Britain as an example, the Foreign Minister, 
Douglas Hurd, told the House of Commons,  
‘Any economic measures are likely to have some effect on people in this country. That is 
why it is essential that such measures should be, so far as is humanly possible, taken 
together with other countries… we cannot say that we will take no action in the economic 
context.’289 
The same concerns were visible in discussions of the Olympic Games. Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, on 17
th
 January 1980, told the House of Commons –  
‘No firm decision has yet been taken. The government are currently discussing this 
possibility with our major international partners. We certainly favour in principle the 
removal of the Games from Moscow and believe the only chance of achieving this is by a 
concerted approach to the International Olympic Committee.’290  
A NATO council meeting on 15
th
 January recorded similar sentiments – Italy had instigated 
some measures against the Soviets, but they would be prepared to consider other economic 
measures, ‘if there was solidarity amongst alliance members’.291 Turkey, suffering economic 
difficulties, ‘would find it very difficult to join in economic measures against the Soviet Union 
and sees no value in making gestures in this area which have no substance.’292 Denmark and the 
Netherlands agreed not to undercut the US action on grain; many others, such as Norway, 
France and West Germany cancelled or postponed bilateral visits, and others, such as Canada, 
decided to study how they could ‘tighten up’ trade with the Soviet Union.293 With regard to the 
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Olympics, Greece was said to be considering offering a permanent Olympic site within its 
borders, and Belgium, Canada and Norway were considering their actions over the Olympic 
Games.
294
 From grain to the Games, January 1980 was a time of discussion, not action. 
However, the broadcasting of three significant events at this time provides real insight into the 





 January 1980, allowing for examination of the reporting of the major 
statements made by the United Nations General Assembly (14
th
 January 1980), the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers (29
th
 January 1980), and the United States President (23
rd
 
January 1980). Jimmy Carter’s State of the Union address had the most significant and long 
running repercussions on Afghanistan and the Olympic Games – where others were busy 
proposing studies and signals of intent, the US President was initiating action. However, the 
comparative difference in how Radio Moscow reported the UNGA and Islamic Conference 
resolutions is what this chapter concentrates on first.  




 January 1980, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution ES/6-2, ‘The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’.295 Key to this 
resolution was point four –  
‘[The General Assembly] calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of 
the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own 
form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from 
outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.’296  
Whilst this resolution was certainly aimed at the Soviet actions, it was couched in language that 
avoided direct condemnation, calling as it does for the withdrawal of foreign troops and outside 
intervention, not specifically Soviet. The phrasing used had many parallels with Soviet 
comments on the role of other states in Afghanistan. In contrast, an ‘Extraordinary Meeting of 
The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers’ was called for 27th-29th January 1980. Unlike the 
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United Nations proposal, this resulted in clear condemnation of the Soviet (not just foreign) 
involvement in Afghanistan – resolution 1/EOS stated that the conference – 
‘1. Condemns the Soviet military aggression against the Afghani people, denounces and 
deplores it as a flagrant violation of international laws, covenants, and norm…  
2. Demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops… and 
reiterates that Soviet troops should refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against 
the Afghani people…’297  
However, these two similar statements were reported very differently, and give an insight into 
how the Soviet Union perceived the relative strength of each body at this time.  
The initial resolution placed before the UN Security Council (which was reported through a 
frame of interference led by the United States) was reported by Radio Moscow as an attack 
upon Afghanistan rather than the Soviet Union. The broadcaster reported that the Soviet Union 
came to the aid of Afghanistan by vetoing the resolution. However, with no veto in the General 





January passing a resolution condemning foreign intervention in Afghanistan. There was no 
Soviet victory here and no reporting of the resolution. What is surprising is that Radio Moscow 
did not try to frame the General Assembly meeting in a manner that correlated with Soviet 
actions, as the language of the resolution opened itself up to interpretation. ES-6/2 may have 
stemmed from an obvious inability to get a condemnation of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan 
through the Security Council, but its failure to mention the Soviet Union at all could have been 
used by Soviet broadcasting to highlight who they considered the foreign troops in Afghanistan 
to be. In a letter to Margaret Thatcher just days after the invasion, Brezhnev made clear that,  
‘The Soviet Union has not at all interfered and does not interfere in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan which are settled by the Afghans themselves… as soon as the reasons which 
caused the request of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union cease to exist we intend to 
withdraw completely…  If a real care is to be taken about the interests of the people of 
Afghanistan, one should above all contribute to the ending of armed invasion from 
outside… And it is here that Britain could do something if it so wished.’298  
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If those directing Radio Moscow had chosen to do so, they could have combined the views of 
their leader with the vagueness of the resolution and told listeners via Radio Moscow that the 
aims of the UN were the aims of the Soviet Union. The UN also respected Afghan sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence, deplored armed intervention in Afghanistan, and 
wanted foreign troops removed – Radio Moscow could have reemphasised the claim that the 
Soviet troops were only in Afghanistan at the invitation of the government to further similar 
objectives. The opportunity was there, but Radio Moscow did not take it. 
This starkly contrasts with the frames used by Radio Moscow to report the Islamic Conference 
of Foreign Ministers, the second largest inter-governmental organisation, which, at the end of 
January, also issued a resolution condemning Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
299
 Silence may 
have been the response to the UN resolution, but attacking the credentials and motives of the 
attendees was the way the station reported the Islamic Conference resolution. 
Even beforehand, the conference was reported to North American and Asian audiences as 
convening under pressure from the USA, and that it would consider only Afghanistan.
300
 This 
can be considered as a subset of the imperialism frame in that it showed US control over others. 
Home service listeners were told -  
‘As is known the initiators of this meeting – amongst whom are Egypt, Oman, and 
Pakistan, acting on the bidding of Washington – intend to make the main point on the 
agenda the so-called Afghan question. They are not concealing their plans to transfer the 
conference into a platform for anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan propaganda.’301 
Reporting the conference in this manner meant that the Soviet audience was primed to receive 
any criticism of the Soviet Union and the actions in Afghanistan in an almost dismissive manner 
– if they accepted the view put across by Radio Moscow then they could dismiss it as merely a 
US-led anti-Soviet event that held no meaning.  
After the conference condemned the invasion of Afghanistan though, listeners to Radio Moscow 
services in North America, Britain & Ireland, the Soviet Union and Africa were informed that 
the Islamic Conference ‘adopted a resolution that is blatant interference in Afghan internal 
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affairs’.302 More detail was given in broadcasts to Asian regions and also in broadcasts in 
Arabic, presumably because of the prominence of Islam in those areas, but this extra detail did 
not tell listeners what the resolution actually said. Instead, the broadcaster encouraged Arabic 
service listeners to consider the reasons behind it, 
‘The extraordinary session of the Islamic Congress has clearly disappointed the hopes of 
its initiators and organisers, Washington in particular. The American administration 
wanted to exploit the session to draw the Islamic countries to the anti-Soviet provocative 
ado stirred by it, about events in Iran and Afghanistan… resolutions constitute a flagrant 
interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and in fact benefit American 
imperialism.’303  
Whilst other areas described it merely as ‘blatant interference’, the more detailed attacks made 
on the Islamic Conference via the Radio Moscow Arabic broadcast service highlight how Soviet 
broadcasting was determined to portray the resolution as based on imperialism, not religion. 
Other broadcasts to Asia in English reinforced the portrayal of the United States as the real 
instigator, again trying to avoid the conference resolution being framed around religion –  
‘Of late American diplomacy has been engaged in intrigues around the special Islamic 
conference held in Islamabad. The intrigues are aimed at grossly distorting the events in 
Afghanistan, in posing them as a threat to other Moslem countries.’304 
The same commentary also continued by throwing the words used by the US President in his 
State of the Union address right back at him – ‘Witness the United States massing of warships, 
the biggest since world war two, in the vicinity of Iranian shores…’305. It concluded with an 
appeal to those engaged in the Islamic Conference, to ‘help it realise the true purpose of the 
manoeuvres American diplomacy is engaged in’.306 This conference, with its criticisms of the 
Soviet Union, was consistently portrayed as an instrument of the United States – unlike the 
silence that surrounded the UNGA resolution. 
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Discussion of the conference did not just focus on the United States; Radio Moscow tried to 
exploit existing tensions by making Israel a major consideration in broadcasts to Asian and 
Arabic regions. Washington was trying to ‘distract the Arabs from solving their main problem: 
elimination of the traces of Israeli aggression and recovery of the national rights of the 
Palestinian people.’307 Afghanistan, it seems, was a distraction from the real issues, the threat to 
Arab and Islamic peace and security - 
 ‘…alliance and cooperation between Egypt, the US and Israel are [word indistinct] of 
aggression against the Palestinian people and a threat to the security and independence 
of all Arab and Islamic countries.’308 
A broadcast to both North America and Britain & Ireland also claimed that the ‘President of the 
Afghan Council of Mullahs says Muslims in Afghanistan have no reason to fear interference in 
their religious life because of the presence of Soviet troops.’309 It was upon these building 
blocks that Soviet radio moved on to criticism of the Islamic Conference itself, a conference that 
all true Muslim patriots were apparently against, and one that would, according to Radio 
Moscow, prefer to discuss Jerusalem than Afghanistan.
310
 Again, the argument was clear – 
discussion of Afghanistan was forced upon the conference proceedings. Home service listeners 
heard that the US was attempting ‘…to portray its expansionist aims in the Middle East as a 
defence of the rights of the Muslims in Afghanistan…’.311 Similarly, listeners to the Arabic 
service heard about ‘celebration of the Prophet’s birthday at Moscow’s mosque’. 312 There was a 
clear contrasting of positions: the Soviet Union was helpful, the United States exploitative. 
Condemning the Islamic Conference as instigated by American imperialists and avoiding 
perceived religious criticism contrasted with a broader attempt by the Soviet broadcasters to 
portray the Soviet Union as the true friend of Islam. In Soviet radio attempts to defend the 
invasion of Afghanistan and show the situation within that country as normal they often took a 
religious angle. Before the Islamic Conference had even convened, it was made clear in 
broadcasts to Africa that the new Afghan government had, 
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‘never disavowed Islam…the majority of public meetings in Afghanistan begin with 
Koran recitation. Islam is being taught in schools; believers celebrate all the religious 
feasts proscribed by Islam. All the 40,000 mosques are open in Afghanistan.’313   
There was a two pronged approach to the Islamic Conference. Firstly, it framed the conference 
resolution as a product of American imperialism and its regional puppets. Secondly, broadcasts 
focused on Asian and Islamic regions promoted Soviet credentials with regard to Islamic 
worship and religious freedom. It seems both frames were designed to dispel any ideas that 
what was going on in Afghanistan was a war with religious connotations.  
On top of this, the contrasting coverage shows the difference between Soviet opinion of the 
United Nations, in which the Soviet Union was a member with significant influence, and the 
Islamic Conference, in which it was not a member. The UN appears to have been too influential 
to criticise, and because the Soviet Union was a permanent member of the Security Council, it 
was not open to the same levels of imperialist accusations that could be levelled at what it 
appears Radio Moscow considered the less significant Islamic Conference. It must also be 
considered that these contrasting reporting styles could also be related to when the 
announcements were made. The UNGA resolution came at a time when Radio Moscow perhaps 
hoped the uproar around Afghanistan would die down, and therefore chose to help this process 
by neglecting to report the news. The Islamic Conference resolution was announced several 
days after the US President had made his highly significant State of the Union address – thus it 
was clear then that the uproar would not die down and Radio Moscow felt it had to act. 
However, the case studies that follow point more toward the first point, as Radio Moscow was 
never afraid to comment on Islamic Conference statements, whereas it tended towards silence if 
anything critical came from the United Nations. 
5.2 THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS – A DISASTER FOR CARTER?  
Within a week of the UN resolution condemning Soviet actions through words, Radio Moscow 
had to contend with the US President re-iterating the actions he announced in his ‘Address to 
the Nation on Afghanistan’ condemning the invasion, and in particular adding emphasis to the 
Moscow Olympic Games boycott threat. The boycott threat hit the headlines just days before, 
when on 20
th
 January 1980, President Carter appeared on NBC television’s Meet the Press 
show, and told the United States, the world, and the Kremlin, that if the Soviet Union did not 
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withdraw from Afghanistan by 19
th
 February 1980, the US team would not appear at the 
Moscow Olympics. On 23
rd
 January 1980, the President reiterated this in his State of the Union 
address –  
‘…I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, 
neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.’314 
With a further statement announcing US policy in the oil rich Persian Gulf, the State of the 
Union address tried to reignite the reaction to Afghanistan.
315
 Yet it is questionable what it 
actually achieved.
 
The speech was undeniably shaped by the invasion, but it also created an 
opportunity for Radio Moscow to divert attention from the troops in Afghanistan and try to 
divert ill feeling away from the Soviet Union itself. Radio Moscow reported this pivotal 
moment by focusing not on what was said, but rather the reasons the Soviet broadcaster 
believed were behind what was said.  
The address made it clear that Soviet Union aggression had led to the sanctions, the threat to 
boycott the Olympics, and the US determination to defend the vital oil fields of the Persian 
Gulf, dubbed the ‘Carter Doctrine’ -  
‘An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’316 
The most comprehensive analysis of the speech delivered to North American audiences, by 
Radio Moscow News Analyst Stanislav Kondreshov, appeared a full eight days after the 
address, and immediately focused on the Persian Gulf statement. The first line of his broadcast 
noted that, ‘The White House is again threatening to use armed forces thousands of miles from 
American shores to protect American interests.’317 In terms of introducing the listener to US 
actions, the word ‘again’ was a trigger for linking this to previous US endeavours, Vietnam for 
example. The report went on to consider the ‘humorous or sarcastic side’ of the doctrine, by 
arguing that,  
‘…is not the United States itself a foreign power in this region, and does not the threat 
made by the American President, the threat to be backed up by aircraft carriers, airborne 
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divisions and marines represent an attempt by a foreign power to establish its 
control?’318 
In itself, this is an interesting example of a frame used by Soviet broadcasting to report certain 
statements. There can be no doubt that the answer to the rhetorical question was indeed, yes, the 
US was a foreign power. And there was no denial about Soviet involvement, or potential 
involvement, in the Gulf region. However, Radio Moscow reacted to the speech by focusing on 
how it showed United States aggression. The Radio Moscow commentator also expanded upon 
the phrase ‘military force’, breaking it down into constituent parts – ‘…aircraft carriers, 
airborne divisions and marines…’ The frame was one of aggression, as Radio Moscow 
continued to emphasise it was the United States, and not the Soviet Union, that was responsible 
for the raising of world tensions. 
The key frame for reporting the address came after this though. For American listeners 
wondering why their President had announced these measures Radio Moscow had a very clear 
answer. Criticising the grain embargo in one sentence, the broadcaster concentrated on the 
Persian Gulf and informed listeners that – 
‘Statements coming from the White House indicate that the United States is not only 
embarking on a course of confrontation, a course fraught with adventurism on the world 
scene, although on the American scene it strengthens – for the time being – Jimmy 
Carter’s election chances. They also indicate that the men in the White House still think 
of themselves as masters of the world.’319   
Electioneering and implied imperialist plans were the arguments Radio Moscow used to frame 
the content of the State of the Union address to the voters of the United States. This also built 
upon the notion of Afghanistan being a pretext for other actions, despite not being mentioned.  
The notion of ‘the Persian Gulf’ was also considered in this piece, with Kondreshov describing 
it as a ‘fog’, intentionally spread so there was space for ‘manoeuvre, blackmail and bluff’, and 
also because no single country in the Middle East had apparently asked for US support.
320
 Radio 
Moscow was trying to make it clear that the US Administration was imposing itself on an area 
that was deliberately ill-defined. With the Persian Gulf statement, it almost seems as if President 
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Carter included an escape clause for Soviet reporting in his speech – it did not have to discuss 
Afghanistan. 
The Olympic boycott part of the address was briefly dealt with in a separate, earlier, broadcast, 
but whilst it was also reported as related to domestic issues, in this case electioneering, it was 
played down somewhat by being incorporated into the wider framework of US aggression. In a 
radio discussion on 27
th
 January, one of the participants announced: 
‘The whole international situation is simply being used by the President today for as far 
as I’m concerned, a supreme political purpose, and that is to be re-elected… you see a 
President whose popularity sagged so low not long ago, and today who many think is 
riding a wave, thanks to this new possibility… The Olympic Games are just one of the 
cards that are being played, one of the ways to play on people’s emotions inside the 
United States.’321  
The commentary continued with other participants agreeing that the Olympic boycott was 
merely a threat grounded in domestic US politics, but it also included an extra twist for the 
audience to consider –  
‘I see it as part of a definite tendency on the part of the United States administration to 
turn away from the situation we had during the early 70s and the mid-seventies…to a 
situation – well, that resembles that of the cold war, and I see this attack on the Olympics, 
the situation of the US administration… as part of a whole series of events over the past 
couple of years intended to turn back the clock and take us back to those very difficult 
years of brinkmanship.’322 
The boycott threat was being presented to North American listeners through the frames of 
domestic issues and international aggression. This built upon a previous commentary, in which 
avid listeners heard - 
‘There is no doubt about it that one reason for the political hue and cry of the past few 
weeks, forced on the public and blown out of all proportion by the current administration, 
is a desire to distract Americans from their basic problems so as to improve the 
Administration’s chances for re-election.’323 
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Immediately after the address, Radio Moscow accused Carter of attempting to ‘turn a regional 
conflict into a world crisis, [and will], whatever the outcome of a November election, worsen 
the international atmosphere for a long time and may even bring confrontation nearer.’324 To 
listeners in North America, the instigator of the aggression was President Carter, not the United 
States as a whole. Not only was this an example of the personification frame being used, but it 
is also an example of the emerging ‘divisive’ frame, one that tried to separate the government 
from the people, blaming the former whilst portraying the latter as innocent.  
Again, this built upon a previous report that told North American listeners Afghanistan was not 
the cause of ‘the current aggravation of international affairs’, but a useful opportunity the 
United States administration was trying to exploit.
325
 It concluded -  
‘The Soviet Union’s aid to Afghanistan has not caused the current difficulties in 
international affairs… President Leonid Brezhnev told an interviewer for the Soviet daily 
‘Pravda’ that if it had not been for the events in Afghanistan certain circles in the United 
States and in NATO would have certainly found another pretext to aggravate 
international relations. They have had plenty of experience.’326    
The final sentence was perhaps put in as a primer for the audience to consider other examples. 
Afghanistan was again presented as a pretext for anti-Soviet measures, reinforcing a frame 
Radio Moscow had used almost since the invasion itself.   
The same frame for the State of the Union address was put to listeners within the Soviet Union. 
Four days after the speech, on 27
th
 January, Radio Moscow’s New York correspondent Andrey 
Sturum reported to Soviet listeners that,  
‘Long before the so-called Carter doctrine was proclaimed, the USA had begun to 
concentrate a powerful naval detachment in the Arabian Sea… This major force has been 
put together to exert military pressure on the Persian Gulf countries…’327 
Implicit within this was both US imperialism and the view that the Carter Doctrine was pre-
planned – recent events, such as troops entering Afghanistan, were not the reason for the 
proclamation, they were pretexts. However, it does appear that broadcasts within the Soviet 
Union itself were more liable to discuss than ignore Afghanistan, perhaps because many 
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listeners may have known troops deployed there. Rather than discuss troop movements though, 
these broadcasts focused on describing Afghanistan as an excuse for ‘the most shameless 
slander’, and the State of the Union address was ‘…evidence of the fact that extremist circles of 
the United States are stepping up their attempts to torpedo international détente.’328 Radio 
Moscow broadcasts within the Soviet Union did not emphasise re-election as an argument for 
President Carter’s words in quite the same way as North American broadcasts. This domestic 
issue was only presented occasionally as a further reason for Washington’s actions, the primary 
frame reporting the State of the Union address instead being the US aggression destroying 
détente.  
Continuing the aggressive frame, President Carter’s reaffirmation of the trade sanctions was 
further condemned in the Home service broadcasting. In what appears to have been both a 
dismissal of the damage trade restrictions could do to the Soviet Union and also a reassuring 
message to listeners fearing the worst, one broadcast quoted an American President of the Farm 
Bureau Federation as saying, ‘Mr Carter aimed at the Russians from a double-barrelled gun: he 
pulled the trigger and hit the American farmer.’329 This is almost a word-for-word repeat of a 
phrase used in an observer piece on 10
th
 January (see chapter 4.3 p.73-74).
330
 The trade 
sanctions were reported with the personalisation frame (i.e. President Carter specifically and not 
the US Administration, Washington or the general public) and the people harm frame (the 
American farmer). Reassuring Soviet listeners that the anti-Soviet measures would not harm 
them, a further broadcast to listeners reinforced this idea - 
‘…the overwhelming majority of sober-minded politicians have no doubts that the 
attempts to blackmail the Soviet Union may most painfully of all hit the initiators of this 
undertaking.’331 
To help support the ‘people harm’ frame, Radio Moscow quoted sources from foreign states 
such as the United States. Soviet listeners heard claims that the State of the Union address 
would have, according to firstly American Senator Howard Baker and secondly the President of 
the National Association of Maize Producers (USA), a ‘…pernicious effect on US agriculture’, 
and that‘…the gravest blow has been inflicted on the interests of American farmers…’.332 The 
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Wall Street Journal was also cited as believing that the grain embargo would ‘harm the 
American economy and farmers, above all.’333 Whilst farmers lost out most, the embargoes had 
an effect on the wider population too. Six days previously (21
st
 January), Radio Moscow 
reported that Reuters claimed the grain embargo would cost the US taxpayer almost $3,000 
million over two years.
334
 This was not a figure heard in broadcasts to North America.  
Not only were the embargoes reported as backfiring and failing to hurt the Soviet Union, but 
there were also hints that the Soviet Union was not weak and could strike back – Radio Moscow 
may have been reporting events around a foreign aggression frame, but it also wanted to make 
clear the Soviet Union was more than capable of standing up to this. On 27
th
 January, listeners 
heard the fears of a West German Chairman of Industry and Commerce, who claimed that the 
West, should it resort to sanctions, could face retaliatory measures by the USSR, particularly 
with oil and natural gas supplies.
335
  
Another interesting argument that appeared within the broadcasts to Home audiences compared 
the ‘Carter Doctrine’ to the ‘Truman Doctrine’ in the late 1940s.336 Using an historical frame, 
the broadcaster was trying to conjure up negative associations with what Carter set out as a 
defence of US interests in the Persian Gulf – this was instead claimed to be part of a 
containment policy designed to encircle the Soviet Union. In an example of localisation of a 
frame, this argument was almost directly transferred over to broadcasts in Arabic, but with one 
crucial difference. Listeners around the Persian Gulf region were informed that the ‘Carter 
Doctrine’ was comparable not to the ‘Truman Doctrine’, but to the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ – 
‘which the Arabs called the doctrine of aggression and neo-colonialism.’337 Instead of trying to 
get listeners to assume the US was trying to encircle the Soviet Union, Radio Moscow was 
using historical comparisons to purvey the idea to Arabic language or Home service listeners 
that the US was reasserting an attitude that allowed the use of force in the Middle East, or the 
encircling of the Soviet Union. Again, any perception of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan was 
sidestepped by focusing instead on one part of the US reaction and framing it as an example of 
US aggressive intentions.  
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In another example of localisation, prior to placing the State of the Union address within this 
historical context the Arabic service first chose to focus solely on oil. A broadcast on 24
th
 
January suggested that President Carter’s threat to ‘use armed forces in the Arab Gulf area 
should…the American vital interests there be harmed…’ was due to, ‘…the interests of the 
American oil companies which make astronomical profits from the oil of the Gulf countries and 
which naturally do not want to lose these profits.’338 There was certainly an element of 
exploitation within this statement. Accordingly, the statement continued with the argument that 
US oil firms had repeatedly encouraged the US to violently interfere within the Persian Gulf 
region – Radio Moscow told Arabic service listeners that Carter’s address was yet another 
example of this.
339
 This was definitely trying to move thinking away from Afghanistan being the 
root cause of the recent statements. In a twist on the people harm and divisive frames, the 
people of the Persian Gulf region were being exploited by US big business, and Radio Moscow 
was trying to use this to build a divide between the US and the Arabic listeners.   
Further analysis appeared on the Arabic service on 25
th
 January, but as with many other Radio 
Moscow analyses of President Carter’s words, specifics were lacking and it was not the speech 
itself that was examined, but the motives behind it and the reactions of states to it.
340
 In this 
instance reporting of Carter’s policy once again used the frames of aggression and people harm, 
and frame localisation. It did this by trying to play on the existing regional tensions listeners 
would have been well aware of -  
‘…Washington’s desire to expand its military bases in Egypt and Israel and strike the 
national liberation movement of the Arab nations and in particular the Palestinian Arab 
people… the new Carter doctrine greatly strengthens the position of the Zionists and 
enables them to pursue a harder expansionist policy toward the Arab countries.’341 
Jimmy Carter’s claim to be defending the security of the Middle East, and the world supply of 
oil, was being explained to listeners as a ploy for American expansion in the region that would 
greatly benefit Israel, to the detriment of the Arab peoples. Afghanistan, the major influence on 
the speech, was only mentioned in this analysis as an event President Carter desired to 
exploit.
342
 The Olympic boycott threat was not mentioned – it was evidently not perceived to be 
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of concern to Arabic audiences at this time – and the reaffirming of the trade embargoes was not 
mentioned either. What this particular broadcast did attempt though was to link criticism of the 
US to praise of the USSR, namely, ‘…the support of the Soviet Union for the Arab and national 
liberation movements and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organisation]…’343 Furthermore -  
‘Irrespective of their [national liberation movement leaders] political views, they all have 
expressed grateful thanks to the Soviet Union for its consistent aid which is not influenced 
by external considerations in the struggle for political and economic independence.’344 
Again, Afghanistan was shown to be a pretext for US actions, yet the broadcasts in Arabic 
framed the State of the Union address by focusing on President Carter’s Persian Gulf plan, 
without directly referring to it. The broadcaster wanted listeners to understand that the address 
was really motivated by imperialism, capitalist oil companies trying to maximise profits, a 
desire to repress Arabic liberation, and aggression – ‘a blatant call for the armament race and 
confrontation with the Soviet Union and other members of the socialist community…’.345 Even 
when trying to frame US actions as focused on the Persian Gulf, Radio Moscow made sure to 
emphasise that there was also aggression toward the Soviet Union – Arabic listeners had to fight 
the same cause as the Soviet people. 
Afghanistan, only ever acknowledged as a pretext for pre-meditated US actions, was not the 
main concern for Soviet radio – presenting US imperialism and aggression was. This was the 
case not only within broadcasts to North America, the Soviet Union, and in Arabic, but also 
elsewhere. Radio Moscow broadcasts in German cited a Pravda article calling the address ‘a 
claim to world domination’, Finnish language listeners were informed that the USA would 
‘continue the policy of force against détente…’, and listeners in Serbo-Croat were informed that 
‘several US Congressmen criticised Carter’s State of the Union message’.346 Other regions, 
including Pashto, Polish and Turkish, all cited Pravda for their analyses of the address, but the 
BBC Monitoring Service material suggests that these reports were not widespread.
347
 
In contrast, broadcasts to Britain & Ireland all but ignored the State of the Union address, 
preferring to focus almost exclusively on the British government and how it was trying to 
                                                     
343
 IWM/SU/F/ RM Arabic 25
th




 IWM/SU/F/ RM Arabic 25
th
 January 1980, 1700, p.1 
346
 IWM/SU/E/174: RM German 28
th
 January 1980, 2000, 1.1; RM Finn 22
nd
 January 1980, 1630, 1.5; 
IWM/SU/E/175 RM Serb-Croat 24
th
 January 1980, 2030, 1.5 
347
 IWM/SU/E/175 RM Polish 29
th
 January 1980, 1700, 2.a; IWM/SU/F/: RM Pashto 29
th
 January 1980, 
1430, 1.1; RM Turkish 29
th
 January 1980, 1400, 4.1. 
Chapter 5: Boycott Rumours Become Reality 
103 
 
exploit the world situation for its own gain. The Conservative government came to power in 
May 1979 with, Radio Moscow informed its audience,  
‘a clear-cut programme – to curtail Britain’s dialogue with the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries and to gain military supremacy for the West and secure positions of 
strength… Now the British Government apparently sees a good chance to use the events 
in Afghanistan for displaying its solidarity with Washington so as to obtain its own 
strategic objectives.’348 
This defined how British policy toward the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and the Olympics would 
be reported, and whilst the content may have been different, the frames were very similar to 
those used to report the situation via North American broadcasts. 
An aggressive foreign policy was framed by Radio Moscow as a means for President Carter to 
hide domestic concerns, a frame that was also used to portray the British reaction to the invasion 
of Afghanistan. This was reported to be a pretext used by the British government as,  
‘anti-Sovietism has always been a reliable remedy to divert attention from domestic 
issues… [to] muffle down people’s discontent over her [Thatcher’s] own social and 
political fiascos…’.349  
As with problems in Afghanistan being blamed on Amin, or US problems blamed on Carter, 
Radio Moscow personalised British domestic problems by placing the blame solely on Margaret 
Thatcher.  
It was also reported that the Thatcher government was becoming ‘Washington’s political 
shadow…’, another reference to the imperialism frame, and that they were following the US 
with further military build-up, linking again to the frames of militarism and aggression.
350
 As in 
other regions, Afghanistan was reported as a ‘pretext’ to enhance British military build-up – 
similar to those in North America, British listeners were informed that their government wanted 
to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf.
351
 However, more than anywhere else, in broadcasts 
to Britain & Ireland there appears to have been analysis of the proposal within the State of the 
Union address to boycott the Olympic Games. In part this could have been because of 
Thatcher’s remark in the House of Commons on 17th January that the government was in favour 
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of the Olympics being moved from Moscow.
352
 Radio Moscow reported this through the 
historical frame, presenting the view that a boycott had been long in the minds of policy makers. 
The tone of the broadcasting was very much summed up by the comments of one letter writer,  
‘…that he had himself predicted many months ago that threats against the Soviet Union 
would include a halt to the moves towards détente, non-ratification of SALT-2 and a 
boycott of the Moscow Olympics.’353 
Radio Moscow presented its own opinion as to why the threat to boycott the Games was being 
discussed by the British government and press. Introducing ‘Vantage Point’, a regular 
commentary on topical issues, the commentator told listeners –  
‘The pro-American Conservative press in Britain [are] screaming holy murder in a bid to 
disrupt the summer Olympic Games in Moscow…’354   
This statement made clear who Radio Moscow blamed for any threat to the Olympic Games – 
the ‘pro-American Conservative press’. Using the misrepresentation frame, the same report 
accused the ‘Tory controlled media’ of having attempted several times to ‘torpedo the Moscow 
Games’, and that the ‘Conservatives have launched a full-scale attack on the Moscow Games, 
and on the entire Olympic movement for good measure.’355 Nowhere in this attack on British 
foreign policy, and the British press, was Afghanistan mentioned. 
Radio Moscow was attempting to make listeners believe that the Conservative government, and 
the press they supposedly controlled, were determined to destroy the whole Olympic movement, 
and with it the Moscow Games.
356
 Linking this to previous attempts, which had focused 
primarily on human rights and occasionally ideology since Moscow was awarded the Games in 
1974, was also a way of deflecting attention from Afghanistan. Again, for those listeners who 
thought about Afghanistan in relation to the boycott, Radio Moscow was making the case that it 
was just another in a long line of excuses to boycott – again using the pretext and historical 
frames to try to influence listener thinking. The report went on to play down suggestions that the 
boycott would be successful, and that the reports, made by ‘Tory spokesmen and newspapers’, 
alluding to the financial burden a boycott could place on the Soviet Union, were wrong.
357
 The 
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commentator told listeners very assuredly, ‘a boycott is of course out of the question.’358 Key to 
the reporting of this very clear anti-boycott message was the separation of Moscow and 
Afghanistan from the Olympic Games themselves. The reason for the boycott call, Afghanistan, 
did not appear at all. And whilst Moscow was acknowledged as the host of the Games, the 
argument was put forward in a manner that focused on how the ‘Olympic Games’, not the 
‘Moscow Olympic Games’, would suffer from a boycott. As for the economic impact, the whole 
Olympic process had, according to this piece, merely moved forward pre-planned building 
works in Moscow, and therefore a boycott would not damage the Soviet economy by wasting 
costs on a sporting event with no sportsmen, because the structures would be built anyway.
359
 
To drive home the point, the report finished by claiming,  
‘…the Olympic wreckers cannot possibly punish the Soviets financially, although they 
can wreck the Olympic movement.’360 
There were no outright statements from states such as Britain or the United States that non-
attendance was because they wanted to punish the Soviet Union financially, the boycott threat 
was based solely, at this time, on the invasion of Afghanistan. The financial punishment of the 
Soviet Union was based around the trade embargoes, none of which Britain could really 
influence. By framing the boycott in economic terms, not only could Radio Moscow avoid 
linking it to Afghanistan, but they also shifted how it could be judged a success – not on athletic 
non-attendance, but on economic damage, which they dismissed as unachievable. Within 
broadcasts to Britain these were incorporated into the bigger, and undoubtedly more 
controversial, Olympic boycott story. What President Carter had said, and his motives for doing 
so, was transferred over to Margaret Thatcher and her government, with adaptions made to suit 
the British & Irish audience.    
Just as Arab tensions with Israel were exploited when reporting the State of the Union address 
in Arabic language broadcasts to Persia, domestic discontent in Britain was being exploited as a 
means of explaining British foreign policy. American audiences were informed that Jimmy 
Carter wanted re-election, British audiences that the recently elected Mrs Thatcher needed to 
stifle domestic discontent over her policies. Radio Moscow reporting to Britain used the 
domestic issues frame in a manner that suggested world tensions were being heightened in an 
attempt to disguise the domestic woes of Margaret Thatcher and her ‘Tory’ government.  
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Radio Moscow’s English language World Service was also broadcasting claims that world 
tensions were being heightened without any basis. By 31
st
 January 1980, it reported that 
‘…most Afghans have the feeling of freedom and of calmly going about their business, and that 
the population supports the government’s political line.’361 Implicit within this statement was 
the opinion that news reporting to the contrary was wrong, and that Afghanistan was back to 
normal – this emerging  ‘normalisation’ frame would appear regularly over the coming months. 
This report again contained a citation from a secondary source – the claim was made by 
delegates from the French General Confederation of Labour, a trade union group with strong 
communist views.
362
 This claim, at the head of the news, was promptly followed by a report 
stating that ‘On the pretext of the Afghan and Iranian issues the United States is openly 
counteracting international efforts to lessen the war menace.’363 Afghanistan was still a pretext, 
but this time it was linked to the on-going Iranian hostage crisis – another pretext the United 
States was apparently exploiting for its own ends. 
The World Service also carried a report about concerns that the US would turn ‘…bases in 
Japan into strongholds for US troops deployed in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas’.364 
There was also reportedly concern amongst the public in Asia that the ‘heightening of the anti-
Soviet campaign…’ would cause a loss of economic opportunity and decreasing trade 
relations.
365
 The same report used the domestic issues frame to argue that ‘the tough foreign 
policy course steered by the American administration and the boosting of military preparations 
are but an attempt to divert attention from America’s own social and economic malaise.’366 The 
news cycle for that day (31
st
 January) thus went like this:  
1. Report from Afghanistan using the normalisation frame.  
2. Describe US actions with regard to Afghanistan through the aggression frame.  
3. Describe US actions as damaging world trade and thus harming the ordinary person.  
4. Describe US actions as a desire to hide domestic problems using the domestic issues 
frame.  
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As each report came from the correspondent of a different region, the overall report helped 
frame the actions of the United States in a way that suggested they were damaging different 
groups around the world. The New York correspondent reported on dominant big business, 
reduced social care and military budget increases – all domestic concerns supposedly being 
covered up by foreign policy adventurism.
367
 The reporter from Jakarta talked of trade concerns 
amongst the public in Asia, and the reporter from Tokyo considered Japanese fears over US 
bases there.
368
 The actions of the United States were being reported through the aggression 
frame on a global scale.  
The World Service also attempted to play down the trade embargo, which was something that 
other Radio Moscow broadcasts mostly failed to engage with. A bulletin on 31
st
 January 
announced that the USSR maintained business contacts with 125 countries, and capitalist 
nations ‘account for about one-third of its foreign trade.’369 The report also claimed that, 
‘Following the European security conference the USSR signed some 30 agreements and 
programmes of economic co-operation with West European nations. These agreements 
have materialised, and are of importance to the West – particularly at a time of economic 
recession.’370 
Therefore, listeners could understand why the economic sanctions would fail to affect the Soviet 
Union whilst damaging the West – and it was not only the American farmer who would be hurt 
by trade sanctions.  
World Service listeners also heard this general dismissal of the effect of the anti-Soviet 
measures applied to the US threat to withdraw from the Olympic Games. Within days of Carter 
officially threatening to boycott, Radio Moscow was almost gleefully reporting rejections of the 
idea from national Olympic committees worldwide. Reporting the failings of the boycott 
campaign through emphasis on the quantity frame, by 31
st
 January, amongst those reported as 
rejecting the boycott call were: the Netherlands Olympic Committee; the Italian Olympic 
Committee; the chairman of the Belgian Olympic Committee; the Vice-President of the French 
National Olympic Committee; the majority of the French public; the Polish Olympic Committee 
(unsurprisingly); the heads of the Swedish and Danish Olympic Committees; the British 
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Olympic Association; the Portuguese Olympic body; and the Iranian Olympic Committee.
371
 
Through listing national Olympic committees in this way, the boycott was being instantly 
portrayed as a failure. 
Western sources were used to support the frames used to highlight boycott failure. With regard 
to the idea proposed by Margaret Thatcher of moving the Games, Radio Moscow cited the 
President of the West German Sports Union as claiming that ‘…switching the Games from 
Moscow would run counter to international rules.’372 A US Senator was also reported as calling 
the boycott ‘…a hysterical action in the spirit of the cold war.’373 The vast majority of those 
reported as anti-boycott were also ‘Western’ states – those most likely to favour the United 
States, and therefore, by constantly implying that US allies were rejecting the boycott, Radio 
Moscow attempted to not only frame the campaign as an abject failure, but as one that was 
dividing the US from its traditional allies. The only supporters mentioned were the US Olympic 




Mentions of states not attending were explained through emphasis upon other factors – Saudi 
Arabia was not attending because sport in that country was at a low level, ‘except perhaps for 
camel riding, which is not an Olympic sport so far’; and Fiji, which was rather small and 
according to Radio Moscow could not burden the financial cost of attendance.
375
 It was known 
before the invasion of Afghanistan that Saudi Arabia would not attend the Olympics for 
sporting reasons, but this did not stop it claiming in January 1980 to be boycotting because of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
376
 Fiji, however, has attended nearly all summer Olympics 
Games since joining the IOC in 1955, including the 1976 and 1984 Games – so when presented 
with evidence the Soviet argument about finances seems to collapse.
377
 Other states, such as 
Israel and Oman, were also mentioned as boycotting solely because of their military and 
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economic dependence on the United States, or, as in the cases of states such as Britain, were 
governments within Washington’s military bloc.378  
In admonishing President Carter, perhaps the finest critique and use of word-play came when 
Radio Moscow told World Service listeners -   
‘…the US President is too busy with such political sports as wrestling with other 
Presidential candidates, lifting the military budget and outscoring his opponents in short-
sightedness.’379  
Within this sentence are the outlines of frames that appeared elsewhere in Soviet broadcasts 
attacking the United States administration – the domestic issue frame, the aggression frame, the 
imperialism frame, and, with regard to ‘short-sightedness’, the harm frame – in this instance 
referring to international politics and economics. Interestingly, there was no direct link on the 
World Service broadcasts between events in Afghanistan and the Olympic Games boycott – 
Afghanistan was merely reported as a pretext used by Washington to aggravate the world 
situation as a whole.
380
 One commentary used it as part of analysis of the State of the Union 
address – an analysis that focused on the military industrial complex in America and the need of 
the US Administration to increase the military budget to $168.8 billion.
381
 Afghanistan was 
exploited by the US Administration because ‘…the American military industrial complex has a 
vital stake in worsening the international climate.’382 Afghanistan was a pretext being used to 
distract from spreading US aggression. It was not just the US being framed as aggressive either. 
The World Service also reported that Britain was using the situation to ‘sharply increase the 
British military presence in the Persian Gulf area…to give large-scale aid to Pakistan… [and] to 
stimulate the development of relations with China, especially military relations.’383  
That Afghanistan was just a pretext for these policies was further encouraged by commentary on 
Carter’s State of the Union address, with analyst Viktor Shragin claiming ‘The American 
President formulated his doctrine as early as December 12
th
 last year [1979], that is prior to the 
events in Afghanistan.’384 Interestingly, and presumably as coincidence, 12th December 1979 is 
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also the reported date of the Politburo meeting that agreed to the invasion of Afghanistan.
385
 
However, it is clear from this that an attempt was made to get listeners to think the State of the 
Union address, and all the measures contained within it, were not reactions to Afghanistan, but 
continuations of a long-running anti-Soviet policy – the reports were using a historical frame.  
Claiming premeditation was not a new way of reporting the situation, but this was the only time 
over the airwaves that a specific date for the anti-Soviet measures was announced. There may 
also be an element of truth in the accusation as well – although whether the reporters knew this 
at the time is unknown. Meetings were indeed held by senior members of the US 
Administration as far back as September 1979 to discuss measures to be taken should the Soviet 
Union invade Afghanistan.
386
 It would be no surprise if plans, or a doctrine of sorts, were indeed 
agreed on 12
th
 December, although it would seem that Radio Moscow still took this out of the 
context of being in reaction to Soviet actions. However, it fitted the frame of US aggression and 
exploitation of Afghanistan far better out of context. 
Broadcasts in English to Africa also chose to focus on the ideas of aggression and imperialism – 
the latter occasionally being localised in the form of colonialism. Radio Moscow informed 
African listeners that whilst Jimmy Carter praised American attempts to promote racial equality 
in South Africa, American investments actually helped ‘consolidate the racist regime’.387 
Furthermore, American actions over the entire continent ‘…amounted to encouragement of 
racists and their aggressive attacks on the frontline countries.’388 Rather than being an analysis 
of the State of the Union address, this commentary turned into a critique of United States 
actions in Africa. This was typical of the way events in January were broadcast to African 
audiences. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was reported as friendly assistance, against a 
backdrop of American imperialist expansion.
389
 Citing the Madagascan news agency, 
TARATRA, Radio Moscow informed African listeners, 
‘…the United States has 80 Air Force bases alone, around the world, not counting those 
in areas where ground forces are stationed. This network with nuclear weapons and 
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delivery vehicles belongs not to the USSR but to the United States, which thus threatens 
world peace.’390 
This was also the argument used to report to listeners of the French language African channel – 
who heard that the address supported ‘politics from a position of force and of increased military 
budget.’391 The African service used the aggression frame to report the statements from the US 
President, at the same time hearing about Soviet actions aimed at helping peace – they were told 
the Soviet Union helped to prevent US subversion in Afghanistan, the same subversive action 
that ‘…was the case in Zaire recently’.392 This is a very good example of Radio Moscow using a 
localisation frame for reporting the news – in this instance linking international events to local 
history in a drive to win over any sceptical listeners to the Soviet side.  
Even the Olympic boycott was described as an example of the ‘…hypocritical stand of this 
country [USA] towards cooperation and détente.’393 The boycotting of a sporting event was 
being portrayed as an aggressive act. Mentioned on the World Service but examined in more 
detail in English to Africa, the Carter Administration’s faux pas in asking South Africa to 
support the boycott was pounced upon by Radio Moscow, who used it as an opportunity to 
examine South Africa’s sporting failings.394 More directly, Radio Moscow quoted the version of 
events described by Ethiopian newspaper ‘Addis Zemen’ -  
‘…the US and its allies want to turn the Olympic movement into a vehicle of imperialism, 
under the pretext of the events in Afghanistan.’395  
Again, Afghanistan was a pretext, but there was a new twist on an existing frame here – the 
Olympic Games were being used for US imperialism. In broadcasts targeting other audiences, 
the Games and boycott considerations had been portrayed around the domestic issue frame. Of 
course, the credentials of the citation must be pointed out– Addis Zemen was the official 
newspaper of the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia, a communist party. The French language African 
service reported similar opinion, quoting a Pravda article that claimed ‘…the USA want to 
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secure world domination for themselves, helped in their bellicose designs by some NATO 
countries and China.’396 Whilst the threat to the Olympic Games made the airwaves, the 
overlying emphasis was still on the US aggressive imperialist aims.  
The same frame was used to report the State of the Union address via the English language 
Asian service. The immediate report to listeners told them ‘Carter reaffirmed US intentions to 
step up military preparations…’.397 In a more comprehensive report, listeners heard – 
‘Carter in his State of the Union message referred to the vital interests of the US in areas 
thousands of miles from the United States. Many Asian countries cannot but be 
alarmed… Humanite for one believes that the current strategic plans of his 
Administration are aimed at frustrating the easing of international tension.’398 
There was no mention of how it all related to Afghanistan, the focus was once more upon the 
Persian Gulf part of the address and the frame was US aggression. In l’Humanite, once more a 
non-Soviet, but pro-communist, source was used to support the argument.  
Asian English language listeners heard the State of the Union address reported separately to 
Afghanistan and the Olympic Games. There was no change in the frames used to report the 
events in Afghanistan, despite the news bulletins targeting listeners in the vicinity of the 
conflict, and there were reports about ‘Afghan forces wiping out several terrorist bands armed 
with American and Chinese weapons’.399 Problems in Afghanistan were blamed on US 
involvement. However, Radio Moscow targeted this audience by emphasising the relationship 
they perceived between imperialism and Pakistan. Listeners heard an Izvestiya report claim, 
‘after [the] imperialist[s] had lost [their] stronghold in Iran and their hopes of 
undermining revolutionary process in Afghanistan were shattered, they decided to use 
Pakistan as an instrument of their policy towards neighbouring countries, especially 
Afghanistan.’400  
Babrak Karmal called Pakistan ‘a stepping stone for armed provocations against Afghanistan’, 
and Gandhi was quoted as expressing concern over US arms to Pakistan.
401
 There was no 
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mention of Soviet acts in Afghanistan, US-Pakistan relations were key – this was, listeners 
heard, the reason behind upheaval in the region.  
For listeners to the English language Asian service, coverage of the Olympic boycott suggestion 
also neglected to mention its links with Afghanistan. The coverage was very brief, suggesting 
the frame used was one of omission, and the reporting did not focus on the call to boycott, but 
instead the reaction of foreign officials. Hence, Lord Killanin, the IOC President, was quoted 
rejecting the Games being moved, a Director of the IOC was reported as suggesting a boycott of 
the Moscow Olympics would lead to reconsideration of holding the 1984 Games in Los 
Angeles, and France was reported as rejecting the boycott call.
402
 There were no commentaries 
dealing directly with the reasons for it or how it would fail – foreign sources were used to help 
frame the boycott as a failure. As with reports to Africa, President Carter may have made a 
speech denouncing Soviet actions in Afghanistan, offering to defend the Persian Gulf from 
outside aggression, and threatening to use international sport as part of a reprisals package 
against the Kremlin, but Radio Moscow was taking his words and using them to further impress 
their own views of the United States upon the world. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
Even though President Carter’s address firmly blamed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for 
the subsequent reactions and heightening of international tension, Radio Moscow continued to 
try and disassociate the two. As the US and other states announced their responses to 
Afghanistan, Radio Moscow searched for reasons to explain these, reasons far removed from 
the Soviet invasion. In particular, the pretext and analytical frames were used, explaining away 
the reaction as both an excuse for pre-planned actions and a distraction from domestic woes. 
The personification frame also advanced at this time, with far less reporting of Afghan 
President’s Amin and Karmal, and far more concentrated focus on, primarily, President Carter 
and his personal motivations. It is clear that Radio Moscow had definitively moved away from 
the initial defensive reporting of the Soviet invasion, supplying justifications for their actions, 
and was now concentrating on attacking the reactions of certain states, and unsurprisingly 
President Carter and the United States bore the brunt of this attack. 
The three significant events discussed here emphasise some key traits of Radio Moscow. Firstly, 
the reporting of the United Nations resolution, or rather lack of it, and the contrast with the 
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attacks on the Islamic Conference, show how Soviet broadcasting, and therefore the Soviet 
hierarchy, viewed the relative strength and significance of each body. The lack of UN reporting 
suggests the broadcaster feared the strength of the body, whereas the Islamic Conference was 
viewed as weak, and a body that Radio Moscow wanted perceived as just a stooge of US 
imperialism. Secondly, the reporting of the State of the Union address shows the adaptability of 
Radio Moscow. President Carter was extremely critical of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, 
and his speech concentrated on this. However, if one only heard the reporting of Radio Moscow 
the speech would be perceived as the US aggressively announcing global expansion.  
The State of the Union address concentrated on condemning Soviet actions in Afghanistan and 
informing the world of the US response. The imperialism frame was particularly useful as a way 
to both suggest that foreign criticism of Soviet actions was being controlled from Washington, 
and that Washington was using the Soviet intervention as a smokescreen to further US goals 
around the world. There was particular emphasis on this in Arabic language broadcasts, due to 
Radio Moscow’s interpretation of the ‘Carter Doctrine’ as being aggressive, rather than 
defensive. Yet depending on which broadcast a listener heard, the speech was reported very 
differently. The localisation approach meant that listeners to the Arabic service heard reporting 
concentrating on President Carter’s expansionist aims into the Persian Gulf, listeners to the 
North American service heard the speech was part of domestic election strategy, and listeners to 
the Home service heard it was further US aggression, using Afghanistan as a pretext for pre-
planned actions. The World Service reported the speech in terms of aggression, and even 
accused the US of involving itself in Afghanistan because it had lost its Iranian foothold in the 
region. There was no one reporting frame, the speech supplied enough material for Radio 
Moscow to pick and choose, localising its reporting to better suit the audience.  
What can clearly be seen throughout the broadcasting at this time therefore is that the speech 
attacking Soviet actions in Afghanistan actually supplied Radio Moscow with enough material 
to instead try to concentrate its listeners on US domestic and foreign policy. Rather than report 
the words of the speech, Radio Moscow preferred to report analysis of the speech, explaining 
why the US was acting in this way, and carefully explaining away any insinuations that it was 
the fault of the Soviet Union, instead using factors such as electioneering or inherent US 
imperialism to explain the situation.   
Alongside these more established frames, three new ways of reporting events appeared at this 
time. These were the religious, analytical, and normalisation frames. The religious frame was 
primarily concentrated on reporting to the Middle East and Asia, and seems to have been used 
to try and emphasise the religious accessibility in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan – another 
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frame designed to push listeners away from the idea that there may be some sort of religious 
war taking place in Afghanistan. The normalisation frame began to appear here as a means of 
reporting life in Afghanistan as improving – there was greater security and people were 
beginning to go about business as usual. This frame helped reinforce the assistance frame 
previously used, to support Soviet claims that they were acting legitimately, and to show that 
the US-backed insurgents were losing. The final new frame was the analytical frame – which 
concentrated on the reasons behind the anti-Soviet backlash. Not only did this frame try to move 
the reasons for this backlash away from the invasion of Afghanistan, but it also moved 
discussion away from directly quoting the words of President Carter, Margaret Thatcher or 
others, and instead focused attention on their motivations. Analysis of, rather than mere quoting 
of, the statements and events was the way Radio Moscow proceeded in covering the State of the 
Union address, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers resolution, and the growing 
Olympic boycott campaign. But rather than defend Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Radio 
Moscow was more concerned with attacking the motives of those that had condemned those 
actions.  
 CHAPTER 6  






 February, there were significant developments for both the Olympic 
boycott campaign and for how Radio Moscow could frame events in Afghanistan. This is a 
longer time frame than the previous chapters because it covers three important but overlapping 
events related to Afghanistan and the Olympic boycott campaign. Firstly, as part of US attempts 
to gain support for the reaction to Afghanistan, especially the boycott, members of the US 
Administration visited states worldwide. Among these was the boxer Muhammad Ali, who had 




 February. Days later, the US Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, made a controversial speech at the Lake Placid Winter Olympics, calling 
for a boycott of Moscow in no uncertain terms. Secondly, during the Lake Placid Games the 
deadline set by President Carter, 19
th
 February 1980, after which the US team would boycott the 
Moscow Games unless there was a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, passed. Finally, on 
22
nd
 February, there was a major uprising in the Afghan capital, Kabul, one that Radio Moscow 
could not ignore.  
This chapter begins by analysing the frames used to report the tour of Africa by Muhammad Ali 
and the Lake Placid speech of Cyrus Vance, before moving on to examine how Radio Moscow 
compared what was happening in Lake Placid with what the Soviet broadcaster claimed would 
happen at the Moscow Games. Whilst previous chapters have examined the frames Radio 
Moscow used when reporting the speeches of President Carter, this chapter considers what 
frames were used when reporting the actions of prominent figures acting on his behalf. 
Additionally, Lake Placid provided an opportunity for Radio Moscow to emphasise the merits 
of sport as a way to bring people together outside the political realm, at a time when the US 
President was threatening to use the Olympics to make a political point. The final section, 
examining the reporting of the Afghan uprising, considers how Radio Moscow managed to 
frame the event in such a way as to fit existing frames such as imperialism, misrepresentation, 
and normalisation. Previous reporting of Afghanistan had concentrated on explaining to 
listeners around the world the reasons for the turmoil that had existed before the Soviet Union 
had sent help to the new regime, this uprising was the first time Radio Moscow had to engage 
with turmoil after the invasion. 
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6.1 RADIO MOSCOW, MUHAMMAD ALI AND CYRUS VANCE  
Muhammad Ali had been a firm supporter of the boycott campaign from the outset. Even before 
President Carter’s boycott threat, he announced that members of his gym would not be going to 
the Soviet Union for the Olympics.
403
 Coupled with his background as a black-American 
Muslim who refused to enlist for Vietnam, and his global profile as ‘the greatest’ heavyweight 
world champion, it was hardly surprising that he was asked to campaign on behalf of President 
Carter in Africa. His tour was not viewed as a success though. The first bruising encounters 
were described by The Washington Post thus -  
‘Muhammad Ali brought President Carter’s Olympic boycott campaign to Africa… and 
immediately ran into a barrage of verbal and diplomatic left hooks that left him 
wondering about the wisdom of his mission’.404 
Writing about the trip in 1993, Wenn & Wenn claimed, 
‘Ali’s selection was assailed by the US media as a foreign relations faux pas by the 
lukewarm reception he received in Africa… and Ali’s own statements which indicated a 
lack of preparation’.405 
Despite these views, the trip initially worried the Soviet Union enough for the Soviet 
Ambassador in India, where Ali was staying immediately before he flew to Africa, to argue the 
Soviet case all night and tire the boxer enough to make the first meetings in Africa a struggle.
406
 
There were protests in Africa during his visit, some undoubtedly started by Soviet activists.
407
 
This allowed Radio Moscow’s Home service to refer to an AFP [Agence France-Presse] report 
‘on a student demonstration outside the US Embassy in protest against Mohammad Ali’s 
visit’.408 The Nigerian President refused to meet Muhammad Ali, complaining that Africa had 
been sent a mere boxer whilst other regions had senior members of the Carter Administration, 
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for example Cyrus Vance went to Europe and Secretary of Defence Harold Brown to China.
409
 
This was reported by Radio Moscow, again citing a third-party source (this time Reuters), and 
Home service listeners also heard that the famous American commentator Walter Cronkite had 
commented ‘…on the folly of the mission…’.410 An emphasis on the protests and refusals to 
meet Ali allowed Radio Moscow to frame the tour as a failure, as an example of a divide 
between the US and Africa. 
By 7
th
 February, the Home service told listeners the tour had,  
‘…already become a scandal… the sportsman’s insufficient expertise in political affairs, 
the Washington administration entrusted him with persuading African states to disrupt 
the Olympic Games in Moscow. In Nigeria… neither the members of the National 
Olympic Committee nor the head of states with whom Ali requested for an audience 
wished to meet him. To top it all Radio Lagos recommended the latter-day American 
diplomat to lose no time in renouncing the mission entrusted to him in order to save the 
blushes of himself and the US administration.’411 
The important phrase in this statement was ‘disrupt the Olympic Games’ – there was no 
mention of Afghanistan, the trip was portrayed as an American attempt to damage the Moscow 
Games, not an attempt to show disgust about Soviet actions in Afghanistan. It is an example of 
Radio Moscow trying to shift the reasons behind world events. Reinforcing the divisive frame, 
there were no mentions of any successful meetings, only an emphasis on those who refused to 
meet Ali.  
The refusal by the President of Tanzania to meet Ali added to the sense of failure, with Radio 
Moscow reporting on 8
th
 February that,  
‘The boxer came in for especial criticism in the local press [Nigerian press] for allowing 
himself, as a Muslim, to be used by President Carter for political ends. Ali’s assertions 
repeating Carter’s remarks alleging the world is on the brink of world war because of the 
events in Afghanistan were laughed at by Africans. Tanzania’s President…said it was 
utter nonsense.’412 
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This partially removed the blame from Muhammad Ali – he was being used by Jimmy Carter 
for the President’s own aims. This is a similar frame to that of imperialism, in that Radio 
Moscow was emphasising that it was the US President influencing the actions of others – 
instead of it being other countries or whole regional groups, such as the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, this time Carter was exploiting a specific person. Continuing the theme that 
the US was exaggerating the events in Afghanistan, and to show Home listeners that foreign 
groups disagreed with the US President, Africans were said to find Carter’s views laughable.  
Of most interest here though is the phrase, ‘…himself, as a Muslim…’. The implication given 
was that Muslims were, or should have been, against the boycott and against the US view on 
Afghanistan. Radio Moscow may have been determined to avoid religious connotations with 
regard to the war in Afghanistan, but, as with the accusations about the Islamic Conference, they 
were not afraid to insinuate that the United States was trying to exploit religion for its own ends 
– in this instance specifically sending a Muslim to Africa to build support for the boycott.  
Despite the high profile nature of the trip, Radio Moscow did not cover it to the same degree in 
broadcasts to other audiences. There were some brief reports via the World Service, 
commenting on Ali’s failures in Nigeria and Tanzania, and the Africa service claimed Ali 
‘doesn’t seem to have understood his new role of political ambassador and had expected that his 
tour of Africa could cause any other reaction than but that of an approval.’413 French broadcasts 
to Africa also carried a disapproving line – ‘…the trip of Mohammad Ali in the African 
countries goes ahead, always for dishonest aims’, and ‘benefited neither him nor those who sent 
him’414. However, despite brief comment in broadcasts to France describing Ali’s cool reception 
in Nigeria, and a commentary by TASS reproduced for audiences listening in Serbo-Croat, 
which focused on a US expedition to Africa with a ‘former world boxing champion’, not 
naming Ali, Radio Moscow was largely quiet on a tour that was also criticised within the US.
415
  
Within the Soviet Union itself, reports also used an exploitation frame to suggest that both Ali 
and his religion were being exploited by the US President for political gains. Radio Moscow 
also claimed the lack of success he enjoyed on tour was indicative of an African dislike of the 
boycott idea. It was as if Ali’s tour was set up to be a public relations coup for the Soviet Union 
– an almost ready-made opportunity to show the boycott campaign was failing. Yet it was an 
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opportunity Radio Moscow chose not to capitalise on. Although the supposed failings of the 
tour appeared to hand Radio Moscow some great anti-boycott publicity, the lack of use suggests 
that, perhaps like the United Nations, the broadcaster found it difficult to criticise Muhammad 
Ali. They did not want to publicise his tour and perhaps make listeners wonder why such a 
world-famous sporting icon, Muslim, anti-war protestor, and of course Olympic champion, was 
promoting the boycott of an Olympic Games.  
Moving away from the specific failings of Ali’s tour, Home service listeners heard on 8th 
February - 
‘It seems that Muhammad Ali’s fiasco has forced Washington to adopt other measures. 
UP, relying on government circles, reports that the US President Carter has decided to 
send the Secretary of State, Vance, to Lake Placid… not in the capacity of a lover of 
sporting spectacles. The aim of the visit is to persuade members of the International 
Olympic Committee to boycott…’416 
This statement all but ended Radio Moscow’s coverage of Ali’s trip – the final review came on 
11
th
 February, with the Home service International Diary program reporting that,  
‘He admits that his trip was ‘not a complete success’: many African countries refused to 
boycott the Olympics… His trip has shown that the independent African countries do not 
wish to follow blindly the anti-Soviet campaign that is being whipped up by 
Washington… it is better to be at home than to fly thousands of miles to take part in a 
disreputable mission even for the President himself.’417 
Within this statement there is a clear allusion to the idea that those who had joined the boycott 
were not ‘independent’ – they were countries that relied on the United States. This links back to 
the initial frame Radio Moscow used to report on the states that joined the boycott campaign, 
that they were reliant on the United States – the imperialism frame. Ali’s trip was also reported 
through the frame of exploitation, by either President Carter or the US Administration. It seems 
that when they did report on the trip, Radio Moscow tried to shift the blame for Ali’s words 
away from the boxer himself and onto the US leadership – thus continuing the theme that all the 
anti-Soviet actions and statements in recent weeks were in some way directed by the White 
House.  
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Before Cyrus Vance made his speech, Radio Moscow tried to portray his appearance as a direct 
consequence of Ali’s failure in Africa.418 This was not a widely reported argument, it appears it 
was only heard by Soviet listeners, and it missed the point that no African teams took part in the 
winter Olympics – Vance was lobbying a different audience. However, reporting this way 
suggested a grasping at events by the US, rather than a concerted and planned approach.  
So Cyrus Vance arrived in Lake Placid and used the opportunity to attack the Soviet Union over 
Afghanistan and demand the Moscow Games be moved or boycotted.
419
 He failed to gain any 
applause from his audience – unsurprisingly considering they made up the International 
Olympic Committee delegation and various other dignitaries related to the world of sport.
420
 
Vance spoke of the ‘honour to welcome this distinguished Committee to the United States and 
to Lake Placid, and to welcome athletes from around the world to the 1980 Winter Olympics.’421 
However, rather than praise the upcoming Games, he focused on Afghanistan. He claimed 
‘…the Olympics have symbolised some of humanity’s noblest principles. Foremost among 
these is peace.’422 Vance’s point was simple –  
‘In the view of my government, it would be a violation of this fundamental Olympic 
principle to conduct or attend Olympic Games in a nation which is currently engaging in 
an aggressive war, and has refused to comply with the world community’s demand to halt 
its aggression and withdraw its forces.’423  
He went on to justify why the Soviet team was allowed, in the view of the US Administration, 
to attend the Winter Games –  
‘This is not a question of whether a national team should be barred from competing on 
political grounds. We welcome every team this Committee has invited… The question… is 
whether the Games should be held in a country which is itself committing a serious 
breach of international peace. It is our conviction that to do so would be wholly 
inconsistent with the meaning of the Olympics… To hold the Olympics in any nation that 
is warring on another is to lend the Olympic mantle to that nation’s actions.’424 
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Vance was clearly not going to get a standing ovation, and Radio Moscow made sure listeners 
around the world knew that this was the case. The broadcaster did not hide why Cyrus Vance 
was in Lake Placid – ‘to campaign for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics’, and to repeat ‘the 
request of the American government for a change in the venue or a cancelation of the 
Olympics’.425 However, on behalf of the International Olympic Committee Lord Killanin was 
cited by Radio Moscow as saying that it ‘is inadmissible for sport to be used for political 
aims’.426 Killanin’s quote helped Radio Moscow frame the boycott campaign, and the United 
States, as being wrong – without having to mention Afghanistan.   
As with Radio Moscow coverage of President Carter’s addresses in January, the specifics of 
Vance’s speech were bypassed, instead the analytical frame was applied and listeners heard 
about the reasons for the speech and the reaction. Citing an AFP story, on 10
th
 February Home 
service listeners heard the speech was, 
‘…met with the indignation of the majority of this [the IOC] Committee. As the French 
NOC representative… stated, Vance went beyond all limits, carrying on the election 
campaign of President Carter…’427  
Not only was Vance’s speech framed as a disaster based on the reaction of the committee, but 
the whole reasoning for his speech was based on the domestic issue frame, in particular the US 
election campaign, and not anger over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Later the same day, 
listeners were told it was –  
‘…a speech which, according to the opinion shared by those assembled, was 
unprecedented in the history of IOC sessions. (?The speech abounded in terminology) 
borrowed from the Cold War arsenal. The State Secretary, on behalf of the US President, 
again voiced provocative demands to transfer or boycott the Olympic Games in 
Moscow.’428 
Vance’s speech was provocative, it was demanding, but it was dismissed by the Soviet 
broadcaster as merely Cold War rhetoric that was met with amazement by leaders of the 
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 All these points were used to reinforce that the boycott was a failure. 
What is more, as with President Carter’s State of the Union address, despite the speech focusing 
on Afghanistan, Radio Moscow did not report the link to Afghanistan once.  
Apart from broadcasts to Home service listeners, these were the only transcripts of broadcasts 
covering Vance’s speech found in the BBC Monitoring archive. However, the words of Lord 
Killanin, the IOC President, which were directly related to Vance’s speech, did gain coverage 
throughout the Radio Moscow world. The broadcaster reported that he had said ‘sport must not 
be used for political purposes’.430 Yet what Killanin actually said was slightly different -  
‘Solutions to the political problems of the world are not the responsibility of sporting 
bodies… do not use athletes for the solution of political problems.’431  
Using sport for political purposes is different to using it to solve political problems. The word 
‘purpose’ suited the portrayal of the boycott as a part of a wider US scheming. Afghanistan was 
the political ‘problem’ Killanin alluded to, but by slightly adjusting the word used by the IOC 
President, Radio Moscow could more easily fit the statement into its various frames reporting 
the boycott campaign – such as trying to link it to imperialist ambitions or domestic issues. As 
with the reporting of Muhammad Ali’s tour, coverage of Cyrus Vance’s speech, or rather the 
reaction to it, appears to have been confined to the Home service. It seems Radio Moscow was 
determined to frame the actions of both men as failures through emphasis on the outrage and 
lack of support from those they addressed. Radio Moscow also avoided acknowledging that the 
invasion of Afghanistan was the real reason behind both visits. 
6.2 OLYMPIC GAMES: LAKE PLACID VERSUS MOSCOW 
Alongside reporting the Lake Placid results, Radio Moscow also took the opportunity to 
compare and, in particular, contrast the facilities available in New York State with those soon to 
be available in Moscow. This appears to have started the moment comments on Cyrus Vance 





 February, this began with complaints over the treatment of Soviet athletes on their 
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way to Lake Placid, and continued with criticism of the facilities.
432
  The Olympic village was 
the main cause of concern – and it was not only Radio Moscow that was critical. Sports 
Illustrated, the US sports magazine, was also not pleased with the village. It was newly built 
and had, according to the promotion material, a ‘…primary goal… to insure a happy, 
memorable visit for these world class athletes, to create a home away from home.’433 The 
problem was that the funding for the village had come from the US Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
and the whole village was to become a prison after the Games.
434
 It seems it was a prison 
adapted for a sporting event, rather than a sports facility ready to be adapted to a prison. Sports 
Illustrated reported that ‘…around this jail a revolt, unprecedented in Olympic history, has 
broken out… a growing number of teams refuse to be incarcerated there’.435 Olympic teams 
have to pay for the use of the Olympic village, whether or not they actually use it, and this rule, 
combined with complaints about the facilities, led to a Director of the IOC announcing that, 
‘This time the accommodations are so poor that delegations will not have to pay for them if they 
move somewhere else.’436 This was yet more material from Lake Placid that Radio Moscow 
could use to highlight the differences between the Winter Games and the upcoming Summer 
Games, or, at a more political level, to highlight the superiority of forthcoming Soviet facilities 
over those of its Cold War rival, the USA.  
Radio Moscow got down into the detail about this, telling Home service listeners - 
‘…the Olympic participants are now living practically in windowless cells, sleep on bunk 
beds and the crampedness of the room is such that two persons can hardly fail to bump 
into each other. And it isn’t surprising; they have only six square metres of residential 
floor space. There is one toilet for 28 people and one shower room… ventilation bad… 
rooms not kept at a reasonable temperature…terrible living conditions… mockery of 
human dignity... the best American sportsmen are not living in Lake Placid at all.’437  
However, the US magazine Sports Illustrated also commented on such issues, describing the 
rooms as ‘…tiny to the point of incipient claustrophobia’.438 Unlike with Afghanistan news, 
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Radio Moscow reporting of the Lake Placid facilities was not framed in an exceptional manner, 
it seems to have merely followed the general trend of many news outlets – one of criticism. 
Further criticism of the Games came due to claims of costly products and bad organisation in 
and around Lake Placid. Radio Moscow cited AFP and Reuters reports on a ‘lack of amenities 
and high prices’ as further proof of the struggles the Olympic movement was having in the 
United States.
439
 The Home service even reported on ‘The Chaos at Lake Placid’ with a 
summary of world news on the matter.
440
 This included stories such as,  
‘... lack of buses… several people have been taken to hospital after standing in freezing 
queues… poor accommodation for judges; journalists complain of being housed too far 
away… enormous dogs searching for the possible presence of drugs.’441  
North American listeners heard that,  
‘…many people had already warned about the difficulties in the organisation at Lake 
Placid. The prediction came true… in the first days of the Games the transportation 
problem was admitted by the authorities, and complaints were numerous about services 
such as lack of restaurants and cafes, and rip-off prices. Newsmen complained about 
communications and insufficient information. The athletes were put up in a building 
which will be used as a penitentiary when the Games are over… imagine the hullaballoo 
the US media would raise if this happened in Moscow during the summer Olympics.
442
  
Radio Moscow broadcast variations of these criticisms throughout its network – World Service 
listeners even heard about ‘breaches of the victory ceremony rules’.443 However, the key point 
was made in the North American broadcast – if these problems had happened in the Soviet 
Union, what would the US media have made of it? It was a point designed to suggest that there 
was anti-Sovietism inherent in US reporting, something applicable to more than just sports 
reporting.  
Whilst North American listeners heard this, the crux of the report to Soviet listeners really 
honed in on how the Olympic boycott campaign had affected Lake Placid – ‘…the Americans 
were making so much noise about boycotting the Olympics that they forgot to organise the 
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Winter Olympics at Lake Placid even tolerably well.’444 The potential for boycott remained a 
constant narrative in the reporting throughout the Lake Placid Games, with one Soviet 
commentator claiming he had ‘…tears of pride and bitterness in his eyes…’ as ‘the competition 
in Lake Placid is taking place to an accompaniment of a furious anti-Soviet campaign unleashed 
by the ruling circles of the USA.’445 It was the ruling circles of the USA, not the USA as a 
whole, who Radio Moscow claimed were instigating the campaign. From Vance to Carter to 
Brown, it was members of the US Administration turning up and trying to influence 
committees, sportsmen and the public. The boycott reporting used an adaptation of the divisive 
frame to show it was the campaign of a government administration and not a people. However, 
all of this was combined with criticism of the US Administration’s attitude to the Olympic 
movement to create a large picture of anti-US discord around the world.
446
  
The reason for all these comments appears quite simple – they were designed to contrast with 
the upcoming summer Games in Moscow, to show Soviet superiority. Lord Killanin had noted 
the progress made in Moscow, with the Soviet Olympic village reported to be 90% complete, 
‘…with only finishing work remaining to be done, and would be commissioned very soon.’447  
The workers had even set up a ‘special subbotnik for peace’, with earnings going to the peace 
fund.
448
 A ‘subbotnik’ was a voluntary day of work – this suggested the people were firmly 
behind the government over the Olympics, in contrast to the divisiveness between government 
and people Radio Moscow suggested existed in the US and elsewhere. By 20
th
 February, Radio 
Moscow was telling Soviet listeners about the new international and long-distance telephone 
exchange opened for journalists in time for the summer Games, as well as how the 
refurbishment and modernisation of the Olympic stadium was now complete, after two and a 
half years, and the stadium was ready for the Games.
449
 There was even a report on traffic 
management strategy during the Games, explaining the restrictions on various types of vehicle, 
and a new traffic management system that would increase the capacity of Moscow’s roads by 
20%, whilst reducing the number of accidents by 10%.
450
 This was in stark contrast to the 
reports about facilities and traffic management at Lake Placid, once again highlighting 
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 There was however, one story that praised the Lake Placid 
Games though, and it focused on the atmosphere – which ‘was an answer to those who are 
attempting to undermine the Olympic movement.’452 At least Lake Placid managed something 
right – something that could be used to condemn the proposed boycott of the summer Games. 
There were stories contrasting Lake Placid with Moscow, as outlined above, but the majority of 
reports, five months before the Games were due to open, were not about facilities or sportsmen 
– the majority of the stories revolving around it were concentrated on the boycott proposal. 
President Carter’s boycott threat was less than a month old at this point, his demand for troops 
to withdraw from Afghanistan by 19
th
 February was passing as the Lake Placid Games 
commenced. Yet Radio Moscow did not dwell on this. When telling listeners about the boycott, 
the station focused on those who were annoyed by it and those who had rejected it. There was 
an element of localisation applied to these reports. For example, British & Irish service listeners 
heard in a listeners’ letters show about the ‘…slanderous campaign to boycott the Moscow 
Olympics… in the Western media’, African listeners heard an African sports official refute 
doubts over African participation, Serb-Croat listeners heard that the US Olympic Committee 
was against the boycott, and North American listeners heard a US weightlifter condemn 
Carter’s boycott attempts.453  
There was a difference between regions here, Eastern European listeners and those listening to 
the Arabic service tended to hear far less criticism of the boycott and far more praise for the 
Moscow Games. For example, Czech listeners heard about the excellent conditions for 
journalists in Moscow, Hungarian listeners heard about Hungarian deliveries to Moscow for the 
Games, Arabic listeners heard praise for the Olympic preparation made by the Algerian 
embassy.
454
 However, Polish listeners were told alongside how the Olympic Games symbolise 
peace that the ‘US Cold War attitude and Government pressure on athletes is unprecedented’.455 
The Radio Moscow message may have varied within regions, but the overall statement was 
clear – there was criticism for the boycott and praise for the preparations made in Moscow. 
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However, there was no mention of the reason the United States was pressing for a boycott. On 
12
th
 February, the Home Service gave listeners a commentary headlined ‘USA- To Destroy the 
Olympic Movement’.456 The purpose of the piece was to tell listeners,  
‘…the White House let it be known that it intends to destroy the IOC if it does not 
capitulate in the face of American pressure. Carter is using his pressure, also via US 
allies in NATO, in order to thwart the Moscow Olympic Games and to prove that he is 
capable of achieving this. It has never happened before that a President… tried to trifle 
with the fate of the Olympic movement, with the fate of the sportsmen who have gathered 
to show their physical strength, stamina and skill, for his narrow political aims, the aims 
of the election campaign.’457  
The conclusion was clear, the boycott campaign was due to Jimmy Carter’s desire for re-
election. There was no mention of punishing the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, 
but the report used the frames of people harm, domestic issues, and imperialism (in terms of the 
US trying to force its will on others). Additionally, there was the harm frame, as a means of 
emphasising what the US policies were supposedly doing to the entire Olympic movement. 
Furthermore, a quantity frame was employed to show it was a campaign lacking support across 
the spectrum. Not only did Radio Moscow tell Soviet listeners that Soviet citizens were 
indignant over US Olympic attitudes, but it also reported on the rejection of the boycott by the 
majority of the IOC, by an Hungarian sports official, the Japanese Olympic Committee (who 
had condemned Carter’s use of the Games for election purposes), and even the Los Angeles 
Olympic Committee and a pro-Games group in California.
458
 Soviet listeners also heard that the 
European Economic Community (EEC) Foreign Ministers had refused to discuss the boycott, 
that 80% of West German sportsmen (in a poll) were against ‘Carter’s Olympic boycott’, and, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, a Cuban world boxing champion was reported as being against ‘Carter’s 
plans to boycott…’.459 However, supporting Jimmy Carter was Margaret Thatcher, who had told 
the British Olympic Association to boycott, and apparently flown into a rage in the House of 
Commons and shrieked hysterically against the Moscow Olympics.
460
 Shrieking hysterically 
and raging over the Moscow Games hardly sound like rational actions, perhaps suggesting the 
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boycott itself was not a rational or logical action. This was not something that was repeated to 
listeners in Britain & Ireland.  
There were similarities between the reporting of the Winter Olympics and the Summer Olympic 
boycott campaign. Lake Placid was presented via Radio Moscow broadcasting as a disorganised 
shambles, through examples of transportation problems and facilities issues, and the boycott 
campaign, with its lack of support and failures in Africa and Lake Placid, was also presented as 
failing in the same shambolic fashion. They were also both accused of not considering the needs 
of the ordinary person, whether athlete or citizen. However, the most significant development at 
this time was the increasing emphasis on why the boycott campaign was failing. Previously, it 
had just been dismissed, but now Radio Moscow was increasingly using news stories as 
examples to fit into a boycott failure frame, from athletes’ condemnation, to state officials 
refusing to meet boycott advocates such as Muhammad Ali, and other groups just rejecting the 
boycott out of hand. As the boycott campaign became more serious, the broadcaster began to 
frame it more around domestic issues, as it had been doing with reporting of the wider reaction 
to Afghanistan. These took the place of the invasion of Afghanistan in reporting the reasons 
behind the boycott campaign.   
6.3 REPORTING ON AFGHANISTAN 
6.3.1 Before the Uprising 
The big event in Afghanistan during February was not on the 19
th
, the deadline demanded for 
Soviet withdrawal, but instead on the 22
nd
, the day of a mass uprising in Kabul against the 
Soviet-backed government.
461
 It did not suggest safety and security, or seem to support the 
normalisation frame, yet Radio Moscow still used it to reinforce and further justify Soviet 
actions. After the uprising, which was only briefly reported, there were stories about how 
patriotic Afghans had repelled the CIA/imperialist inspired uprising and how Kabul was 
‘normalising’.462 Helping to support the reporting on Afghanistan, at the base of each story 
remained two clear points – it was foreign groups causing problems for the Afghan population, 
and the foreign insurgents were losing. 
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Examples of this were bountiful throughout the month – on 5th February, Soviet listeners were 
told that,  
‘Afghan army units with the population’s support crushed a well-equipped gang in the 
Badakshan province. Another gang is currently being liquidated in the Paktis province. 
These gangs, according to testimony of those taken captive have been trained in Pakistan 
and were equipped with US weapons.’463  
Two frames can be seen clearly here. Firstly, the subversion frame – the common claim that the 
insurgents in Afghanistan were funded externally, particularly by the United States. Secondly, 
and more common to broadcasts targeting Soviet listeners, there was an emphasis on the Afghan 
army and the Afghan people defeating the insurgents. This was a newly emerging frame – that 
of ‘Afghan leadership’, and it was especially prominent in broadcasts via the Home service. 
Soviet troops were not mentioned as being in the front line, perhaps as a way of reassuring any 
parents of Soviet soldiers listening and also as a way of playing down the Soviet military 
involvement. In reality Soviet troops were far more involved on the front line than was 
admitted.
464
 Radio Moscow may have used the assistance frame when reporting on Soviet 
actions in Afghanistan, supplying friendly assistance under treaty obligations, but they did not 
mention what the friendly assistance was actually doing. Instead, it was the Afghans, both 
civilian and military, who were reported as defeating the insurgents.   
Variations of this report were also heard via the World Service, the English language service to 
Asia, in French broadcasts all over the world, and across both Eastern and Western Europe.
465
 
The World Service report even went into some detail about how Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US 
National Security Adviser, had visited the training grounds of the gangs, even holding their 
weaponry – these gangs were labelled ‘terrorists’ and accused of brutally murdering students.466 
This report personally linked a member of the US government with those Radio Moscow 
accused of murdering innocents.  
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Contrasting these claims were reports such as ‘the Afghan people are taking all steps to protect 
the independence and territorial integrity of the country and ensure a safe and peaceful life.’467 
Events in Afghanistan were being reported using the frames of Afghan leadership and foreign 
insurgency. Thus, in one stroke, reporting the defeat of the insurgents seemingly justified why 
the Soviet Union were in Afghanistan, whilst also highlighting the use of US weapons by the 
enemy – weapons endorsed by key members of the US Administration. In addition, the 
statement implied the Afghan population supported the Afghan leadership. Strong words 
appeared too, such as ‘crushing’, ‘liquidated’ and ‘terrorist’ leaving no margin for doubt – the 
Afghan army and the Afghan people were beating the rebels and bandits ‘trained in 
Pakistan…with US weapons’.468   
However, coverage of the uprising did not seem to appear in broadcasts to North America, 
Britain & Ireland, or via Radio Moscow’s Arabic services. Instead, in an example of how Radio 
Moscow localised its broadcasting, the radio used reports of prominent figures denouncing 
interference in Afghanistan – thus rather than hearing exactly what was happening, listeners 
heard others denounce what Radio Moscow reported was happening. Hence, whilst Soviet 
listeners heard that Afghan people had helped fight off foreign insurgents, listeners in North 
America instead heard more about Amin’s plans for a pro-US dictatorship and the Amin terror – 
both subtle justifications for the Soviet intervention.
469
 More overtly, North American listeners 
also heard the rather vague reference to ‘…broad circles of the international press express[ing] 
concern…’ about US interference in Afghanistan, along with specific references to leaders, such 
as Indian Prime Minister Gandhi denouncing US arms to Pakistan, and the Soviet newspaper 
Pravda restating that the Soviet Union would leave Afghanistan when all the other foreign 
invaders had withdrawn.
470
 The US stand was portrayed as causing concern internationally, and 
quoting Pravda was an attempt to put the emphasis back on the United States – once they went, 
so would the Soviet Union. Once again, the Soviet action in Afghanistan was reported in a 
defensive manner – using the assistance frame, it was the Soviet Union stepping in to help its 
neighbour thwart the aggressive plans of the United States.  
The same frames were applied to the situation via the Britain & Ireland service, with the 
addition that British involvement in Afghanistan and elsewhere was due to a desire to copy the 
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 One report about this was followed by an examination of Western press 
reporting about Afghanistan, making sure listeners knew that anti-Afghan activities had been 
going on for many years, thus reporting the problems in the country using an historical frame to 
disassociate events from Soviet movements.
472
 As with the North American broadcasting 
through, the reporting focused on the reasons behind foreign reporting and foreign actions, not 
on the situation in Afghanistan or any Soviet or Afghan troop movements. The situation in 
Afghanistan was being reported not around the actions on the ground, but with a concentration 
on what was behind the reactions of outside states.  
The Arabic service also did not focus on fighting and it did not concentrate on the reasons for 
foreign involvement either. Instead, the major concern was informing listeners about the 
religious aspects of life in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. It carried reports of the ‘Prophet’s 
birthday celebrated in Afghanistan’, a talk on Muslim life in the Soviet Union which moved on 
to criticise US actions in and around Afghanistan as ‘denounced by God the Almighty’, and a 
piece citing Babrak Karmal’s defence of the Soviet intervention, originally made in The 
Times.
473
 Clearly, this was another attempt to play down the fears religious leaders had about the 
Soviet Union, and, as with the reporting of the Islamic Conference, to avoid any suggestions 
that there was a religious war going on with the Soviet Union. Quite the opposite in fact, as 
listeners heard that ‘the Afghani people and all the Muslims [are standing] in cohesion with the 
new government and are decisively standing up to the plans of imperialism’.474 Arabic service 
listeners did not hear any talk of blaming religion for the upheaval in Afghanistan, it was 
imperialism that was causing the problems.  
However, going against this religious frame, the problems in Afghanistan were blamed on a 
religious group in a broadcast to the Soviet Home service –  
‘[those who] burn down houses and schools, murder teachers and party activists and 
carry out reprisals against children, women and old men… are members of the terrorist 
organisation “Muslim Brethren”’.475  
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Soviet troops were in Afghanistan to help stop ‘terrorists’ murdering presumably innocent 
groups, which was a common way the broadcaster framed the situation. However, adding an 
element of religion to the disturbances was rare for Radio Moscow, and nothing like this was 
ever heard on the Arabic service. Even criticism of Pakistan seems to have been kept to a 
minimum via the Arabic service, there were no mentions of training camps or a US arms deal. 
As with the North American and Britain & Ireland services, there was nothing specific on any 
actions or events taking place in Afghanistan, just the assertion that the United States was 
behind it all.  
On the eve of the Kabul uprising, Radio Moscow was telling the world how Pashtun elders were 
ready to defend Afghanistan from imperialism. Home service listeners heard that there had been 
a large Soviet-Afghan meeting and that Afghans had praised the new stage of the April 
revolution.
476
 A ‘message to the Ministry of Border Affairs’ appeared in broadcasts to Asia, 
North America, and via the World Service, informing listeners that ‘the elders in the Pashto 
tribes living in the areas bordering with Pakistan have declared their readiness to defend 
Afghanistan against imperialist interference.’477 This all fitted with how the situation in 
Afghanistan had been portrayed ever since the Soviet advance in December 1979. The 
imperialism frame was again emphasised, but coming to prominence now was the Afghan 
control frame – it was the Afghan people who were ready to fight imperialism, there was no 
mention of the Soviet military assistance. 
 This Afghan control frame also appeared via the North American service on 21
st
 February, the 
day before the uprising -  
‘According to reports from Kabul, mass rallies and demonstrations in support of the 
people’s Government and against interference in the country’s affairs by the United 
States and China have been taking place in other provinces in Afghanistan.’478  
This was a rare occurrence of Radio Moscow reporting events in Afghanistan to North 
American listeners, but then it was about support not conflict. It also reinforced the frames used 
to report the situation around US insurgency and widespread Afghan support for the Soviet 
backed regime, and the broadcast itself is another example of a method Radio Moscow often 
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used for reporting news – citing an external source. The following day there was a major 
uprising in Kabul.  
6.3.2 Reporting the Uprising 
The first reports of the uprising appeared at 1430 [GMT] in broadcasts to the Soviet Union. 
Reporting on an official statement from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan, the 
broadcast declared that – 
‘…on the morning of 22nd February, foreign agents and mercenaries, British, US, 
Pakistani and Chinese henchmen, resorted to open instigation and subversive actions in 
Kabul, attempting to disturb the peace in the city. In the interests of observing the 
democratic standards, the government of Afghanistan strove to prevent these 
inflammatory actions. However, the venal mercenaries, (? and contingents of) the 
country’s national (?? Army), began openly to indulge in a plunderous pogrom. In order 
to secure safety of the life and to safeguard the property of the citizens of Kabul, the 
Afghan Ministry of Internal Affairs found it necessary to declare martial law in the city 
and to undertake the most decisive measures against those guilty of the actions. A curfew 
has been declared in the city… The government of Afghanistan is in full control of the 
situation.’479 
The same statement was also broadcast via the Dari service to Afghanistan, emphasising the 
involvement of the United States and China.
480
 The uprising was a major event and listeners to 
Radio Moscow services worldwide heard how the foreign mercenary led uprising had been put 
down, although all the reporting had an after-the-event air to it – the uprising had been put 
down and the government was in control. It was not reported as an Afghan uprising against the 
Soviet-backed Karmal government though. The uprising was reported using the subversion 
frame, in this instance listing a host of agents and mercenaries from foreign states. However, the 
key phrase was ‘plunderous pogrom’, suggesting the uprising was motivated by theft and 
damage rather than politics. Those committing the uprising were ‘mercenaries’ – another word 
evoking ideas of people motivated by greed and not much else. Just as significantly was the way 
the Afghan government was reported as being in full control of the situation – not only was 
there the implication of it acting quickly, but also acting decisively.  
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Initial reports of the uprising as heard by World Service listeners also blamed ‘agents of Britain, 
US, Pakistan and China’, but there was an additional emphasis on control – ‘The Ministry of the 
Interior underlined that the government was in full control of the situation and was capable to 
resist any provocations and aggression.’481 Later in the day, listeners heard that, ‘the Afghan 
security forces have arrested a CIA agent, Robert Lee, in Kabul. Sixteen Pakistani and a group 
of counter-revolutionaries have also been arrested… foreign agents attempted to provoke unrest 
in the city’.482 This reemphasised several frames used to report Afghanistan. Firstly, the Afghan 
leadership frame, secondly, that it was US led subversion causing disturbances, thirdly, the 
insurgency frame highlighting that those causing trouble in Afghanistan were not only backed 
by foreign regimes, but were foreign people themselves – it was not the Afghan people rising 
up.  The Afghan government, Radio Moscow announced, had condemned ‘the undeclared war 
against Afghanistan’.483 Except for blaming foreign agents, there were no reports about why the 
uprising took place, but there was an emphasis on how the situation had been resolved and how 
the Soviet-backed Afghan government was in control, beating the foreign funded insurgents, 
one of whom Radio Moscow was able to name as a CIA agent. 
North American and British & Irish listeners heard the situation reported using the same frames. 
There was admittance that there was an uprising, but that it was firmly because of ‘foreign 
agents’ and that the government was back in control having declared martial law.484 Again, the 
report used the Afghan leadership frame to show that the Afghan government was in control and 
beating the foreign insurgents – there was no mention of Soviet troops helping to quell the 
uprising, or indeed any Soviet involvement. To whichever region Radio Moscow broadcast, the 
point was clear – the uprising had failed.485 
Reports about the aftermath of the uprising also made it onto the airwaves of Eastern Europe. 
However, these reports were brief and may have led listeners in some states to wonder what had 
happened in Afghanistan. Bulgarian listeners heard about martial law being declared; Czech and 
Slovak listeners heard that the Afghan government had arrested ‘US-trained terrorists’; 
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Hungarian and Polish listeners heard that a state of emergency had been declared in Kabul, due 
to ‘foreign agents and mercenaries trying to disturb the tranquillity of Kabul’.486 Serb-Croat 
listeners were told that the foreign agents and mercenaries were ‘openly plundering and setting 
fires… the government is in full control of the situation’.487 As with other broadcast regions, 
Radio Moscow wanted to suggest a non-political reason for the uprising, to emphasise the role 
of foreign mercenaries in Afghanistan and to make clear the government was in control.  
Radio Moscow broadcasts in Arabic did not carry news of the uprising at all. This would 
suggest that whilst the Soviet Union was willing to admit troubles to the rest of the world, with 
the caveat that they had been overcome, to the Arabic Persian service listeners it did not want to 
mention anything. There were still reports about the Afghan government accusing the US of an 
undeclared war, and of the Afghan appeal against ‘imperialist sabotage’, but BBC Monitoring 
records no mention of the uprising.
488
 There was also a rare instance of criticism of Pakistan’s 
involvement in Afghanistan.
489
 However, several days after the event, reports stated Kabul was 
‘normalising’, but not from what.490 The word ‘normalising’ was used to frame the situation in 
Afghanistan via many different broadcasts, in an attempt to reiterate the improvements being 
made in the country with Soviet assistance.   
Even where Radio Moscow did not report the initial uprising in Kabul to an audience, they 
reported the situation in Kabul in terms of the normalisation frame, trying to emphasise how 
peace and quiet was returning to the streets.
491
 Rather than focus on the uprising itself, Radio 
Moscow was framing reports around the idea that the situation in Kabul was improving.  
Describing the situation in this way allowed Radio Moscow to suggest that government and 
officials were in control, to imply a normal state of affairs for the people, and to reaffirm, for 
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those who may have been questioning it, the reason why the Soviet troops were in Afghanistan 
at this time and the success they were having.  
In the days after the uprising, Radio Moscow reiterated TASS claims of US, Chinese, Pakistan 
and British involvement in Afghanistan, the objective being to leave listeners with no doubts as 
to who caused the problems in Kabul.
492
 Additionally, the insurgents were accused of beginning 
‘…to stage pogroms and kill women and children’.493 The foreign funded insurgents were 
murdering innocents, and the word ‘pogrom’ was suggestive of systematic murder and 
destruction. The statement was using a people harm frame to show what foreign funding was 
doing. For the first time, the World Service also implied the use of Soviet troops to dispel the 
uprising – ‘…Soviet troops were introduced to Afghanistan, at the Afghan Government’s 
request, to repel aggression.’494 It did not specifically say Soviet troops were involved in 
stopping the uprising, but the implication here was they were. This was not repeated on the 
Home service.   
Before the uprising the Home service had repeated a claim made in a Pravda article that there 
was an ‘Undeclared War on Afghanistan’.495 This was later repeated via the English language 
World Service, although this time attributed to the Kabul New Times.
496
 By the end of the month 
this same statement, an ‘undeclared war’, was being reiterated, only this time with the 
addendum that the Soviet Union would only withdraw from Afghanistan once the United States 
had withdrawn. The ‘undeclared war’ was a justification for Soviet involvement, and meant 
they could, with the feeling that they had justified their position, cite the likes of Brezhnev, who 
North American listeners heard on the 27
th
 February had said the Soviet Union would withdraw 
from Afghanistan when the foreign aggression went.
497
 The following day, US listeners heard 
Vladimir Pozner’s commentary on the situation, in which he reiterated, almost verbatim, 
Brezhnev’s statement – 
‘We will be ready to begin withdrawing our troops as soon as an end is put to all forms of 
outside interference aimed against the Government and people of Afghanistan. Let the 
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United States, together with Afghanistan’s neighbours guarantee that, and the need for 
Soviet military aid in Afghanistan will cease to exist.’498  
Brezhnev was blaming the United States for the problems in Afghanistan and, as with previous 
reports, was placing the emphasis on them, rather than the Soviet Union, to improve the 
situation. For devoted listeners to Radio Moscow, this would have been entirely understandable 
– whichever region of the world they were in they would have heard about US, Chinese, British, 
or other imperialist interference in Afghanistan.
499
 Home Service listeners even heard a 
reiteration of an Izvestiya report about how Afghans ‘speak with gratitude and great warmth 
about the peace-loving foreign policy position of the Soviet Union’ – again justifying Soviet 
involvement.
500
 Listeners in some regions may not have heard about specific events, but the 
Soviet broadcaster was attempting to make clear throughout February that the problems, even 
those unreported by Radio Moscow, were caused by the US and its allies, and that normal 
Afghans favoured Soviet assistance.  
Radio Moscow also reiterated claims that the previous President of Afghanistan, Hafizullah 
Amin, had been accused of planning a pro-US dictatorship.
501
 They continued to press the 
assertion that the United States had been operating in Afghanistan since long before the Soviet 
Union was forced to intervene, using a history frame to give listeners the impression that the 
Soviet intervention had not caused the current situation. Home service listeners heard that the 
CIA had been involved for more than a year, World Service listeners heard the agency had been 
involved ‘for many months’, whilst listeners to the Britain & Ireland service heard this 
involvement stretched back over 3 years to 1977!
502
 Radio Moscow was hitting back at 
accusations about Soviet actions in Afghanistan by claiming the CIA, and the United States in 
general, had been causing subversion in the country for more than a year, if not three. This 
historical frame helped justify the Soviet intervention, and alongside the ‘normalisation’ frame, 
showed the Soviet assistance was helping to fix a long term problem.  
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Defence of Soviet Union actions in Afghanistan seemed to partly rely on pronouncing the US 
and its allies as hypocrites – they were the ones arming the bandits, whom the Soviet-supported 
Afghans defeated; they were the ones inciting uprisings – again defeated by the Soviet-backed 
patriotic Afghans. Finally, they were the ones condemning Soviet involvement in the country, 
yet Radio Moscow persistently tried to highlight US involvement in causing problems within 
Afghanistan. Listeners may have been reading criticisms of the Soviet Union in the domestic 
press, but Radio Moscow was trying its hardest to show that those reports lacked, or even 
twisted, the full facts. The events on the ground were not reported for what they were, rather 
they were framed by what Radio Moscow believed were the reasons behind events.  
6.4 SUMMARY 
February saw the high profile boycott campaigns of Muhammad Ali and Cyrus Vance, it also 
saw an uprising in the Afghan capital and the deadline for Soviet withdrawal pass without 
action – and Radio Moscow ignored the latter. There was nothing that signalled a breakthrough 
for the boycott campaign or the anti-boycott campaign. The former may have been stuttering, 
but it was certainly not a campaign that Radio Moscow could easily dismiss anymore. However, 
whilst Radio Moscow did not always report on the campaign or the uprising, it seems that it was 
not actually the goal to hide what was happening. They needed to report on these situations so 
they could use the frames that helped promote Soviet actions and criticise the US actions. 
Additionally, the actions of Ali and Vance left themselves open for criticism, and they faced this 
not only from Radio Moscow, but from many other groups around the world as well.  
The reporting of the uprising and the reporting of the boycott campaigning may have been 
separated by Radio Moscow, but the frames used in the reporting of both during February were 
remarkably similar. There was an emphasis on the human element in the frames used, and 
whether it was in Afghanistan or the boycott campaign, innocent people were being harmed by 
the actions of others. Equally, the harm to these innocents was linked right to the top of the US 
Administration, personified through the examples of Brzezinski visiting training basis for the 
insurgents, or the statement of Vance directly calling for a boycott or moving of the Games. 
History was again invoked to help support the Soviet argument, with vague claims about foreign 
involvement in Afghanistan long before the Soviet Union official assistance arrived in 
December 1979. 
Against this backdrop of US aggression and reports using the imperialism frame, the typical 
Afghan was reported as being happy with the Soviet assistance, and those quoted on the boycott 
campaign, from outside the US Administration, were all firmly against the plan. The uprising 
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was reported as one of foreign insurgents, and foreign-backed insurgents, causing planned 
trouble and murdering innocents. These were portrayed as ‘mercenaries’ and there was a 
definite suggestion the uprising was to do with greed rather than an ideological dislike of the 
Soviet Union or the Karmal government.  
Unlike reporting of the State of the Union address, there was considerably less localisation in 
the broadcasting covering these events. Part of this could be that there was not such a range of 
material for Radio Moscow to pick and choose from. However, Radio Moscow did work with 
what it had. There was a noticeable difference in the broadcast coverage of Muhammad Ali’s 
tour – Home service coverage was critical but elsewhere coverage was more or less non-
existent. The World Service repeated the claims of the Home Service, and the English language 
African service called it dishonest, as well as a failure. There was no localisation though, and 
the same applied to Cyrus Vance’s speech which was portrayed through an imperialist frame, 
with Home service listeners hearing added emphasis on the upcoming US elections. There was 
no need at this time to report the boycott campaign in a very localised sense – Radio Moscow 
could tell the world that the campaign, along with the facilities at Lake Placid, was failing 
worldwide. 
There was clear localisation in the reporting of the Kabul uprising, and it is a prime example of 
how Radio Moscow tried to avoid reporting events to specific audiences. The Home Service 
concentrated on explaining away the motives of the insurgents/mercenaries, whilst at the same 
time emphasising that the Afghan authorities were firmly in control. The World Service 
reported the same, but diverted attention by combining the personification and harm to people 
frames when accusing Brzezinski of associating himself with killers. Again the method of not 
actually directly reporting the incident was displayed via both these stations. Meanwhile, other 
language broadcasts heard very little. Radio Moscow chose not to broadcast anything further, 
and instead referred listeners back to pre-existing themes and frames – British listeners heard 
their government was slavishly copying the US, Arabic listeners heard about Soviet-Islamic 
cooperation, North American and Eastern European listeners heard that Afghans were in control 
and that any struggles were the fault of imperialism. It appears that imperialism was the fall-
back frame for Radio Moscow at this time.    
With the uprising over, there was a distinct shift towards emphasising the Afghan control frame 
– the government was in control and Afghan armed forces were defeating the insurgents. There 
was also little in terms of reporting on advances in the Olympic boycott campaign, but there was 
a considerable amount about the reasons behind it. This follows the analytical frame that had 
developed previously, as rather than focus on facts, Radio Moscow preferred to deal in opinion. 
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Alongside some examples of selective reporting and selective coverage of what others were 
saying, this enabled the furthering of the ultimate frame that Radio Moscow was working 
toward, that of the United States acting in a wrong and harmful way whilst the Soviet Union 
acted for peace. 
 CHAPTER 7  
‘OURS WILL NOT GO!’ THE UNITED STATES BOYCOTT IS 
OFFICIAL 
Without the customary applause for a President, on 21
st
 March 1980 Jimmy Carter entered a 
room full of athletes, who had trained and dreamed of a place on the 1980 US Olympic team, 
and announced,  
‘I can’t say at this moment what other nations will not go to the Summer Olympics in 
Moscow. Ours will not go. I say that not with any equivocation; the decision has been 
made.’503  
The boycott threat had moved from words to actions. The US would not be in Moscow. The 
President’s speech encompassed far more than just a statement about the Olympics – as The 
Times reported, Carter had explained ‘…Soviet troops had taken thousands of lives in 
Afghanistan, and hundreds of thousands would be lost elsewhere if the United States did not 
make sacrifices to preserve world peace’.504 The first speech made by the US President on the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had instigated trade sanctions as the major punishment, with a 
threat to not attend the Olympics seemingly a minor addition – now the Olympic boycott was 
the major way of punishing the Soviet Union.  
This chapter examines the broadcasts of Radio Moscow from 18
th
 March 1980 to 5
th
 April 1980. 
The primary focus is on how Radio Moscow reported President Carter’s announcement, but this 
time frame also captures reaction to the British Parliamentary vote of 18
th
 March supporting a 
boycott, the subsequent British Olympic Association (BOA) vote of 25
th
 March, overriding the 
Parliament and deciding that athletes were free to choose for themselves. Not only did this show 
the divisiveness of the boycott campaign within states, but it also highlighted the difficulty for 
supposedly free and liberal governments in condemning the Soviet Union for human rights 
abuses, such as the exile of the dissident Andrei Sakharov in February, and trying to force their 
own people not to go to Moscow.   
President Carter’s speech changed the focus of the reporting of the boycott campaign. It could 
no longer be framed as a suggestion or a threat that could continually be dismissed as mere 
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words – the United States would not be in Moscow. Radio Moscow had to change its approach, 
and this is the focus of the chapter. However, there were shifts in the frames used to report the 
situation in Afghanistan at this time, and whilst reports were daily, they remained consistent 
with previous months – any new events were slotted in to pre-existing frames focusing on 
foreign insurgency, US funding and imperialism, or Afghan happiness with the Soviet 
assistance. The boycott campaign did become more prominent though, suggesting a sudden 
realisation that it was very real and needed more forcefully attacking. 
This chapter firstly examines the broadcasting surrounding the British House of Commons vote, 
before moving on to focus on the frames used to report President Carter’s address to US 
athletes. Following this is a study of the frames used to report two European meetings regarding 
the boycott and the British Olympic Association’s own vote not to boycott. The final section 
analyses the reporting of Afghanistan, both in relation to the boycott and as a separate entity.  
7.1 THE BRITISH BOYCOTT RESOLUTION 
After a lengthy debate on 17
th
 March, the House of Commons voted in favour, 315-147, of the 
resolution, 
‘That this House condemns the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and believes that the 
United Kingdom should not take part in the Olympic Games in Moscow.’505 
Margaret Thatcher had been a vociferous supporter of boycotting the Games all along, now she 
had the official support of the British Parliament. Not only that, Parliament had also strongly 
condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
With so many states waiting to see what others would do about potentially boycotting the 
Moscow Olympics, this was a significant development. The British Parliament had resolved to 
support the campaign – others may therefore have felt safer in following the US lead. However, 




As important a development as the House of Commons resolution was, Radio Moscow only 
reported it over the airwaves to Britain & Ireland, and then only with a broadcast on the 18
th
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 Personifying the report, the station described it as Margaret 
Thatcher’s ‘anti-Olympic political show’, and claimed that ‘…Britain happens to be the only 
country that has given its open and enthusiastic backing to the boycott idea conceived in 
Washington.’507 Not only was this a take on the quantity frame, telling listeners the US boycott 
only had one firm supporter – it is almost the imperialism frame in reverse – rather than report 
on the US imposing its will, Britain was being reported as an enthusiastic follower. Radio 
Moscow pushed this frame of following the US further, claiming the debate was ‘designed to 
cater to the American rather than the British taste’ and ‘probably Washington is giving three 
cheers to the ‘anti-Olympic political show…’.508  
The divisive frame was explicit here too. Radio Moscow claimed ‘Mrs Thatcher’s intention of 
boycotting the Games ran counter to the consensus of the British people’, and supported this 
claim with reference to an Observer public opinion poll asserting that 69% of Britons wanted 
British athletes to go to the Moscow Games.
509
 Radio Moscow appears to have been attempting 
to create a divide between the British people and the British government, a divide that fits with 
the previous claims about governmental policy supporting US actions going against the wishes 
and wants of the British people. 
The personification frame can also be seen in the broadcasting on this vote. Rather than 
reporting that it was the British Parliament as a whole that had voted to support the boycott, 
Radio Moscow focused on describing it as the ‘Thatcher Cabinet’, the ‘Conservative Cabinet’, 
and more pointedly, the work of ‘Mrs Margaret Thatcher’.510 Whilst there were 314 other 
Members of Parliament who voted for the resolution, only one name was repeatedly mentioned 
– the Prime Minister herself. Highly vocal in her support for a boycott in the months before this 
vote, it appears that Radio Moscow attempted to frame the boycott in Britain as Margaret 
Thatcher’s own personal crusade. As with reporting of the boycott campaign in other regions of 
the world, where the focus tended to be Jimmy Carter, the implication was that it was one 
person forcing through a boycott against the tide of public opinion.   
The commentary on the 18
th
 personalised the debate around the wants of Margaret Thatcher, but 
it centred on the Olympics. There was no mention that the debate considered Afghanistan or 
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that the vote condemned Soviet actions in the country, and there was no reference to 
Afghanistan and the Olympics being in any way linked. The focus was on the Olympic boycott, 
as a personal projection of Margaret Thatcher, as a policy instigated by Washington and as an 
idea that the majority of the British people disagreed with. It was also presented as an 
opportunity to deny human rights to the British people. Radio Moscow claimed it showed that 
the Thatcher Cabinet ‘... [had] more than disregard for basket three of the Helsinki conference 
[humanitarian and cultural cooperation]… the overriding question is how much it cares indeed 
for the democratic rights and political liberties of its subjects in the United Kingdom.’511 
Listeners were told that the British authorities were ‘…clamping down on the athletes so as to 
discourage them from taking part in the Moscow games.’512 In later years, the 100 metre 
Moscow Olympic champion Alan Wells commented on this pressure, telling The Guardian, 
'We received maybe half-a-dozen letters from 10 Downing Street trying to put us off. I 
opened one. There was a picture with a letter saying this is what the Russians are doing. 
It showed a dead Afghan girl with a doll. I can still see the picture even now as if it were 
yesterday.’513  
Radio Moscow did not report anything quite that extreme, but they did report that, 
‘…senior officials of the Foreign Office summon all members of the British Olympic 
Association and exert pressure and try to browbeat them into not going to Moscow…the 
government has adopted a decision which has no precedent: not to grant leave of absence 
to civil servants and armed servicemen to go to the Olympic Games this summer. By 
rights all this can take place in a police State only…this could have adverse effects on the 
freedom of British subjects in peace time.’514 
This did not appear in the debate, although discussion of what to do with civil servants and 
armed forces personnel did arise, with one MP concluding,  
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‘We have decided that we cannot grant special paid leave… for a purpose that we believe 
is against our interests. However, how individuals use their annual leave and whether 
they ask for unpaid leave are matters for the individual in a free society.’515 
Mr Clement Freud MP even stated that ‘…we do not have the right to stop those who want to go 
from going” – and he voted in favour of the resolution!516 As Radio Moscow avoided reporting 
the exact phraseology of the House of Commons though, it was able to frame the debate how it 
chose, in this instance reporting the resolution using the people harm frame, as part of an 
attempt to instigate draconian measures against the freedoms of the British people.  
Attempting to frame the debate in historical terms, Radio Moscow also accused the Thatcher 
Cabinet of not caring about Britain’s prestige as ‘a country known as a cradle of sports and 
famous for its noble traditions.’517 Boycotting the Olympics apparently undermined this 
tradition, but there was not the slightest suggestion that refusing to enter the capital of a state 
that had recently invaded its neighbour may also have been noble and in keeping with the 
ancient Greek tradition of ekecheiria – a cessation of hostilities while the festival took place.518 
But then Afghanistan was not mentioned at all – condemning the Soviet invasion was an 
intrinsic part of the House of Commons debate and resolution, but this was omitted. Not once 
was Afghanistan alluded to as even a part of the debate. Thus the commentator did not have to 
reiterate the by now well-worn justification for the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. More 
importantly for the frames Radio Moscow used, the further apart the Olympic boycott and 
Afghanistan could be placed in the minds of the listener, the easier it would have been to 
portray the boycott as lacking support, as a personal crusade, a human rights travesty, or even 
part of a long term plan. Hence the complete lack of engagement with the first half of the House 
of Commons resolution – the boycott allowed Radio Moscow to attack the British 
establishment, mentioning Afghanistan would have complicated matters. 
However, the Radio Moscow coverage was within keeping with British domestic coverage, to 
an extent. The front page of The Guardian ran the headline '315 MPs vote for Olympic boycott’, 
and The Times ran the headline ‘MPs vote for boycott of Olympics by majority of 168’.519 Both 
concentrated on the boycott resolution rather than the condemnation of the Soviet actions in 
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Afghanistan – the Soviet reporting of the vote was only slightly more concentrated on the 
Olympics than that of the domestic press. There were no mentions of this debate on any other 
Radio Moscow frequency at this point. Mention was presumably made on the Britain & Ireland 
service to counter such comments in the British domestic press. Only when the British Olympic 
Association rejected the government recommendation for a boycott, in its own vote on 25
th
 
March, did Radio Moscow deem news from Britain worth reporting to regions worldwide. 
However, before this happened, President Carter announced that the United States Olympic 
team would not go to Moscow. 
7.2 CARTER’S ANNOUNCEMENT 
On 21
st
 March 1980, the athletes hoping to be part of the US Olympic team assembled in a room 
at the White House and listened as President Carter told them they would not go to Moscow. In 
the speech, entitled ‘Remarks to Representatives of U.S Teams to the 1980 Summer Olympics’, 
Carter spoke apologetically of this action -  
‘I have great admiration for you and a deep feeling for you in this time of challenge and 
disappointment… You occupy a special place in American life…It’s not a pleasant time 
for me…I hope that at least in the minds of some of you the medal that you might win in 
competition [alternative Games] and the recognition of a grateful nation will at least 
partially make up for the sacrifice that you’ll have to make…’520 
But he was also highly critical of the Soviet Union actions in Afghanistan – 
‘…nations who believe in freedom and…human rights and…peace…[should] not add the 
imprimatur of approval to the Soviet Union and its government while they have 105,000 
heavily armed invading forces in the freedom-loving and innocent and deeply religious 
country of Afghanistan.’521 
As with the British Parliament vote, the reason for the boycott, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, was integral to the speech, and as with the British Parliament vote, the invasion 
aspect was also ignored by Radio Moscow. However, unlike the British resolution, which 
Radio Moscow ignored outside of its Britain & Ireland service, the Soviet broadcaster debated 
President Carter’s announcement in broadcasts all around the world. As with the reporting of 
the House of Commons resolution, the analytical frame was used to report not what was said, 
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but rather the reaction and the implications. Radio Moscow also changed the manner of 
President Carter’s announcement. North American listeners heard that ‘Carter met 150 
prominent US athletes on Friday and asked them to refrain from participating in the 
Olympics’.522 The broadcaster presented the listener with the idea that the President had ‘asked’, 
rather than told, and that the announcement was actually a question and not a final decision.  
The first reaction on the North American service to this announcement was within hours of 
Carter making the statement. BBC Monitoring notes that on the 22
nd
 March, via the 0030 GMT 
broadcast, Radio Moscow reported that an ‘NOC public opinion poll reveals that 67% of 
Americans are against the Olympic movement being used for political purposes’.523 This was 
broadcast five hours after President Carter made his announcement, but the lack of reference to 
the specifics of the meeting itself would suggest that this was a pre-planned mode of attack with 
which to frame whatever Carter happened to say. As with the House of Commons debate, rather 
than deal with what was said, the speech was reported through the divisive and people harm 
frames. BBC Monitoring reported that North American listeners heard ‘various well-known 
American athletes quoted arguing against the boycott’, and the ‘Carter administration’s boycott 
campaign will in the first place backfire against the United States athletes… athletes and non-
athletes round the world are hopeful that soberness in the White House will prevail’.524  
The Home service also reported the speech using an analytical frame, rather than dealing with 
its content. On 21
st
 March, just hours before the speech, listeners were informed that the 
meeting between the President and the athletes would be taking place, and, ‘on the pretext of 
explaining his standpoint, Carter will be attempting to put further pressure on them’.525 This 
effectively primed the listener for reports after the speech that may have contained bad news for 
the Olympic Games. Again though, the speech was reported as Carter ‘attempting’, not telling 
the athletes they would not be going. There was no hint that it would be a definitive 
announcement. On the 22
nd
, in a report about the meeting, Home service listeners heard that 
‘…the gross pressure by the White House has not yielded the desired results…’ and,  
‘Most sportsmen refused to sacrifice the lofty ideals of the International Olympic 
Movement for the dubious political ambitions of the present Washington 
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Administration… an ever greater number of foreign politicians is opposing Carter’s 
appeal’.526  
The speech was portrayed as asking, not telling. There was no mention that President Carter had 
announced the US Olympic team would not be in Moscow, there was merely reporting that US 
Olympic hopefuls, and their supporters, did not agree with him. The speech was not reported as 
an outright statement of intent, but it was reported as President Carter versus the athletes – 
incorporating both the personification and divisive frames. 
In a later broadcast to Soviet listeners, Radio Moscow announced that Carter had made an 
‘emotional appeal’, which, joining previous phrases such as hoping ‘soberness’ would prevail in 
the White House, and accusing Margaret Thatcher of ‘shrieking’ about the boycott campaign, 
suggest a subtle frame implying those promoting the boycott were irrational.
527
 Carter was also 
accused of trying to bribe the athletes – ‘the master (khozyain) of the White House promised 
them special prizes if they agree to take part not in the Moscow Olympics but in the so-called 
parallel games…’.528 However, listeners were also told that,  
‘Carter has stated that the Government will use all its power and legal possibilities at its 
disposal in order to prevent American sportsmen from taking part in the summer Olympic 
Games.’529 
This appears to be the only time Radio Moscow referenced anything said in President Carter’s 
speech – no other BBC Monitor record of the broadcasting network contains reference to the 
specifics of the statement. However, it is not accurate. Nowhere in the ‘Remarks to 
Representatives of U.S. teams to the 1980 Summer Olympics’ did Carter threaten athletes with 
using power or legal possibilities – he did mention he had significant power, but the possibilities 
stated here by Radio Moscow had been mentioned in previous announcements. The tone of the 
speech was far less threatening than Radio Moscow claimed, with phrases such as ‘I hope that 
you will help me’ and ‘whatever you decide, as far as your attitude is concerned, I will respect 
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it’.530 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt it was a forceful speech leaving no room for 
manoeuvre. Whilst the President was willing to respect the attitude of the athletes, the US team 
were still boycotting and nothing would change that – ‘Ours will not go. I say that not with any 
equivocation…’531  
The same frames were used to represent the speech to listeners in Britain & Ireland. Listeners 
were told that the President had met and ‘asked’ 150 athletes to refrain from participating in the 
Olympics, and the majority had refused.
532
 Radio Moscow was not willing to broadcast about 
the US team actually boycotting the Games – they tried to continue to present it as in 
discussion, reporting  comments from athletes protesting, domestic press polls showing 
disapproval, and international condemnation. Rather than report that the US President had 
dictated a path the athletes and many others were against, emphasising the divisive frame, it 
seems Radio Moscow preferred to suggest the US team could still appear in Moscow. Not only 
did it suggest the boycott was failing, but it also reveals that Radio Moscow was more 
concerned with trying to play down the extent of the boycott than it was with promoting news 
that highlighted divisions within the society of its chief Cold War rival.  
Changing the context of the decisive statement to more of a question that could be refused, and 
reporting the reaction of athletes and the public, appeared in broadcasts to regions and 
languages such as Africa (in French and English), Sweden, Italy, Greece, Finland, Serbo-Croat 
and Turkish.
533
 The vast majority of broadcasts seem to have been translations of what the 
English World Service reported – ‘…athletes and noted sports officials are being subjected to 
unprecedented and crude pressure…’.534 Again, the word ‘pressure’ suggests something that can 
be refused, however difficult that may be. However, unlike broadcasts to Britain & Ireland, or 
those to North America, the World Service commentary went further than just noting that ‘…the 
majority of the American athletes come out for participating in the Moscow Olympics’.535 It 
also included reference to statements made by others in the United States establishment, such as 
an assistant White House advisor who, Radio Moscow reported, had said ‘the United States will 
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destroy the Olympic movement if the International Olympic Committee declines to accept the 
American position’.536 It also differed from the Britain & Ireland service in that it suggested far 
more than a mere question. The Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, according to the World 
Service, had ‘threatened legal action against those American athletes who dare to violate the 
administration’s ban and go to Moscow for the Olympics.’537 Unlike via the North American 
and Home Service, World Service listeners heard Carter’s statement was presented as decisive, 
rather than as a question. However, it was not something athletes were necessarily going to obey 
– thus suggesting division.  
Again, President Carter’s words were not reported, but the reaction to them was, combined with 
choice statements that appeared threatening – the US Administration was threatening both 
people and the Olympic movement as a whole. As with the British debate, human rights were 
evoked, with Washington accused of utterly contradicting the Helsinki Accords, especially 
‘accords on [the] development of contacts in sport…’.538 This was all suggestive of US actions 
hurting athletes and harming others.  
7.3 THE SPEECH IN BOYCOTT CONTEXT 
President Carter’s announcement was condemned via all Radio Moscow broadcasts that 
reported it.
539
 However, what Radio Moscow also reported fitted into the previous frames used 
to cover the boycott campaign. Only via one World Service broadcast was there any admission 
of success on Carter’s part – early on 22nd March came the report that ‘the meeting was a 
limited success judging by the results of a poll of the athletes who participated’.540 ‘Limited 
success’ did not appear again via the airwaves, even though it fitted with the divisive frame that 
Radio Moscow tried to project.  
There seems to have been a regional difference in the Olympic boycott reporting here – the 
stations that did report news on President Carter and other boycott announcements tended to be 
those to Western and Eastern Europe, North America and the Soviet Union. Listeners to the 
Arabic language broadcast did not hear about President Carter’s boycott announcement, nor did 
listeners to languages such as Dari, Ndebele, Shona, Amharic, Swahili, Somali, or French to 
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Algeria. That is not to say the boycott per se was not reported in these languages – certainly the 
Arabic, Algerian, Swahili and Persian services carried more general reports. Yet there was very 
little comment compared to what was being reported to Radio Moscow listeners in Europe, 
North America and the Soviet Union, or even to English language service listeners in Asia or 
Africa.
541
     
President Carter’s announcement that the US team would not be attending the Moscow Games 
was not reported as the standout statement that it in reality was. Unmentioned in some regions, 
in others it was just another part of the wider boycott story. Letters saying the boycott would 
fail, statements from athletes and Olympic Committees determined to attend, even reports of 
whole conferences condemning the campaign – these were just some of the more regular anti-
boycott stories around which the Presidential announcement was reported. Previous reporting of 
the boycott being rejected made it far easier for Radio Moscow to frame President Carter’s 
address as an appeal, a threat, and an attempt to force his will upon an unwilling world, a type 
of Presidential imperialism frame, than the definitive announcement that it was. To an extent the 
indecisiveness of state governments and the ambiguity of control between said governments and 
National Olympic Committees created an almost ideal situation for Soviet foreign broadcasting.  
The opinions of the US athletes were reported almost worldwide, but there was an element of 
localisation with other groups, with athletes, governments and Olympic Committees more 
closely linked to the listener also mentioned. In broadcasts to Europe, Swedish listeners not only 
heard about the US athletes’ aversion to the boycott idea, but also the Swedish Olympic 
Committee declaring their intention to attend.
542
 Likewise, Finnish listeners heard that, amongst 
others, Finnish sportsmen had ‘expressed their opposition to a boycott of the Games’, East 
German listeners heard that FRG athletes, at a public meeting in Munich, favoured participation 
in Moscow, and Italian listeners heard that ‘the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Italian 
Parliament have declared themselves in favour of the Moscow Olympics’.543 Localisation was 
clearly an important factor in trying to portray the boycott as failing. 
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In Africa, English language listeners were told that the Lesotho Foreign Minister had said, 
‘Lesotho does not believe in a boycott. Lesotho will participate at the Games.’544 On 20th March, 
the same station broadcast a brief roundup of ‘opposition to Carter’s stand on the Games’, 
quoting an American athlete, an Ethiopian sports official, the Nigerian President, an Angolan 
newspaper, and, somewhat bizarrely, an Austrian magazine.
545
 The boycott was portrayed as 
something far away – the US President supported it in the White House far overseas, fellow 
Africans did not. Listeners to the French language African service heard much the same – letters 
condemned the boycott whilst US sportsmen and an African sports official were also quoted as 
being against the idea.
546
 
Reporting the failure of the boycott campaign using localised disapproval also occurred in 
broadcasts to Asia. In amongst reports that the US Olympic Committee was being blackmailed 
by Jimmy Carter, and a report that the Japanese government would take the advice of the 
Japanese Olympic Committee, was a report that Sri Lanka was the 106
th
 country to apply to 
attend the Games – emphasising the quantity of teams Radio Moscow expected in Moscow.547 
Additionally, the Philippines Olympic Committee was reported to have removed the chairman 
because he tried to prohibit the football team from attempting to gain a place at the Games.
548
 
The message was clear, those in the vicinity of the Asian listener were against the boycott – 
which Radio Moscow Asian listeners at one point even heard labelled as a ‘fiasco’.549 
These are not the only examples showing that anti-boycott reporting during this period tried to 
situate itself locally in a clear attempt to frame the situation in a manner that would be more 
appealing to the listener than just hearing American- or Euro-centric reporting. French Algerian 
broadcasts mentioned that the Algerian football team would take part in the Olympic football 
tournament; Arabic broadcasts told how Libya had reaffirmed its intention to participate in the 





 Positive Olympic news was also reported in this manner – for example, Arabic 
audiences were told about how the Soviet Union was helping to train, and coordinate with, 
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Jordanians in the build-up to the Olympics.
551
 Religious facilities at the Games were also 
emphasised,   
‘…large halls are being prepared for prayers… Since the Olympics time coincides with 
the month of Ramadan… there is a place for at-Tarawih… An Imam will be appointed for 
these duties’.552  
Not only was Radio Moscow reporting the boycott campaign using local rejections, but it was 
beginning to frame publicity for the Games around local concerns – in this instance the religious 
needs of Islamic athletes.  
Many of the frames were encapsulated within a Pravda article, reiterated worldwide by Radio 
Moscow both before and after the announcement.
553
  On 18
th
 March 1980 Pravda published a 
commentary under the heading ‘The Price of Ambition’, in which it castigated ‘…the scheming 
enemies of the Olympic movement’.554 Some of the key points were: 
‘Certain politicians… brazenly interfered in the international athletic movement, their 




‘Washington politicians are trying to impose the decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics, 
dictated by the short-term plans of Carter’s election headquarters, on other countries at 
the governmental level and then make the national Olympic committees submit to this 
decision… what the present US administration would like most of all would be a conflict 
that would make Americans rally around the current President and would distract them 
from the internal problems rending the US.’556  
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The personification frame can be seen here – the boycott campaign was the goal of only ‘certain 
politicians’, and a specific part of President Carter’s election campaign, designed to hide 
domestic problems. However, there were also accusations about the campaign framed around 
human rights abuses - 
‘…whole countries, governments and individual athletes are being subjected to crude 
pressure and blackmail. Wholesale threats are being made that passports for travel to the 
USSR will not be issued, leaves will be cancelled for those with jobs, and Olympic team 
members and coaches will not be allowed to go abroad. That’s human rights and liberties 
for you! That’s what the US administration’s profuse talk about civil rights is really 
worth!’557 
Listeners were reminded that ‘in their dirty game, official spokesmen for the White House… do 
not shrink from outright lies’.558 Any suggestion that the US allies may join the boycott 
campaign was explained away by the ‘notorious “Atlantic solidarity”.559 However, whether 
framed by lies, domestic unrest, electioneering, or Cold War politics, the ultimate point Radio 
Moscow wanted listeners to understand was - 
‘Washington’s pressure is leading to a result opposite from the one the White House 
intended – it is strengthening the resolve of the sports community the world over to 
uphold the independence of the Olympic movement and its humane ideas.’560 
The boycott was being reported as a failure, even though President Carter’s announcement had 
just stepped it up a gear.  
7.4 EUROPE VOTES NO! 
The day after President Carter told US athletes they would not be going to Moscow, 
government and sporting officials from Europe met to discuss their own course of action. The 




 March, of West European Sports Ministers. 
The second, on 22
nd
 March, was a meeting of West European National Olympic Committee 
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members in Brussels, also attended by the United States Olympic Committee.
561
 On the same 
day in Latin America, Sports Ministers for that region also met in Mexico City, although this 
was not reported via any of the broadcasts this thesis examines. Radio Moscow reported the 
outcome of the West European ministerial meet quite clearly – Home Service listeners were 
informed at 0700GMT on 21
st
 March that, 
‘…the overwhelming majority of sports ministers from 21 countries of Western Europe 
has refused to support the American idea of boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow. 
Only the British and Dutch Ministers voted in favour.’562 
Listeners to the Britain & Ireland service also heard that ’18 participants out of 21 rejected the 
idea of boycott’.563 On 20th March Radio Moscow’s French for Europe service reported that,  
‘France is against a discussion of the American idea of a boycott… at a conference of 
European Sports Ministers which opened in Strasbourg today.’564  
No further references to this meeting seem to have been broadcast – it is as if outside the Soviet 
Union, with the exception of Britain and France, the meeting was not deemed worth reporting, 
despite it seemingly highlighting a split between Europe and the United States. The Times did 
report, albeit briefly, on this meeting, under the title ‘Europe falters on boycott’ – so perhaps as 
a media event per se it was not deemed newsworthy.
565
 However, this report conflicts with that 
of Radio Moscow -   
‘Only Britain, Holland and Portugal voiced support for a boycott of the Moscow 
Olympics… Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Cyprus took a strictly neutral line, saying 
they would leave the decision to their national Olympic committees and not try to 
influence them… The other 14 member states also say the decision is up to their Olympic 
committees, but they have not decided whether they will influence them for or against a 
boycott.’566  
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So what Radio Moscow reported to Soviet listeners as an overwhelming majority refusing to 
boycott was, according to The Times, an overwhelming bout of indecision. Thus without the 
manipulation that appeared in the Home service broadcast, it did not support any of the frames 
Radio Moscow used to report the boycott as failing.  
More widespread was reporting of the 22
nd
 March Brussels meeting of the West European and 
United States National Olympic Committees. Radio Moscow reported that, as with this example 
from the Finnish broadcast, ‘the National Olympic Committees of 15 West European states say 
they will do everything to enable the athletes of these countries to take part in the Moscow 
Olympics.’567 This appeared in broadcasts across Europe, with the exception of Britain & 
Ireland.
568
 In Europe, where there was a lot of indecision, reporting this meeting as anti-boycott, 
and embattled as well, was perhaps a way of trying to push debate more toward the anti-boycott 
side of the agenda. The British Olympic Association vote three days later provided a further 
opportunity to do this.  
7.5 THE BOA VOTES TO ATTEND!  
Lloyd Cutler (White House Counsel) sent a memorandum to President Carter on 20
th
 March 
stating that,  
‘The British Government realises if the BOC [BOA] decides next week to go to 
Moscow, the effect on the Government’s prestige at home and abroad will be 
disastrous. Even worse, the other West European Governments and NOCs may say that 
this makes an effective boycott impossible, and make this an excuse for going to 
Moscow themselves.’569 
Europe may have dithered, but, on 25
th
 March, Cutler’s memo came true. The British Olympic 
Association voted against British government calls to boycott and allowed individual athletes 
and teams to make their own decisions. This led to substantial Radio Moscow coverage.  
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Radio Moscow reported the BOA announcement immediately. The vote was on 25
th
 March and 
by 2000 GMT that evening, listeners to the Britain & Ireland service were being informed that,  
‘The British Olympic Association has decided to send a national team… the decision 
conflicts with the stand assumed by the Thatcher Government which is supporting the 
United States Administrations attempts at boycotting the Moscow Olympics.’570 
Adding to the localised rejection of the boycott, Britain & Ireland service listeners were at this 
point first informed about the European Sports meeting, and how 18 of the 21 participants also 
‘rejected’ it.571    
Home service listeners were informed in a commentary on the 23
rd
 that the BOA decision ‘…is 
almost sure to give the British government a slap in the face…’, this was duly reported briefly 
on the 25
th




 Listeners were told that the BOA ‘took 
the decision to accept without delay… a decision taken in the teeth of the pressure exerted by 
Thatcher’.573 Another domestic broadcast claimed Denis Follows (BOA chairman) also ‘rejected 
attempts to organise so-called parallel games’ and, bringing some form of political ideology into 
the debate, ‘Denis Howell, a member of the parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party, 
demanded that the baiting of sportsmen be stopped…’574 Howell labelled the Olympic Games 
an enormous moral dilemma, ‘in addition to a military and political dilemma such as the 
invasion of Afghanistan…’, and the wider parliamentary debate concerned the reaction to the 
Afghanistan invasion, but this was not reported by Radio Moscow.
575
 The Home service 
reported the campaign in Britain using the divisive frame; it was a battle of the government, 
specifically Margaret Thatcher, versus the sporting community.  
The World Service also reported that the BOA would be in Moscow after government 
intimidation had failed.
576
 In itself, the word ‘intimidate’ framed the government calls in Britain 
in a rather more threatening manner than they were. This report went on to add that despite 
rumours about media outlets potentially reducing their coverage of the Games, ‘the British 
                                                     
570
 IWM/SU/C/217 RM GBI 25
th
 March 1980, 2000, Section 1.6 
571
 IWM/SU/C/217 RM GBI 25
th
 March 1980, 2000, Section 1.6 
572
 IWM/SU/B/526 RM Home 23
rd
 March 1980, 0800, International Observers at the Round Table, part 3, 
p.7; IWM/SU/B/527 RM Home 25
th
 March 1980, 2200, no.19; RM Home 26
th
 March 1980, 1745, no.13; 
RM Home 26
th
 March 1980, 1750, no.17. 
573
 IWM/SU/B/527 RM Home 26
th
 March 1980, 1745, no.13 
574
 IWM/SU/B/527 RM Home 26
th




 March 1980,  vol.981, cc31-168, ‘Olympic Games’, Mr Howell line 148-149 
576
 IWM/SU/C/ RM WSE 27
th
 March 1980, 2100, Section 2.5 
Chapter 7: ‘Ours will not go!’ 
159 
 
television companies have announced their decision to provide maximum coverage…’ – further 
emphasising how out of touch the government boycott support was.
577
 Elsewhere, the same 
simple but strong message appeared – the British would be in Moscow despite the personal 
efforts of Margaret Thatcher.
578
 Despite this being a more definitive outcome against the 
boycott than the meeting of the European sports minsters, there do not appear to have been any 
references to it in broadcasts to Eastern Europe. 
These reports suggested the situation in Britain was over, Thatcher’s pro-boycott campaign had 
lost. However, by 26
th
 March British & Irish listeners were being told the fight was not over, as 
the station personified the campaign in Britain further – ‘…the anti-Olympic marathon, in 
which Margaret Thatcher is the leader, has not finished yet.’579 Valeriy Belyanskiy, the Radio 
Moscow observer, reported that a government representative had claimed the BOA decision 
‘does not mean that this is the end of the matter.’580 So instead of joining in the somewhat 
celebratory frame presented elsewhere, the commentary took a rather more sinister approach. 
For the British government –  
‘…punitive measures remain the only ones in the arsenal… What makes the Government 
of a country with such Olympic will and determination to undertake anti-Olympic 
actions, even if in this case they had to violate democratic rights and freedoms of their 
own citizens… One should rather come to a…conclusion, namely that Margaret Thatcher 
in her anti-Olympic distance Marathon speaks on behalf of the White House. After all, it 
is there that the idea of boycott of the Moscow Olympics originated.’581  
Radio Moscow appeared to be prolonging the campaign in Britain, and, using the people harm 
frame in this instance, further personified the campaign around both Margaret Thatcher and the 
US Administration. The Soviet broadcaster had the opportunity to use the BOA vote as 
comprehensive proof that the boycott campaign had failed in Britain; instead it chose to suggest 
the campaign was very much alive and relying on further repressive measures to be instigated 
by the British government. It seems that showing the boycott campaign as failing was not 
always the main motivation for Radio Moscow.  
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7.6.1 Afghanistan and the Olympic Boycott 
Via all the broadcast regions examined in this research, between 18
th
 March and 5
th
 April there 
were only four references directly linking Afghanistan with the boycott – Soviet media was 
successfully separating the two. Reporting of the British House of Commons debate on 17
th
 
March, which condemned the invasion whilst recommending a boycott, and the broadcasts 
surrounding Carter’s meeting with US athletes, which also explained the boycott by widely 
condemning the invasion, did not mention Afghanistan.  
There were occasionally broadcasts via the North American, Britain & Ireland and Home 
services that linked Afghanistan and the boycott. However, these emphasised that the link was 
in the minds of President Carter, Margaret Thatcher, and their anti-Olympic allies – the link was 
mentioned so it could be dismissed.  
Home service listeners heard that, 
‘…the strategic design by imperialist reaction to wreck the Moscow Olympics had been 
formed long before the Afghan events. As far back as several years ago prominent US 
observers calculated that there would be such a turn of events’.582  
Debate over the Games had existed for many years, related to Soviet human rights abuses and 
even political ideology, so there was a basis for trying to remove Afghanistan as the reason for 
the boycott by using an historical frame. However, using these examples from the past to frame 
the boycott campaign as ‘the strategic design by imperialist reaction’ was perhaps an over 
elaboration. It was more than just MPs and government officials who had called for a boycott 
before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Amongst the Foreign Office files stored at The 
National Archives can be found letters from a Reverend and from the Women’s Campaign for 
Soviet Jewry – neither of whom wrote letters that appeared to have imperialist motives.583 The 
same report also used the domestic issues frame to discuss the boycott – ‘as the US Presidential 
elections approach, the fate of the 1980 Olympics will undoubtedly be used by the most 
reactionary forces in the struggle for the White House’.584 So listeners were informed that 
Afghanistan was a pretext, and not only were the Olympic Games being used in the great US 
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domestic game of electoral politics, disruption of the Games had been a long term US 
Administration plan.  
British and Irish listeners were informed that one Conservative spokesman had said Britain 
should boycott ‘because what was at stake in Afghanistan were Western values’.585 These 
values were then questioned by the commentator, who suggested the Western values at stake in 
Afghanistan were relevant to the CIA and Pentagon, and that actually ‘the people of the socialist 
world might have their own set of values…’.586 More importantly, ‘…as far as the events in 
Afghanistan are concerned, the most relevant Soviet value is…an unflinching loyalty to treaty 
obligations and a responsiveness to a neighbour’s call for help.’587 Not only was the emphasis 
on the CIA and Pentagon re-emphasising the subversion frame, but this report was reasserting 
the assistance frame by praising the Soviet assistance under international law and bilateral treaty 
obligations. 
When Afghanistan and the boycott were mentioned in the same report via North American 
broadcasts, discussion of the 1980 Presidential election also appeared. A broadcast on 29
th
 
March talked of the ‘growing movement in the United States to dump Carter’s boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics’, and also ‘this is an election year in the United States and every columnist 
has noted that Carter hopes to get some political mileage out of his boycott.’588 Election year 
politics was a prominent frame throughout the boycott campaign, and here it was reintroduced 
yet again. What is more, ‘Afghanistan, when facts are looked at, provides no reason whatever to 
put up barricades’.589 Radio Moscow reported Afghanistan was being used as an unfeasible 
pretext for a boycott.  
No other stations appear to have set out to discuss how Afghanistan related to the Olympic 
boycott at this time. That was not for lack of opportunity however. The Olympic Games and the 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan appeared regularly in news coverage, but extremely rarely in 
relation to one another. In both the British government vote that called for a boycott, and the 
speech to athletes by President Carter announcing a boycott, Afghanistan was crucial. Yet Radio 
Moscow chose to ignore the Afghanistan parts, concentrating instead on the Olympic aspects. It 
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was a clear example of the attempt that was made to separate Afghanistan from the Olympic 
Games whilst playing down both issues.  
7.6.2 Defending Soviet Actions in Afghanistan 





March Radio Moscow claimed that over 300 prisoners had been released from Afghan prisons, 
whilst those seeking refuge from the Amin regime abroad were now free to come back. Home 
service listeners were informed that,  
‘The Afghan authorities have released over 300 people who were detained in February 
for taking part in disorders in the capital which were provoked by foreign agents. The 
total number of people so far released thus reaches 1400.’590 
This report went on to inform listeners that the situation in Afghanistan was beginning to 
improve,  and the Afghan army, ‘with the help of the Soviet military contingent’ was 
safeguarding security against the ‘hired gangs of saboteurs’ from Pakistan engaged in killing, 
plundering farms and destroying livestock.
591
 This was similar to the ‘normalisation’ frame that 
appeared around the time of the uprising in February. That foreign agents provoked the 
disorders was made clear, but equally the damage was causing harm to the Afghan people, not 
the Soviet soldier. Interestingly, the report was another example of the Soviet military 
contingent being portrayed in a secondary role, ‘helping’ the Afghan army, thus presenting the 
intervention as friendly assistance and continuing to push the idea that Soviet troops were not in 
the vanguard.   
This level of detail was lacking elsewhere. BBC Monitoring recorded that English language 
listeners around the world, excluding Britain and North America, were informed that ‘Radio 
Kabul reports release of over 300 people detained in February for taking part in Kabul 
disturbances’.592 This is an interesting report to consider, as it does appear to have been 
broadcast in different areas of the world, even with the connotations of disruption, reminding 
                                                     
590
 IWM/SU/B/526 RM Home 19
th
 March 1980, 1745, International Diary, Section 3. 
591
 IWM/SU/B/526 RM Home 19
th
 March 1980, 1745, International Diary, Section 3, p.2 
592
 IWM/SU/C/ RM WSE 19
th
 March 1980, 1600, Section 1.4; IWM/SU/C/217 RM Eng Africa 19
th
 
March 1980, 1700, Section 1.3; RM Eng Asia 19
th
 March 1980, 1400, Section 1.5 – The Monitoring 
reports do not quote this precisely, but it would appear that the same report was repeated over the English 
language stations. 
Chapter 7: ‘Ours will not go!’ 
163 
 
listeners of the problems in February.
593
 However, as with the reports of the Kabul uprising, the 
whole situation was reported in an ‘after the event’ manner, acknowledging there was 
disruption, but producing a report employing the Afghan control frame to show the government 
was strong enough to feel able to release political prisoners.   
This story was not reported in the direct broadcasts to North America or Great Britain & 
Ireland. At first, this may seem surprising, as the reports showed a system of law and order at 
work in Afghanistan. Yet Radio Moscow did not report the uprising in February to either 
region, so it makes sense that they did not report any follow on reports – even ones that could 
easily be framed to show the Soviet assistance positively. Previous reporting of the uprising to 
North American and British & Irish listeners had concentrated on personifying Amin as the 
cause of Afghan problems. This time, reporting was about an amnesty for Afghans who had fled 
abroad from the Amin regime.
594
 Rather than report about people who had been jailed because 
of uprising against the new regime, Radio Moscow reported on people trying to come home 
because the previous bad regime had gone. This was a report that only appeared elsewhere on 
the English World Service broadcast.
595
 It clearly implied a change of circumstance for many in 
Afghanistan, and fitted with the normalisation frame as it suggested the country was improving, 
something that the release of the prisoners held due to the recent uprising may not have 
achieved to the same degree. 
These were not the only news reports that attempted to put across the idea of Afghan society 
improving in recent months though. Each new story seemed to be designed to frame relations 
between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan government and people positively, and to highlight 
how the situation in Afghanistan was constantly improving. Radio Moscow reported how 
Soviet-Afghan relations had improved, schooling in Afghanistan had improved, how the 
government, and Soviet soldiers, were helping Afghan peasants with their crops, Afghans were 
showing support for their new government, and of course how useful the ‘disinterested’ 
assistance by the Soviet Union had been.
596
 Babrak Karmal was even quoted via the North 
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American, Britain & Ireland, Home and Arabic services, speaking of the friendship with the 
USSR being ‘an expression of the freewill of the Afghan people’, and, ‘traditional’.597 The clear 
purpose was to frame reports about Afghanistan as favourable toward the Soviet Union and 
every opportunity seems to have been used to show how Afghanistan had improved since the 
Soviet assistance in December 1979. Soviet assistance had helped the state get back to 
normality – something Radio Moscow may have wanted to make clear to audiences worldwide 
in case they also needed assistance.  
7.6.3 Attacking the US-led interference 
There were daily reports about western lies, about arms heading into Afghanistan, about United 
States policy – quite often these reports were preceded by or followed reports on the good the 
Soviet Union was doing. For example, throughout 21
st
 March, the Home service not only 
informed listeners about Afghan-Soviet friendship, Afghanistan’s desire for good relations with 
nearby states, and letters from listeners supporting Soviet aid; but it also informed listeners 
about US arms to Afghanistan, the undeclared war in Afghanistan, and the claim that US 
President Carter’s foreign policies were being perceived negatively on the world stage.598 There 
was a clear framing of the good Soviet assistance contrasted with the bad US-led insurgency, 
and the reasons for it, in Afghanistan at this time. 
The US-Chinese relationship was a significant factor in Radio Moscow’s attempts to frame the 
situation in Afghanistan during this time. North American listeners were told the new Indian 
President Indira Gandhi had denounced, in a newspaper interview, US and Chinese weapons 
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 World Service listeners were told ‘observers’ of Chinese military 
delegations in Pakistan were working on a new phase of the ‘joint anti-Afghan strategy worked 
out by Washington and Peking to deliver American weapons to Pakistan through China, to 
conceal the US involvement in supplying arms for the mercenaries infiltrated in Afghanistan’.600 
British and Irish listeners were told that the Delhi Conference for peace and security 
‘condemned [the] US and China for campaigning against Afghanistan and censured US growing 
military might in the Persian Gulf area’.601 Previous emphasis had been placed on the US as 
being instigator-in-chief of world tension, but here it can be seen that the Soviet Union also 
portrayed the Chinese as a threat to world peace – and this time it was not just to Asian 
listeners, but to listeners worldwide. 
The Home service told listeners that ‘Washington and Peking see it in terms of escalating the 
anti-Afghan campaign and extending subversive activity against Afghanistan’.602 The only 
mention of outside opinion was a comment about US-Chinese discussion of the ‘so-called 
Afghan question’, made by Reuters.603 Additionally, all these reports via the Radio Moscow 
network used the subversion frame to suggest the insurgents were fighting Afghanistan, the 
government and the people, rather than fighting the Moscow-installed leadership and its Soviet 
military help.   
Again, instead of discussing the fighting within Afghanistan, Radio Moscow focused on the 
surrounding situation. There was nothing specific about what effect these arms movements were 
having within Afghanistan, what Radio Moscow wanted to tell its listeners, all over the world, 
was where these armaments were coming from.  
That these arms were making their way to Afghanistan through Pakistan was something Radio 
Moscow was keen to report. Along with the World Service, the Home service listeners were 
informed that, 
‘In the countries of Asia – and not only there – ever greater concern is being provoked by 
Washington’s attempts to turn Pakistan into an obedient tool of its policies… Having 
suffered defeat in Iran, American imperialism has gone over to practical implementation 
of a long-pondered plan for the creation of a broad military bridgehead in the Near East 
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and South-west Asia… Pakistan has begun to assume a key significance in the plans 
directed against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.’604  
Asian audiences were informed regularly about Pakistan being used as the US bridgehead into 
Afghanistan. On 20
th
 March, English language Asian service listeners were told about the 
intensification of US and Chinese arms movements into Pakistan – ‘where mercenaries 
infiltrated into Afghanistan are trained and armed’.605 On 22nd March, it was announced that, 
 ‘…what Japan is now doing, freezing economic aid to Afghanistan and giving more 
assistance to Pakistan, whose territory is being used for intervention in Afghanistan, is 
clearly leading to more tensions in that part of Asia’.606  
There was a clear pattern – on 23rd March, listeners were informed about Chinese subversion in 
Afghanistan, again via Pakistan, and on 26
th
 March, Radio Moscow reported Pravda claims 
about Washington’s attempts to draw Pakistan into its aggressive policy in Asia.607 This pattern 
of reporting Afghanistan did not stop – there were further reports at this time about US 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance evading questions over arms to Pakistan, and regular reporting 
of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan subversion.608  
Radio Moscow was clearly trying to instigate Pakistan in the events in Afghanistan, to the 
extent that it could be argued they were using the country as some sort of regional enemy. The 
United States was pulling the strings, and Pakistan was portrayed as the local puppet state 
within the wider frame of American imperialism. In broadcasts to Asian listeners, Pakistan was 
being used by the US and China as a bridgehead into Afghanistan.  
The reports that listeners may have heard elsewhere were not just linked to schemes by the 
United States and its allies though. Radio Moscow was keen on occasion to link the current 
events in Afghanistan to events long in the past. The subversion in Afghanistan was claimed to 
be part of a wider and more on-going plot linked right back to the Western reaction to the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917. In a review of a British book, ‘When Britain invaded Soviet 
Russia’, Soviet listeners were informed by the reviewer that –  
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‘When you look back the more than six decades that have elapsed since the British 
intervention in the north of Russia… you can see how the hysterics at the at time about 
the red danger and the present-day anti-Soviet concoctions in the press are in tune, how 
similar in its near-sightedness and its die-hardness the anti-Sovietism of the British ruling 
clique in 1918 and 1980.’609 
This was a rare instance of the insurgency in Afghanistan being linked to anti-Sovietism, as 
opposed to being anti-Afghan. Yet it fits with the frames used to report the events in and around 
Afghanistan. It implied a government and media conspiracy, leaving out any criticism of the 
ordinary person. Again, the anti-Soviet actions were placed within an historical frame, to 
distance them from Afghanistan, and this history was something Radio Moscow was trying hard 
to emphasise – they may have reiterated the Soviet defence of the invasion through a treaty of 
friendship, but they were keen to show that the problems in Afghanistan went back further than 
December 1979. Reporting the release of prisoners, or the returning home of those who had fled 
the old regime, was an attempt to show not only that the foreign support for the insurgents was 
failing, but that Afghanistan was improving to a level higher than anytime previously.     
7.7 SUMMARY 
With the exception of the release of over 300 prisoners from Kabul prisons, the key moments 
covered in this chapter were almost exclusively boycott focused. The reporting on Afghanistan 
remained consistent and followed the pattern of previous months; in amongst the attacks on the 
US and China, there was an increased emphasis on how Afghanistan was ‘normalising’. 
However, the announcements surrounding the boycott shifted the debate over the Moscow 
Games from merely words to actions, making this a significant moment for Soviet reporting.  
The key to the reporting at this point was the desire to split the reaction, the boycott, from the 
cause, the invasion. Afghanistan was integral to the House of Commons vote, as it was to 
President Carter’s decree over the US Olympic team, yet Radio Moscow told audiences 
worldwide about various other factors they claimed contributed to the pro-boycott statements 
instead – they did not associate the boycott calls with the invasion of Afghanistan. With 
coverage of each announcement there was a clear attempt to continue to frame the boycott as the 
pet project of Jimmy Carter and Margaret Thatcher – they were often attributed with pro-
boycott comments, everyone else, sports officials, the general public, and other politicians, were 
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attributed with comments supporting the Olympics. The boycott was being forced through 
predominantly by President Carter, against the will of the world – when a leader was said to be 
pro-boycott, the people were described as being against it. However, the broadcaster also 
presented the boycott as dividing the US from its Western European allies – the European vote 
was highlighted, accurately or not, as justification of how bad the boycott campaign was for US 
international relations.  
There was increased localisation in the broadcasts attacking the boycott campaign as Radio 
Moscow began to reference local athletes and local groups. Evidently, just presenting a 
worldwide rejection was not enough anymore, as the boycott campaign gathered momentum; 
Radio Moscow felt the need to present the anti-boycott campaign as increasingly local. 
However, whilst it continued to present the boycott campaign as failing, it was not always the 
case that the broadcaster wanted to present the boycott campaign as dying. It may not be a 
surprise that President Carter’s ‘Ours will not go’ speech was not broadcast as a definitive 
announcement confirming the boycott. However, that the British Olympic Association 
announcement, defying the British Parliament boycott-supporting vote, was not treated as 
definitive raises questions about the motives of Radio Moscow at this time. Radio Moscow 
wanted to continue to portray Margaret Thatcher as acting against the British people – for her 
government to be seen to accept the will of the BOA would not suit this claim. Equally, the 
boycott campaign was certainly distracting from the invasion of Afghanistan, and perhaps these 
were the reasons behind reporting the campaign in Britain was far from over. The divisiveness 
of the boycott campaign also provided Radio Moscow with the opportunity to frame the 
situation as government versus people, to build upon the personification of Margaret Thatcher 
and her ‘anti-Soviet political sideshow’. Had Radio Moscow accepted the British team would be 
going and the US team would not be, they would have been left to discuss the other important 
international issue at this time – Afghanistan. 
 CHAPTER 8  
DEADLINE DAY 
This chapter examines how Radio Moscow reported news about the Olympic Games in the days 
surrounding the 24
th
 May 1980 – the deadline for national Olympic committees (NOCs) to 
accept or decline the invitation from the Moscow Olympic Organising Committee to attend the 
Games. In many states there had been no firm acceptance or rejection, many governments and 
Olympic committees were waiting to see what others did before committing either way. 
Deadline day forced their hand. After 24
th
 May a more complete picture of the scale of the 
boycott, or at least those states not attending for various reasons, became clear – although the 
full scale of the boycott and the sporting reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan would not 
become completely clear until the opening ceremony of the Games themselves, when many 
teams either marched under the Olympic banner in protest at the Soviet actions or did not appear 
in the parade. However, it became clear after deadline day that there would be a boycott, and it 
would be significant. Before this Radio Moscow had argued the boycott would be a failure, 
based on the number of acceptances it claimed the Soviet organising committee had received. 
Deadline day was a turning point for this argument, there was conclusive evidence that the 
boycott would be major, based on the number of non-acceptances. How Radio Moscow framed 
this change is the focus of this chapter.  
The broadcasts examined cover the dates from 17
th
 May to 3
rd
 June 1980. The first section of the 
chapter will examine the Olympic deadline, as this had the most resonance for how Radio 
Moscow framed the boycott campaign. The second section will explore reports of the 
developments surrounding Afghanistan at this time. The Afghan government itself put forward 
peace proposals and the 11
th





 May 1980, once more condemning the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, additionally 
proposing to set up a commission to investigate the invasion. Radio Moscow made its opinions 
of each of these known, fitting them into pre-existing frames. The Soviet military sweeps of 
Ghanzi and the Kunar valley, and other military actions that would not have fitted well with 
claims that Soviet troops were not involved in the fighting, did not make it onto the airwaves.
610
 
Radio Moscow continued to tell listeners about Afghanistan, but it was undoubtedly selective in 
what was reported.  
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8.1 HOW DEADLINE DAY AFFECTED THE FRAMING OF THE BOYCOTT 
CAMPAIGN 
This section will investigate how the reporting of the states attending the Games changed after 
the deadline passed, comparing how the boycott campaign was portrayed before and after the 
announcement, and considering whether the states Radio Moscow chose to criticise changed. It 





 May 1980, before the announcement about attendees was made by the IOC. The 
second section looks at the reporting after the announcement, from 25
th
 May to 3
rd
 June 1980. 
8.1.1 Building up to Deadline Day 
In the days before the impending deadline, Radio Moscow continued to frame reporting to 
portray the boycott campaign as failing. Following on from previous months, the broadcaster 
continued to use the quantity frame, naming states it claimed had agreed to attend, or rather 
those it claimed had rejected President Carter’s boycott call. Home service listeners were told 
on 20
th
 May that the Italian, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Icelandic, Irish, Swedish, 
Congolese and Botswanan Olympic Committees would be taking part.
611
 This was reinforced on 
21
st
 May, with commentary claiming that, ‘Reuters reports a growing list of European countries 
which will send teams to Olympics’.612 On the day of the deadline, the Home service was still 
reporting the teams attending – for example, states such as Costa-Rica, Nicaragua, Uganda, 
Panama, Venezuela and Nepal.
613
  
North American listeners were told much the same – except this time the countries listed were 
Spain, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Angola and Cameroon.
614
 Soviet listeners 
may have gained the impression from their list that almost the whole of Europe would be 
attending, North American listeners that the Americas, with the exception of the USA, would be 
in strong attendance. There was localisation in reporting of the boycott rejections, with some 
additional states listed from further afield to support Radio Moscow claims that it was not only 
a local rejection, but an international rejection.  
Portraying the boycott in this manner was not restricted to North America and the Soviet Union 
– seemingly every regional broadcast held some reference to more states, particularly ones local 
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to the listener, agreeing to attend. For example, African listeners, to both the French and English 
regional broadcasts, heard about the actions of individual states and even the specific teams 
attending – again though, this localisation was mixed with international rejection. While French 
language listeners were told about the planned participation of the Ghanaian, Algerian and 
Zambian football teams, English language listeners heard how the national Olympic committees 
of ‘Australia, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain, Guatemala and the UAA [sic]’ had said they 
would send a team.
615
  
A slightly different way of reporting the acceptances appears to have been placed on Western 
Europe. Instead of informing listeners about states both local and worldwide, listeners to 
European broadcasts were informed primarily about European states. More so than for any other 
region, it appears localisation was particularly important for Radio Moscow when telling 
European listeners that their neighbours were attending. The announcement that the Italians 
were intending to go to the Games was publicised in broadcasts to France, Portugal and, of 
course, Italy.
616
 Swedish and Finnish language listeners were told that the Swedish, Finnish and 
Yugoslavian teams had been announced.
617
 Listeners to the Britain & Ireland service were told 
about Austrian and Swedish attendance alongside that of Irish attendance – the latter a report 
not only praising the Irish Olympic committee for going against the boycott, but rebuking the 
Irish government for withdrawing financial support, in the region of $184,000, from the 
Olympic committee because they refused to boycott.
618
 Additionally, the ‘Tory government of 
Margaret Thatcher’ (again personifying the boycott) had also refused financial aid to the British 
Olympic Association – however, with the apparent help of £650,000 raised from public 
donations, this would not stop as many as 340 athletes going to Moscow, which according to a 
claim made by BOA Chairman Denis Follows cited by Radio Moscow was ‘…more than was 
planned’.619 This was a reinforcement of the divisive frame, showing not only that the Irish and 
British committees/associations had gone against their governments wishes, but that the public 
had helped support the Games by supplying money when the government refused.  
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Foreshadowing the frames used to report the boycott campaign after the deadline day had 
passed, the same commentary to Britain & Ireland on 22
nd
 May also claimed that, 
‘Of course it’s regrettable that the United States, West Germany and Canada will not 
take part in the Moscow Olympics, but their absence will not make the Games less 
significant…the Americans have lost the lead in world sports. In Montreal they were only 
third in the number of medals won, while the Canadians did not win a single gold…’620 
Despite the on-going lists of attendees and the massive numbers claimed for British athletes in 
particular, this statement about the US and Canadian teams, implying weakness, was part of a 
subtle frame shift beginning at this point. Whilst Radio Moscow was still making statements 
about quantity, for example over 102 states attending or more than 340 athletes in one team, 
reporting of the boycott began to use a frame concentrating on the quality of the athletes who 
would be in Moscow – those who were not turning up would not be missed because they lacked 
quality.
621
 This was the first time Radio Moscow had used a frame that was specifically sports 
focused. It can also be seen as the turning point, the realisation that the boycott was going to hit, 
and hit hard. 
Continuing the European focused nature of European broadcasts on the Games, French listeners 
were told that ‘seven more Western European national Olympic committees have confirmed’ 
their attendance.
622
 In a Cold War political sense, and even in an Olympic sporting sense, it was 
clear that the Soviet Union continued to try to present Europe as not following the US lead – the 
US decision was divisive and isolating. This was a point specifically made to Radio Moscow’s 
Italian listeners after their Olympic committee had defied their government –  
‘…the ill-famed Atlantic solidarity which is demanded by Washington every time it wants 
to intensify the situation in the world and to hit détente… the decision of the Italian 
National Olympic Committee will serve the cause of consolidation and expansion of 
international cooperation.’623 
Moving on to list Western European teams attending, Radio Moscow told Italian listeners – 
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‘…the intention to send athletes to Moscow has already been announced by the national 
Olympic committees of such west-European countries as Britain, Austria, Belgium, 
Holland, Denmark, Eire, France, Sweden and others. The adherence by the Italian 
national Olympic committee isolates the United States and the FRG in their attack 
against the ‘sancta sanctorum’ of world sport.’624 
Listing states in this manner, rather than saying ‘more than eight’ was also a technique adopted 
by Radio Moscow. Not only did it provide specific examples of attending states, but by naming 
a string of states rather than just a number, the list of attendees sounded longer. The argument 
put forward here not only used this technique to show how isolated the United States was, it 
also framed the boycott as an attack on the ‘sancta sanctorum’ of world sport – not as a reaction 
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
Whilst the Italian Olympic Committee defied the Italian government, the same cannot be said 
for the West German Olympic Committee. The Italian resolution appeared across many of the 
European Radio Moscow airwaves, but the West German boycott of the Olympics only gained 
the briefest of mentions. What is more, in a similar manner to how reporting of the Islamic 
Conference meetings came to their anti-Soviet conclusions, the vote to boycott was framed 
more as an expected outcome due to US pressure rather than because of any true political or 
West German reason. Soviet listeners were told that the FRG national Olympic committee voted 
in favour of a boycott by ‘a tiny majority of the votes – 51-40…’ in a vote on 15th May 1980.625 
The actual vote was 59-40, an additional eight favouring a boycott, so it was rather more than a 
tiny majority, it was almost 50% more.
626
 However, the commentary broadcast to audiences in 
the Soviet Union on 21
st
 May 1980, just three days before the deadline, went on to rather 
accurately portray the outcome of the boycott in Europe, by claiming, 
‘…not a single West European country followed the example of West Germany. Even 
among the NATO member States no more could be found to dance to the US tune… one 
may conclude that this is a telling blow to the US policy of blackmail and pressure…’.627  
This statement is slightly misleading. Canada, Monaco and Norway boycotted the Games, all of 
which come under the banners of NATO and Western Europe. As each had already boycotted 
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by this point, the line ‘no more could be found’ was accurate, albeit misleading. Importantly 
though, the claim that the boycott was based around US blackmail and pressure, and 
independent and free thought went against it, was further emphasised here. 
Radio Moscow mentioned specific teams or states, whether or not localised to an audience, as 
part of the wider quantity frame portraying broad participation. For example, British and Irish 
listeners were told that 102 countries had announced their participation, although ‘in many 
countries Olympic Committees are acting under exceptional pressure from the US government, 
but we think that the majority of countries will take part in the Summer Games...’.628 There was 
perhaps a hint of audience priming here, should the actual number be dramatically lower than 
102, listeners could point to exceptional US pressure as the cause. The figure of 102 also 
appeared elsewhere, both in English language broadcasts to North America and via the World 
Service, and in broadcasts to other regions of the globe, such as in French to Europe, Italian, 
Turkish, and Dari.
629
 This number was less than had been quoted in previous months (for 
example, in January Radio Moscow had told North American listeners that 120 teams had 
indicated their participation), but it was still intended to indicate ‘broad participation’.630 
Whether Soviet broadcasting considered the numbers involved in previous Olympics is not 
clear, but throughout the build-up to deadline day the numbers claimed were always 
significantly higher than those at the 1976 Montreal Olympics (92 – due in part to a boycott by 
African teams), and roughly comparable to attendance figures from both Munich ’72 (121 
NOCs) and Mexico ’68 (112). Through sheer quantity of (claimed) acceptances, the boycott was 
still being framed as a failure. However, at the same time, listeners were being informed that the 




Radio Moscow continued to publish letters from listeners criticising the boycott, the station also 
continued to frame the boycott around reasons unrelated to Afghanistan, using the analytical 
frame to relate it to domestic electioneering, or that the US was actively trying to damage the 
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Olympic movement as a whole.
632
 The last point was made by Vladimir Promyslov, then Major 
of Moscow, who the Britain & Ireland service claimed had said, ‘the USSR believes the 
unwillingness of the USA and several of its allies to take part in the Moscow Olympics will 
damage the Olympic movement’.633 Rather than mention the reasoning behind the boycott, 
Radio Moscow was putting forward a claim about the consequences of the boycott. Using the 
analytical frame, boycott reporting concentrated not, in this instance, on trying to split it from 
Afghanistan, but on trying to place it within the context of destroying the entire Olympic 
movement. An interesting parallel here was the Soviet actions in 1968, when they themselves 
threatened to boycott the Mexico Olympics because of South African involvement. In that 
instance, it was the IOC, not the Soviet Union, that Soviet sources claimed was splitting the 
Olympic movement – even though it was the Soviet Union, and many other African states, 
threatening non-attendance.
634
 Whilst the two boycotts are only in their broadest sense similar, 
the Soviet claims about unity and the potential for jeopardy were markedly similar, despite the 
different position the Soviet Union found itself in for 1980 compared to 1968.
635
 
Splitting the Olympic movement was an argument also broadcast to North American listeners - 
 ‘One of the most serious consequences of [the] US Administration’s line is the threat of a 
possible splitting in the international Olympic movement which would lead to an end to 
the very spirit of the movement’.636  
This commentary also talked of the US athletes – ‘…the ones who stand to lose from the 
boycott’.637 Radio Moscow had claimed the grain embargo would do most damage not to the 
Soviet Union, but to the American farmer. Now it was claiming the boycott would not harm the 
Soviet Union but instead the United States athlete, in addition to potentially splitting the 
Olympic movement. Furthermore, the same commentary incorporated the argument that - ‘the 
whole campaign of boycotting the Olympics is designed above all to serve the interests of 
Carter’s election marathon’.638 Using the word ‘marathon’ was clearly a play on the Olympic 
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event, and again, it was all about shifting the listener away from any illusions that the boycott 
was related to Afghanistan.  
Alongside letters condemning the boycott, there were also reports designed to give the 
impression that well-known sections of the foreign press were also anti-boycott. One example 
from the Home service began by discussing reports from The New York Times, before moving 
on to give the views of the Soviet commentator.
639
 Whilst there was no direct quote from The 
New York Times condemning the boycott or the US Administration, just being mentioned in the 
piece alongside the condemnation was one way Soviet radio used Western reporting when 
framing its own reports.
640
 
In the days before the deadline, Radio Moscow proceeded with many of the frames it had used 
in the previous months. They were still telling listeners all over the world that the boycott was 
failing and that Afghanistan was not the real reason behind the campaign. They were also 
referencing important foreign news sources that they claimed supported the Soviet stance. And 
to show that the boycott lacked support in other areas of the worldwide population, they were 
still reading out listeners’ letters and quoting athletes and the general public. However, whilst 
there were lists of states and numbers of attendees stated with great regularity, there was also an 
increasing emphasis on the boycott pressure placed by the US on other states, the imperialism 
frame, and the beginnings of a shift away from focusing reporting around the quantity frame. In 
anticipation of the IOC announcing considerably less states attending than the previous claims 
made by Radio Moscow, the quality of the athletes was a consideration Radio Moscow was 
starting to raise more and more. 
8.1.2 The Deadline Passes… 
Within days of the deadline passing, the IOC reported that 85 Olympic teams had accepted the 
invitation to attend the Games.
641
 As this was a significant reduction from the 102 and 120 the 
station had previously claimed, it could be anticipated that this would be the point when Radio 
Moscow would be forced to admit the boycott campaign had had an effect.
642
 However, this did 
not happen. Initial reports proclaimed this number as proof the boycott had failed, whilst at the 
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same time some broadcasts were carrying comments from the IOC claiming the number was 
‘satisfactory’.643 This was hardly a ringing endorsement. However, Vladimir Popov, the Radio 
Moscow commentator, informed British and Irish listeners that,  
‘The general flow of applications… indicates quite clearly that with little exception all 
major countries will take part in the Games.’644 
So rather than frame the boycott in terms of numbers, as had previously been the case, the 
emphasis seems to have switched to highlighting that most major countries would appear. No 
longer could Radio Moscow base its arguments on comments, actual figures were now known 
and out in the open, so the framing of the campaign had to shift. The boycott was still reported 
as a failure, not now because over 100 countries had agreed to attend, as previously claimed, but 
because the major countries were still attending. Framing the boycott was about highlighting the 
quality, not the quantity, of athletes attending. 
Moreover, in the same commentary, Popov asserted that the figures claimed by the US 
Administration were wrong –  
‘They also cite the list of the countries that have not submitted applications and conclude 
that these countries support the anti-Olympic campaign of the American administration. 
But let’s turn to the facts. According to IOC spokesmen the majority of these countries 
have explained their absence at the Olympics by reasons which are far from being 
political, but are financial, organisational, or stemming from the inadequate form of 
athletes.’645  
There was perhaps a grudging admittance that 85 (or indeed 80 as the IOC website now reports) 
acceptances was not what the Soviet Union had hoped for.
646
 However, the argument was 
thrown straight back at the United States, non-attendances were for reasons unrelated to politics 
(a vague reference to dismissing any link with Afghanistan). This was a new twist on the frames 
used to split the boycott from Afghanistan. In the months before the deadline, Radio Moscow 
had claimed the boycotters were unduly pressurised by the United States government, now the 
claim was put forward that those not attending were in the vast majority of cases not attending 
because of other matters, they were not actually boycotting.  
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This way of describing the non-attendees fitted with the argument that the boycott had failed. 
Radio Moscow claimed that yes, there were fewer teams than the Soviet Union anticipated, but 
those not attending had their reasons, unrelated to politics, and those attending consisted of the 
majority of the top teams. Therefore, Radio Moscow claimed that, ‘the results of the count of 
applications that have been submitted shows that the boycott campaign imposed on the 
international sports movement… has failed.’647  
The quality frame was also used in Home service broadcasts –  
‘…the majority of the National Olympic Committees have officially announced that they 
would be taking part in the Games and that among this… virtually all leading sports 
countries are represented except for the United States, the German Federal Republic and 
Japan; that the representatives of all continents of the world will be taking part…’648  
The boycott was framed as a failure because, Radio Moscow claimed, it was not worldwide, it 
included few of the major sporting nations, and it was only supported by a minority. More 
specifically, the commentary went on to claim,  
‘…the Games in Moscow will not only be of full value as to their quantitative 
composition… but… also as to the qualitative composition and will indisputably make 
their great contribution to the development both of amateur sport and of the International 
Olympic movement’.649  
Again, of those who were not attending, ‘only a few… have, under the United States’ diktat, 
embarked on declaring the political reasons for their non-participation’.650 Thus, for Soviet 
listeners, the effect of the boycott on both quantity and quality was dismissed, with the 




The publication of the attendees had dealt the ‘American-led boycott’ a ‘major setback’, 
according to the World Service.
652
 However, the crux of the argument for those listening to the 
World Service was thus - ‘The pillars of the boycott, USA, FRG and Japan were not so 
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successful at Montreal. The Moscow Games will be fully-fledged Games, which will promote 
sport’.653 Hence, World Service listeners were reassured about the quality of the Games, 
although in a manner that questioned the success and ability of athletes from the foremost 
boycotting states rather than focusing on the number of attendees. There may have been a 
boycott, but Radio Moscow was using the quality frame to inform listeners that it would not 
affect the top athletes. This was also a further reason for the boycott – the US and others were 
worried about underperforming and thus needed an excuse not to attend. Additionally, in an 
attempt to discredit information from other sources, the World Service quoted a TASS observer 
claim that the US State Department had openly falsified the number of countries it claimed to be 
boycotting the Games.
654
 Not only were the numbers being falsified elsewhere, but the reasons 
for those who were not attending were also being falsified by others to portray the boycott as 
more successful than Radio Moscow believed it to be. 
Listeners in North America were told that 29 committees had declined to appear at the Games, 
again, mostly due to non-political reasons.
655
 There was no mention of the further 27 who had 
not responded to the invitation at all.
656
 Listeners heard the boycott described as a ‘pointless 
campaign’, but, interestingly, they also heard the commentator Vladimir Pozner claim that 
‘Soviet people were aware of the reasons for the boycott…’ – these reasons included 
Afghanistan (‘this alleged reason’), ‘as well as the real reasons underlying US policy’.657 US 
listeners heard the explanation for these 29 not attending before they were informed that 85 
teams would be attending.
658
 However, presenting this relatively small number before admitting 
the number of actual attendees, Radio Moscow had tried to form in the listeners minds the idea 
that the boycott had achieved very little. Had they announced 85 teams were attending before 
anything else, listeners, who may have heard Radio Moscow’s previous claims about 120 teams 
attending, may have considered the boycott something of a success. Reversing the 
announcements in this manner allowed for a more effective framing of the boycott as a failure 
as it provided the opportunity to focus the minds of listeners around the reasons for non-
attendance, and in doing so highlight how few states, according to Radio Moscow, actually 
supported the US-led boycott campaign. It was almost as if in doing this Radio Moscow was 
creating a popularity table, the US boycott having a tiny fraction of the support the Soviet’s 
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claimed for their Olympic Games – although this was a somewhat skewed claim. Many 
attendees, such as members of the team from Britain, were going not because of politics or a 
desire to support the Soviet Union, but because of a desire to compete at an Olympic Games. 
In addition to concentrating on those who were not attending because of matters unrelated to the 
boycott campaign, Radio Moscow also attempted to portray those who had agreed specifically 
to boycott in a negative manner. Whilst it claimed some states were put under pressure by, and 
eventually wilted to, the United States Administration demand to boycott, there were other 
regimes Radio Moscow was far more critical of. The station told North American listeners that,  
‘It is hard to believe that in a country claiming to be democratic the President by his 
personal decision can deprive hundreds of athletes of their inalienable right to take 
part… Such an arbitrary rule violates the elementary democratic freedoms and looks like 
dictatorship rather than democracy. And perhaps it is not accidental that the White 
House’s anti-Olympic crusade has been supported mainly by the states with extremely 
reactionary regimes: Chile, Haiti, Paraguay, Honduras and South Korea’.659 
Not only did this allude to the divisive and people harm frames, but it also linked the boycott 
campaign to states who Radio Moscow claimed were predominantly ‘extremely reactionary 
regimes’.660 Radio Moscow was making it clear that the US government was enlisting the 
support of some dubious regimes. This was a clear attempt to frame the boycott in a particular 
way, a boycott supported by Canada, Norway and West Germany would not be open to the 
same accusation of ‘extremely reactionary regimes’ – although it would still be open to political 
ideology. This was also a way of detracting from the obvious realisation that with only 85 
announced attendees, there were states missing – but Radio Moscow wanted to make clear that 
those states, led by the US, were undesirable either because of disagreeable political ideology 
and/or sporting weakness. 
8.2 AFGHANISTAN, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND PEACE PROPOSALS 
North American listeners were retold on 19
th
 May the reason the Soviet Union was involved in 
Afghanistan, ‘the Government of Afghanistan applied to the USSR for military aid under a 
Treaty in existence and after repeated requests the USSR gave help…’.661 This explanation was 
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in response to a letter criticising the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan – ‘…the reason the 
USSR is in Afghanistan is because it wants to take over the country’s oil wells’.662 This was a 
rare example of the radio station letting an anti-Soviet perspective get aired, although only so 
that it could be swiftly exposed as wrong – ‘…there are no oil wells in Afghanistan… The oil 
wells are in Iran… and the military presence and threat there is, as you hopefully know, not 
Soviet’.663 The negativity of the complaint was swiftly turned into a defence of Soviet 
involvement and an implicit attack on the United States.  
On the 25
th
 May listeners in North America were told about claimed CIA failures in 
Afghanistan – apparently the failures of the CIA had led to the US Administration taking out 
vengeance on the Olympic Games.
664
 Within days of this claim, North American listeners were 
again told about the involvement of the United States, China and Pakistan in Afghanistan, and 
also direct US help to Afghan mercenaries.
665
 This was a part of the wider imperialism and 
insurgency frames used to report Western involvement in Afghanistan. Home service listeners 
heard again the claim that Pakistan was the bridgehead for this involvement –  
‘armed bandits are penetrating the country from Pakistan under the guise of nomads… at 
the training centres where the forces of aggression learn their job, officials from the 
American embassy in Pakistan are ever more often engaging openly in anti-Afghan 
propaganda. They advise their instructors to make wider use of caravan routes and 
nomads’ camps for transferring their hired killers into Afghanistan… quite a few centres 
for the training of diversionaries have been set up in Pakistan. Around Peshawar alone 
there are at least five such camps, which are maintained on CIA funds and with money 
coming from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others hostile to democratic Afghanistan.’666  
‘Democratic Afghanistan’ was being portrayed not only as the state working for peace in the 
region, with Pakistan the opposite, but also, significantly, as a government amongst equals – a 
stable regime with peaceful plans. Again, the ‘armed bandits’ were portrayed as fighting against 
Afghanistan, rather than the Soviet Union and the Afghan leadership they supported. 
These claims were backed up with the words of others. Just days after Radio Moscow had again 
made these claims, the broadcaster reported an admission by a US spokesman that the US was 
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‘aiding anti-government groups which infiltrate Afghanistan’. 667 This made news bulletins 
worldwide, as can be expected for an announcement that confirmed previous Radio Moscow 
claims. Also, the new Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made comments, in a German 
newspaper, critical of US, Chinese and Pakistan collaboration in Southern Asia, and these 
featured across many Radio Moscow stations in Western Europe, and the English service in 
Asia.
668
 There were also reports that Gandhi had made accusations about the use of US made 
chemical weapons by Afghan anti-government fighters, these appeared in broadcasts to Eastern 
Europe, broadcasts in Arabic, Dari and Shona, and also on the English-language Asian 
service.
669
 Not only did these broadcasts link the US to the insurgents, but they also linked the 
US to a group using chemical weapons.  
Whilst the United States and others were criticised for their attempts to worsen the situation in 
Afghanistan, the Afghan government, on 14
th
 May 1980, put forward a proposal with regard to 
settling differences within the region. This was seized upon by Radio Moscow as an opportunity 
to further frame the situation in Afghanistan as ‘normalising’, and to show the Afghan 
government was in control. Home service listeners heard that ‘Afghanistan’s government is 
striving for the speediest possible settlement of the regional problems…’.670 The problems, as 
admitted to, were not solely in Afghanistan, but the whole region! More importantly, it was the 
Afghan government trying to sort them out. The Afghan government was reported as trying to 
reach out to Iran and Pakistan with a regional agreement, the specifics of which were not 
explained. Listeners had to believe that it was peaceful and positive because it had been 
approved by many groups, including the Soviet Union. Of more importance to Radio Moscow 
than the specifics of a peace proposal was showing the Afghan government as desiring peace, 
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and not only that, being strong enough to be the state putting forward the solutions to the 
‘regional problems’.671 
North American listeners were informed that implementation of the proposal ‘would be 
guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States’.672 The specifics of the plan were never 
expanded upon in any Radio Moscow broadcast, even though they had, it was claimed, been 
supported by ‘…participants of the recent session of the political consultative committee of the 
Warsaw Treaty organisation…’, ‘…had also been welcomed by different Arab countries…’, 
and, had ‘…been given considerable attention by Western leaders.673 The specifics were not 
important to Radio Moscow though, what was important was framing the proposal in a way that 
portrayed the new Afghan government as working for peace, beating the insurgents and playing 
a significant role on the international stage. The proposal helped to frame Afghanistan as 
‘normalising’ and emphasise that the government was in control.  
The proposals by the Afghan government gained far more coverage than the admission by a US 
spokesman that the US had been heavily involved in Afghanistan all along, despite the latter 
supporting the accusations Soviet media had made. On 24
th
 May, the Home service reported a 
Pravda article discussing the Afghan proposals – focusing on how ‘imperialism reaction… 
turned Pakistan into the main launching pad for anti-Afghan schemes’.674 On the 27th, a meeting 
between the Yemeni leader, Ali Nasir Muhammad, and Brezhnev was stated as claiming that,  
‘A political settlement is fully possible. Its core is a guaranteed end to military incursions 
into Afghanistan by the forces of counter-revolution from the territories of neighbouring 
states.’675  
So whilst the US were admitting involvement in Afghanistan, the Afghan government was 
being reported as trying to solve the regional problems – an example of the Afghan control 
frame used to portray the situation as Radio Moscow wanted it perceived; the US was the 
aggressor, the Soviet-supported Afghan government was working for peace. 
As with the reporting of the US admission, the solution proposed by the Afghan government 
was reported across the Radio Moscow airwaves without any noticeable regional shifts in the 
argument. Unlike the US statement though, it was not reported across the networks on the same 
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day. Some, such as those in Western Europe, only received one mention of the proposal in the 
weeks after, despite the usefulness for framing the Afghan government as stable enough and 
capable of making proposals to settle ‘regional’ differences.676 The proposal clearly seems to 
imply the Afghan government was getting to its feet unaided on the international stage, and it 
was added to by reports of the Afghan government actually complaining to the United Nations 
over the fighting against them.
677
 Specifically, this was related to Afghan claims that the USA, 
China and Britain were exporting gas and other chemical weapons for ‘anti-Afghan bands’ to 
use, but again, it was a further example of the new Afghanistan government making its voice 
heard on the international stage.
678
 Additionally though, the report also linked the US and others 
to the use of gas weapons, framing their involvement in aggressive and harmful ways. Perhaps 
because of the clear implication that there was fighting in the country, this development was not 
reported via the Home Service.  
It is easy to see how Gandhi’s comments, as reported by Radio Moscow, supported the overall 
Soviet frame of Western aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. On the 
19
th
 May, she was reported as complaining about the bandits being secretly sent into 
Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran.
679
 By the 30
th
 May, in a separate interview, Gandhi 
complained about military cooperation between the United States, China and Pakistan.
680
 Radio 
Moscow had persisted with the claim that the ‘bandits’ were supplied by the United States, 
Gandhi was an external source that supported these claims. She was also a useful source of 
support for reports supporting Soviet actions in Afghanistan – in yet another interview reported 
around this time, Radio Moscow claimed she ‘…refuted western news media inventions that the 
USSR is pursuing expansionist aims in Afghanistan’.681  
Another useful source for praising the Soviet Union was Babrak Karmal, the Afghan President, 
who appeared across the airwaves thanking the Soviet Union for various friendly actions. Home 
service listeners heard him thank the Soviet Union ‘…for its great and disinterested help to 
Afghanistan in the sphere of education’, and, in a separate speech a few days later, heard him 
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speak of the Afghan people’s appreciation of Brezhnev.682 Other regions of the world heard 
Karmal thank Brezhnev for the support the Soviet Union had given to the peace proposals 
drawn up by the Afghan leadership.
683
 These reports again made clear there was more to the 
Soviet assistance than military support, which again builds on Radio Moscow’s desire to frame 
the assistance in a friendly, peaceful and helpful manner. 
Radio Moscow was not only using the Afghan peace proposals to impress upon listeners the 
idea that Afghanistan was a state striving for peace – listeners also heard more reports about 
large numbers of families who had fled Afghanistan under the previous Amin regime returning 
home. It seems they did not report this to listeners in North America or the Soviet Union; 
however it, and how life in Afghanistan had improved, was broadcast to many other regions of 
the world.
684
 Not only was Radio Moscow reporting the Afghan government as a regime of 
peace and one that was active on the international stage, the Afghan control frame, but life in 
Afghanistan itself was also being reported through the normalisation frame – the country was 
becoming safer as demonstrated by families willing and able to return home.  
On 25
th
 May, the World Service, citing newspapers in Kabul as its source, claimed that ‘in the 
past few days over 1,200 families returned to settlements in the eastern province Konar, and 
over 800 families to the central province Ghowr’.685 By 29th May, this story had developed, and 
the same station was now claiming that 11,000 families had returned home, ‘…after fleeing 
from the persecutions of the Amin regime’.686 The development of the story changed the reason 
why many had left – on the broadcasts of the 25th May, Afghans had fled ‘…under the influence 
of the campaign of lies launched by the enemies of the April revolution…’, yet by the 29th this 
had changed to a focus on persecutions by the previous Afghan President.
687
 The earlier story 
implied foreign actors were getting through and being successful. The second reason eliminated 
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any suggestion of anti-Afghan actor success – it was all about Amin, again personifying the 
problems Afghanistan had faced before the Soviet invasion. Regardless of the reason though, 
the story was part of the on-going frame to suggest all was well in Afghanistan, that the country 
was finding its feet and overcoming the foreign insurgents. 
Continuing the theme of life in Afghanistan, the World Service reported a Pravda story about 
life in Herat, showing how everything was actually normal despite Western claims –  
‘…captured by rebels as Western news agencies have claimed… The Governor of the 
Herat Province… who, according to Western news agencies had been shot, told the 
correspondent that life in the city had been normal all the time. He said the authorities 
had begun to build homes for workers…. They have also opened courses for liquidating 
illiteracy. The Governor ridiculed the reports about the seizure of Herat and called them 
invented.’688  
This report was clearly trying to get across to listeners the opinion that Afghanistan was a state 
that had been through turmoil and was now in a stable position to rebuild. It reaffirmed the idea 
that the situation was improving.  
8.2.1 The Islamic Conference, Afghanistan and Foreign News Reporting 
The 11
th





May 1980, was once again critical of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, commenting on how the 
situation had not changed, ‘despite the call by a considerable majority of the members of the 
UN General Assembly and the unanimous demand of the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers’.689 The conference also proposed setting up a working group to ‘watch over the 
development in Afghanistan and to find ways and means of implementing the resolutions to be 
adopted’.690 As with the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference held in January 1980, 
it was not a conference that praised Soviet actions in Afghanistan. 
As such Radio Moscow reporting did not comment on such statements as point seven of the 
conference resolution -   
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‘His Excellency expressed his great regret that despite the call by a considerable 
majority of the members of the U.N. General Assembly and the unanimous demand of the 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, foreign troops were still there in Afghanistan in 
large numbers, and the peoples of Afghanistan were deprived of their legitimate right to 
determine their form of government and to order their lives in accordance with their 
traditions. Men, women and children in Afghanistan were being obliged to leave their 
hearths and homes because of the situation prevailing in that country.’691 
Whilst not directly referencing the Soviet Union, in the same way that UN ES-6/2 did not, there 
was clear annoyance with, and condemnation of, Soviet actions. However, Radio Moscow 
concentrated once again on the motivations behind the meeting, rather than the outcome of the 
meeting. World Service listeners heard that the conference was attended by ‘…leaders of 
counter-revolutionary bands entrenched in countries bordering Afghanistan’, whilst listeners to 
the Arabic service were repeatedly told about the US trying to use some of its Islamic followers 
to force resolutions upon the conference.
692
 The implication was quite clear, nothing favourable 
to the Soviet Union or Afghanistan would come out of a conference attended by such groups. 
This was the same portrayal that was applied to the Islamic Conference condemnation in 
January. However, Radio Moscow did not deem it news worth telling in any detail to audiences 
in Britain and Ireland, North America, or even the Soviet Union itself. Comment on the 
resolution of the Islamic Conference was primarily reserved for audiences in Asia and the 
Middle East. 
Across the Radio Moscow network, there was only a passing reference to the outcome of the 
conference, via the Arabic language service –  
‘…the Islamabad Conference, under the pressure of certain forces, adopted a resolution 
concerning Afghanistan, which is in fact, interference in the internal affairs of that 
country as well as an attempt to cast doubts on the Soviet Union... spreading seeds of 
antagonism between the Arab nation and its friends at the fore of which are the Soviet 
Union and other Socialist states.’693   
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This was not a discussion of the point that condemned foreign troops in Afghanistan, but instead 
an attack on the idea to create a panel to watch over Afghanistan. Importantly for the framing of 
the report, this statement made it clear that Radio Moscow believed it was not an independent 
conference that resolved to condemn the Soviet invasion, but one influenced by others. The 
Arabic service claimed Afghanistan was a distraction from the real issues facing Islam, such as 
the ‘struggle against Zionist occupation’.694 The World Service informed it’s listeners that 
‘…the debate on the events in Afghanistan is an attempt to distract the attention of the Islamic 
world from serious problems facing it’.695 By implication, Afghanistan was not a ‘serious 
problem’ for the Islamic world – in this manner the resolution on Afghanistan was dismissed. 
Again not reporting on the outcomes, Radio Moscow reported complaints about a lack of 
Afghan representation at the conference, that Libya had condemned the conference, and that 
Afghanistan did not consider itself bound by the resolutions of the conference.
696
 These 
arguments appeared over different language networks, but they had the same goal – to discredit 
those attending, and therefore any outcomes of, the Islamic Conference.  
Rather than consider the resolution that condemned the foreign intervention in Afghanistan, 
Radio Moscow instead focused their attacks on the conference around the following statement -  
‘…it was incumbent on this Conference to study the problem in all its aspects and to 
consider setting up a committee whose only aim would be to keep watch over the 
development in Afghanistan…’.697 
Doing so avoided the need to report condemnation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan – instead 
they could criticise the Islamic Conference for interfering. This was interference in a state that 
Radio Moscow had been arguing was able to stand on its own internationally, one that had put 
forward peace treaties of its own, and one that was welcoming Afghans who had previously fled 
the old regime. Radio Moscow had long been complaining of foreign interference in 
Afghanistan, and here was another example. However, rather than go on the attack, the only real 
mention of this resolution via most broadcasts was a statement that the Afghan Foreign Minister 
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 The resolution was reported using the Afghan control frame, by claiming 
the Afghan leadership had a say in the whole process of setting up a committee – which was not 
the case, especially as the Afghanistan government was at that time suspended from the Islamic 
Conference. 
Whilst Radio Moscow claims may not have represented the Islamic Conference reality, the 
broadcaster was still keen to point out when others had projected untruths onto their audiences. 
The Home service audience was informed about Western lies in Herat, with Western 
propaganda ‘…attempting to make use of the events in Afghanistan in order to portray some 
sort of doomsday…’, and the pre-planned US military budget exploiting the situations in 
Afghanistan and Iran.
699
 Effectively, they were informed about perceived falsity in the Western 
press and the reasons behind it. Pravda’s comments on Herat rebuked foreign news reporting 
and appeared across the board of Radio Moscow stations, and attempted three tasks.
700
 Firstly, 
the comments were an attempt to dispel evident Western claims about Herat. Secondly, through 
the words of the Governor of Herat, the report put forward the view that Herat, and perhaps by 
implication other parts of Afghanistan, were as normal and not as foreign media had portrayed 
them. Thirdly, by showing Western lies over Herat, this report was an attempt to get listeners 
thinking about other stories in the press that may have presented Soviet actions in Afghanistan, 
or indeed life in Afghanistan at that point, in a negative way. This last point is particularly apt as 
the story seemingly appeared almost everywhere, with the exception of the Warsaw Pact states 
of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It seems stories such as this were used by 
Radio Moscow to challenge the credibility of Western media where the latter was readily 
available.  
Pravda was also a source of information about the proposals put forward by the Afghan 
government. However, reporting of the newspaper article was concentrated on the Warsaw Pact 
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states rather than being broadcast everywhere.
701
 It was not heard via the World Service, or it 
seems any English language broadcasts, and appears only to have been broadcast in Western 
Europe to Italian or French listeners.
702
 Western newspapers were not sources of information; 
they were, according to Radio Moscow, sources of disinformation (unless they seemed to 
provide a view that suited Radio Moscow, in which case they were often reported to audiences 
elsewhere). French listeners to Radio Moscow were reminded that it was ‘American propaganda 
and certain reactionary organs of the French press…’ informing them that recent talks between 
French President Giscard and Brezhnev had achieved nothing for France.
703
 Furthermore, 
attributing events in Afghanistan to the worsening world situation was false, Afghanistan was 
but a pretext for pre-planned American and, because this was broadcast to France, NATO 
schemes.
704
 Italian listeners were told that the Afghan Information Minister ‘accuses Western 
propaganda of distorting events in his country’.705 World Service listeners were told about 
Western radio’s lies concerning Afghanistan, North American listeners were told, in response to 
letters sent in to the station, about ‘cock and bull stories’ in the US press.706 Whilst Pravda was 
held up as the truth on Afghanistan, Western broadcasting was portrayed as completely the 
opposite – but then this was being broadcast to listeners who may have been susceptible to those 
views already. 
8.3   SUMMARY 
The broadcasting surrounding Afghanistan continued to portray the country as peaceful and 
progressing, even on the international stage. This may have been a counter to foreign news press 
claiming otherwise, and in the Soviet Union itself, it may have been presented in this way to 
pacify mothers worried about their soldier sons. This was particularly the case with broadcasts 
that discussed how Soviet help had improved education and other infrastructure, moving the 
assistance away from military engagement. The Afghan control and normalisation frames were 
prominent, with broadcasting designed to give the impression that the Afghanistan government 
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was capable, and in putting forward a peace proposal, actively working for peace in the region. 
Key to this was the word ‘region’ – some of Radio Moscow’s commentating claimed that 
Afghanistan was working for peace in the region, not just within Afghanistan itself. The 
situation within the country was being framed with the suggestion that the whole region was in 
turmoil. Even the Islamic Conference was dismissed as trying to interfere – not only were many 
members readily associated with the United States, but Radio Moscow was trying to make it 
clear that Afghanistan did not need any interfering with. Reporting of Afghanistan at this time 
continued to be framed in a way that gave the impression that the country was getting back to 
normal and everything was fine. 
This was not the case with the Olympic boycott campaign though. By the very nature of the 
deadline day making states and national Olympic committees commit to attending or not, it 
affected the way Radio Moscow framed its reporting. By 27
th
 May, the IOC published a list of 
those who had accepted and those who had declined, the only grey area Radio Moscow could 
argue over were the states who had neither accepted or declined. There can be no doubt that 
only 85 Olympic committees accepting the invitation was something of a blow to Soviet 
aspirations for the Moscow Games. However, rather than dwell on this number, and ignoring 
the difference between the reality and the 102 attendees claimed by the radio station just days 
before the deadline, Radio Moscow instead chose to focus on the reasons why some teams were 
not attending. As many as possible of the non-attendees were explained away through 
arguments far removed from Afghanistan – teams who were following the US boycott lead were 
portrayed as those from undesirable regimes. In this way, Radio Moscow framed the outcome of 
the invitations by not focusing on the outright number, but instead concentrating on reducing the 
amount of states it claimed were actually supporting the USA. 85 teams may have been less 
than at Montreal, but it was far more importantly still considerably more, Radio Moscow 
claimed, than those who supported the US boycott campaign. Radio Moscow did not give up on 
suggesting this number would increase either, by readily promoting the IOC’s statement that 
they would consider late claims. However, it was not something they dwelled on. 
Elements of localising the frame can be seen here, with broadcasts tending to present a wide 
variety of attendees. States local to the target audience were mentioned alongside those from 
further afield, to give the impression that not only would there be a worldwide gathering at the 
Games, but many local states would also be in attendance. Thus, the boycott was failing on both 
a worldwide level and a more local level. For broadcasts to North America, there were also 
specific statements about the pariah states that the US government was allying itself with over 
the boycott. Broadcasts to Europe were noticeably more focused on telling listeners that other 
European states were attending the Olympics, which suggests Radio Moscow saw the area as a 
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key battleground. This linked to the divisions Radio Moscow was trying to place between the 
United States and Europe, and between governments in the region that actively supported the 
US and the people within those states the Soviet broadcaster claimed were suffering because of 
this support. Jimmy Carter may have been using the Olympic Games boycott to create divisions 
between the Soviet people and the Soviet leadership, but Radio Moscow was using the 
campaign to try and emphasise divides between the United States and the rest of the world, with 
particular emphasis on its European allies.  
A further frame that developed from this moment on was based on quality. No longer could the 
Soviet Union claim the Games would be the biggest ever, but they could continue to claim that 
the Games would provide excellent quality. The crux of this argument was that the USA, West 
Germany, Canada and Japan, some of the big-name boycotters, had been overtaken in terms of 
Olympic ability – indeed that it was perhaps one of the reasons the USA, and the Canadian team 
who even failed to win a gold medal at their own Olympics four years previous, would not go to 
Moscow. Not only did this sporting frame report the boycott campaign very differently from 
previous political frames, it further removed the cause of the boycott campaign from the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Claims it was part of Jimmy Carter’s election campaign had quietened 
down; claims that it was due to sporting inadequacies had increased. This was perhaps the 
biggest development in terms of framing the boycott campaign at this time. Gone were the 
claims linked to quantity, on the rise were the claims that the boycott, what little there was of it 
according to Radio Moscow, would not affect the quality of the athletes on display. The boycott 
was still reported through these frames as a failure. Whether or not the events in the Olympic 
Games, only two months away at this point, would back up the claim about quality is 







 CHAPTER 9  
RADIO MOSCOW REPORTS THE OLYMPICS 
 
The Soviet report into the Moscow Olympic Games, ‘The Official Report of the 
Organizing Committee of the Games of the XXII Olympiad’ explained that,  
 ‘The Opening Ceremony and Closing Ceremony, essential elements of the Games, 
provide a good opportunity for demonstrating the basic Olympic ideals and principles.’707 
Following this was a lengthy description of the opening ceremony, from the words of both 
Ignati Novikov, the President of the Moscow Olympic Organising Committee and Lord 
Killanin, outgoing President of the IOC, which ended with a description of the finale - 16,000 
participants created ‘a mosaic picture of the Earth with a star on it symbolising Moscow, host of 
the Games.
708
 This vast number in itself, combining the performance artists with the athletes, 
was part of the frame used to portray the event as successful through sheer quantity of numbers. 
The report also commented on media coverage -  
 ‘France Presse… noted that the Moscow Olympic Games had begun with an impressive 
ceremony… The Washington Post reported that the Soviet Union had opened the Games 
with a magnificent spectacle unequalled in Olympic history.’709 
The Times also described the opening ceremony, as ‘…colourful and superbly organised…’.710 
However, this was the one positive in an otherwise damning indictment of Soviet manipulation 
of the opening ceremony - 
‘For the millions of Russians watching the colourful and superbly organised opening 
ceremony on television, the Western protest was scarcely noticeable. Soviet television 
skilfully avoided showing any of the Olympic banners flying in the place of national flags, 
and quickly cut to shots of the cheering crowd whenever a lone standard-bearer 
appeared.’711  
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Whilst Soviet television was adept at avoiding showing anything other than hints of the political 
maelstrom surrounding the Olympics, Radio Moscow was not quite so fearful. However, it did 
all it could in the build-up to the Games, and even during them, to dispel any ideas that the 
boycott was anything but a failure.  




 July 1980, the weeks either side of the 
Olympic opening ceremony (19
th
 July). It analyses the build-up to the ceremony and the ways 
Radio Moscow reported the spectacle during the first week of the Olympic Games. The chapter 
demonstrates how reporting switched from condemning the boycott to demonstrating how the 
boycott had completely failed. After months of build-up, the opening ceremony was the moment 
when words became actions, and the prayers of many, for the boycott to either succeed or fail in 
highlighting Soviet actions in Afghanistan, were realised.   
As demonstrated by the previous chapters, Radio Moscow had attempted to frame the reporting 
since December 1979 in a manner that split the reaction, the Olympic boycott, from the cause, 
the invasion of Afghanistan. This chapter continues to explore how the two were separated and 
how, increasingly, Radio Moscow went to great lengths to portray Afghanistan as a stable state 
getting involved peacefully on the international stage. One way they did this was to send a team 




9.1 THE OLYMPIC GAMES ON THE HORIZON 
In the build-up to the opening ceremony, audiences around the world were informed about who 
would be attending, and who had already arrived. Of all Radio Moscow listeners, those within 
the Soviet Union were most frequently told about the influx of foreigners into the USSR for the 
Games. These ranged from an announcement on 16
th
 July that ‘nearly 6,000 Olympic 
participants have already settled at the Olympic village’, through to an explanation that ‘1,200 
representatives of the electronic press, representing dozens of radio and TV companies of the 
world…’ were also in Moscow.713 Whilst reports such as these can be construed as fitting the 
quantity frame that had previously been used to attack the boycott, this could also be construed 
as typical promotion in the days before a major sporting event. In terms of embracing the world, 
Soviet listeners were told about the different nations attending – ‘It is pleasant to stress that the 
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Olympic debut of the athletes of Vietnam, Cyprus, the Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Laos, and 
Botswana will take place in Moscow’.714 On 18th July, they heard that,  
‘Some of the largest teams in the history of the Olympics have been sent to Moscow by 
Poland, Sweden, Hungary, Brazil, Zambia, the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, 
Nepal and Yugoslavia.’715 
The statement is somewhat misleading as it implies the likes of Nepal had sent some of the 
largest teams in the history of the Olympics, when in fact they had merely beaten their own 
previous participation records. There are, for example, only eleven Nepalese athletes listed as 
having participated in the Games – hardly large in Olympic terms.716 Poland did send 321 
athletes, Sweden 145, Brazil 109 – but these hardly compare with the teams the Soviet Union 
fielded in 1980 or 1976, 560 and 410, or the US team from 1976, numbering 396.
717
 The point 
was to frame attending teams as large and from all parts of the world. An American writer was 
quoted on the Home service, pushing these points further, claiming the Games ‘will further 
friendship’, whilst another broadcast quoted an American writer [it is not clear whether this was 
the same one] saying ‘participation in the Olympics is vitally important for all’, and a German 
artistic director was reported as claiming they ‘serve mutual understanding for all’. 718 
Clearly building up the Games to be a success, not only for sport but for world peace, and by 
implication and weight of numbers framing the boycott as failure, these broadcasts also put 
across some other aspects of the Games that reflected well on Moscow and the Soviet Union. 
Technologically, Soviet listeners were meant to be impressed that,  
‘For the first time all socialist countries and not only the European ones but also 
Vietnam… the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, Cuba, will be able to watch the 
Olympic sports contests via the Intersputnik communications satellite system’.719 
Another report claimed that ‘broadcasts can be carried out simultaneously via 20 colour TV 
channels… journalists have at their disposal 1,206 commentators’ seats at all sports sites…’.720 
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A further bulletin stated that ‘hundreds of millions of sports lovers… will be able to watch the 
Olympic reportages from Moscow on TV’.721 Technological advance was being mixed in with 
recording just how many states would be attending the Games, both designed to frame the 
Soviet Union as technologically advanced and the Games as a success. Even with this positive 
framing of the Games, which would most likely have appeared whether there was a boycott 
campaign or not, there was a mention of the boycott campaign. Home Service listeners heard a 
French athlete claiming that, ‘the fact that most sportsmen in the West, in spite of the pressure 
exerted on them, have come to the Olympic Games… demonstrates their adherence to the ideals 
of the Olympic movement.’722 Not only were there large teams appearing, new teams were 
appearing, technology was providing access for viewers in many new places, and even the 
athletes who had been pressed not to attend were attending. 
The World Service also talked about the specially built TV and radio centre that allowed for 20 
television and 100 radio lines to be available.
723
 Within Europe, rather than focus on this 
technology, many broadcasts concerning the television and radio coverage just assured listeners 
that Radio Moscow would be providing commentary in full. Italian listeners were told precisely 
this, as were listeners in Portugal.
724
 Listeners to the Serb-Croat service were told that the 
‘Olympics will be widely televised’, and were advised on which bulletins to listen for Olympic 
news.
725
 Listeners to the Polish service were told in more detail about technical preparations –  
‘one hundred radio channels have been prepared in Moscow to broadcast in seventy 
languages of the world. We hope that Moscow Radio will help you feel the Olympic 
atmosphere.’726  
This focus on technology and broadcasting took on a more critical edge in broadcasting to 
Britain & Ireland though. Rather than discuss Soviet technology and how the world would see 
the Games, Radio Moscow discussed how some regions would not see the Games. ‘The BBC 
and ITV had succumbed to political pressure… and will not be showing coverage of the 
Olympic Games between 1930 and 2230 hours’ claimed a commentator on 14th July, in 
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response to listeners’ letters.727 This was a very different claim to that made via the World 
Service in March 1980 – ‘the British television companies have announced their decision to 
provide maximum coverage…’.728 However, it fitted with an earlier report attacking a specific 
journalist – ‘That Mr Tony Buckingham is a liar is an under-statement’ – he had according to 
the Radio Moscow commentator (the original newspaper article has not been traced) claimed 
that planes are surrounded by ‘Russian troops’, hotel assistants were rude, and the KGB were 
everywhere, all labelled ‘utter bilge’ by Radio Moscow.729 This was extrapolated to the western 
media as a whole – ‘the same kind of things are said not only in English but also American 
newspapers, and they are said by the Western media in general’.730 This attack on a specific 
journalist is interesting as it seems to have been a rare tactic from Radio Moscow. Typically, the 
personification of an argument concentrated around national leaders and politicians, for example 
Jimmy Carter or Margaret Thatcher. Even when criticising journalism, Radio Moscow tended to 
label whole newspaper or media outlets rather than the specific people within them – dividing 
the journalists from the organisations in a similar manner to how it tried to suggest there was a 
divide between the Soviet supporting people and the imperialist governments. The reasons for 
this distortion by the Western media, and perhaps the desire for Radio Moscow to talk up the 
broadcast technology providing the Games to the world, were made clear – ‘The Olympic 
Games offer a unique opportunity for millions of people to see for themselves. What those who 
come will see will differ profoundly from what they have been told for decades’.731 Restrictive 
coverage in the West was part of an attempt to hide the truth about the Soviet Union from 
people who had only heard what local media had to say. However, the broadcast also let the 
façade slip – the Moscow Olympics was not just about sport, but also about rebuking years of 
criticism of the Soviet Union. 
Lord Killanin was reported via the Home service as having the wish that journalists ‘should 
objectively cover the 1980 Olympics’, with the Home service telling listeners that there were 
Western journalists who,  
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‘to all appearances are interested not only and not so much in the Olympic games as in 
completely different themes which have nothing in common with sport or with the 
Olympic idea of strengthening friendship and peace between peoples’.732 
On the 19
th
, listeners heard foreign lies personified into one person, Margaret Thatcher, who,  
‘attempted to make again her contribution to the anti-Olympic campaign… The bellicose 
Lady went as far as to allege that Moscow is a closed city for its population. But all these 
attempts collapse when confronted with facts… Moscow became today world capital of 
sports, which irreproachably fulfils all the conditions of the Olympic Charter.’733  
Condemnation of these allegations about controls in the Olympic city also appeared in 
broadcasts to Britain and Ireland, which tried to make listeners question the claims about 
restrictions on journalists. A report by CBS journalist Denis Baxter claiming there were ‘tight 
controls by the authorities of all reports from the Soviet capital concerning the Olympic Games’ 
was dismissed by observer Igor Dmitriyev with the counter claim that if there were indeed 
‘guides and interpreters who see to it that reports by foreign correspondents conform to the 
official line’ how could dispatches appear that were inaccurate or did not conform?734 Foreign 
reporting that was critical of the Soviet Union was portrayed as lying, in a further addition to the 
frame of the foreign media and governments as misrepresenting the truth, whether in 
Afghanistan or Moscow.  
That Moscow children would be removed from the Olympic city for the duration of the Games 
was also dismissed by Radio Moscow. Vladimir Pozner, dismissing this in his ‘Daily Talk’ 
report to North American audiences, said, ‘I can hardly keep from sniggering. I mean it’s all so 
totally ridiculous’.735 He went on to explain that the reports some may have read about children 
being removed were fundamentally inaccurate, and, in what can be considered an attempt to 
promote the Soviet system above that of the US, explained about children’s yearly holiday 
camps, which took ‘over 600,000’ of Moscow’s junior citizens.736 Pozner asked the listener if 
the Western reporters had in fact ‘a list of things they are expected to say regardless of the 
facts’, considering, 
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‘Western journalists who have been here before during the summer must know this is a 
regular thing, and those who have come for the first time could have checked it out if they 
really wanted to know’.737 
According to Radio Moscow, the Olympics may not have been harming Muscovites, but the 
boycott was causing harm elsewhere. British & Irish listeners were told that the boycott showed 
up ‘the sorry state of human rights in the USA’, whilst North American and Home service 
listeners were informed that the LA Times had reported the boycott had hit US business.
738
 
Home service listeners were also informed that the failure of foreign firms to supply the Games 
had no effect on quality, as domestic firms were perfectly capable of producing the same goods 
– foreign offers had been accepted to help publicise the firms, in what listeners were expected to 
consider a nice gesture by the Soviet Union, not a need for foreign assistance.
739
  
This friendly gesture pointed towards framing Games reporting around the idea of peace and 
friendship. The North American service heard a commentary on the Games ability to spread 
exactly this,  
‘Many Western observers predict the 22nd Olympics will be a sport event of extraordinary 
significance… the ideas of peace, sport and cooperation between people and nations has 
more appeal than the hostility and mistrust of cold war time. We may be sure the Olympic 
Games in Moscow will not only provide new records; they will promote the noble ideals 
of a peaceful life and closer international cooperation.’740  
Listeners in Asia heard the Indian basketball captain say that, ‘he feels the atmosphere of 
friendship, rapprochement between young people and mutual understanding will have a clear 
ring at these Olympics.’741 The French Algerian service also carried listener’s letters wishing the 
Games success ‘as a festival of sport, peace and friendship’, whilst French African listeners 
heard an interview with a member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Madagascar 
praising the Games in Moscow as sure to ‘contribute to the consolidation of peace’.742 The 
African service heard that the Olympics would be ‘an important contribution to strengthening 
friendship among peoples’ – which is the opposite of the divisive and people harming frames 
                                                     
737
 IWM/SU/C/221 RM N.Am 18
th
 July 1980, 2300, section 7, p.3 
738
 IWM/SU/C/221 RM N.Am 15
th
 July 1980, 2300, section 1.2; IWM/SU/C/221 RM GBI 12
th
 July 1980, 
2000, section 1.11; IWM/SU/B/535 RM Home 15
th
 July 1980, 1330, ‘International Diary’, no.8 
739
 IWM/SU/B/535 RM Home 15
th
 July 1980, 2100, no.21 
740
 IWM/SU/C/221 RM N.Am 18
th
 July 1980, 0001, section 2 
741
 IWM/SU/C/221 RM Eng Asia 18
th
 July 1980, 1400, no.4 
742
 IWM/SU/D/ RM Fre Alg 16
th
 July 1980, 2000, section 5; RM Fre Afr 18
th
 July 1980, 1830, section 3 
Chapter 9: Radio Moscow Reports the Olympics 
200 
 
used to describe the US boycott actions.
743
 They were also informed about the Zimbabwean 
team, sending 65 team members, ‘both black and white sportsmen, [who] would be happy to 
compete at the Games’.744 Not only would the Games bring together ideologically different 
groups, but also groups divided on racial grounds.   
There was more praise for what the Olympics were about in broadcasts to both Western and 
Eastern Europe. Spanish listeners heard interviews with Juan Antonio Samaranch (Spanish 
ambassador to Moscow and President-elect of the International Olympic Committee), with the 
Secretary General of the Afghan Olympic Committee, who emphasised the importance of sport, 
and with the Chairman of the Laotian Olympic Committee, who expressed the view ‘that the 
Moscow Games will show the solidarity of all [the] world’s progressive forces’.745 Listeners to 
the Czech service heard Lord Killanin, and a listener in Martinique, talk about the peace and 
cooperation character of the Games.
746
 Listeners to the German service heard about non-Soviet 
reports on the Games build-up – the Stuttgarter Zeitung praised Moscow for being well 
prepared; a ‘Swiss paper’ was reported as commenting on the ‘contribution to peace and 
international understanding’.747 Hungarian and Bulgarian listeners were told about teams 
arriving for the Games – with no hint of any boycott surrounding these reports.748  
This frame continued in other regions too. Arabic audiences heard letters praising the Soviet 
Union and the Olympic Games, alongside one complaint from an Egyptian listener about 
President Sadat agreeing Egypt would join the boycott.
749
 This was suggestive that the Egyptian 
government was not acting in the interests of the Egyptian people, and if this was the case with 
the boycott then perhaps this was also the case with the Camp David Accords. This would also 
suite Radio Moscow attitudes towards the Camp David Accords. Fitting in with the peace and 
mutual understanding framework, Persian and Turkish listeners were told about the religious 
facilities available in the Olympic village.
750
 Directly attacking the boycott campaign had been 
overtaken by Radio Moscow pushing what might be described as political positives of the 
Olympic Games, pushing peace and understanding amongst different states and peoples. 
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However, in itself, this can still be considered indirect criticism of the boycott campaign, and on 
occasion peace and understanding was contrasted with the ‘pressure’ placed on athletes to 
boycott.  
This frame ran alongside the quantity frame discussed in previous chapters. The World Service 
reported on 16
th
 July that ‘6,000 athletes are already in Moscow’, and, on the 17th, that athletes 
from 74 states were already in the Olympic village.
751
 Listeners in Britain & Ireland did not hear 
anything about attendance by states or athletes during this time, but French listeners were told 
about the prominence of sport in the Soviet Union, and Swedish listeners were told about the 
6,000 athletes who had already arrived (by 16
th
) in Moscow – 6,000 being more than at any 
previous Games according to Radio Moscow.
752
 The African service claimed that,  
‘athletes from 85 countries will participate. This is about the average for the previous six 
summer Olympics; 16 of these are countries whose athletes won the first twenty places at 
the Olympics in Montreal.’753  
The average for the past six summer Olympics was actually 95.5 teams – thus this ‘about 
average’ number for Moscow was out by around 11%.754 In an attempt to localise attendance at 
the Games, African listeners heard the continent was strong in track and field and boxing, 
especially the teams from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Nigeria.
755
 The Ndebele language listeners 
heard about both the Angolan and Zimbabwean teams commenting on the Games, whilst Shona 
language listeners specifically heard comments by Zimbabwean athletes.
756
 The boycott was 
mentioned via the African service because of Kenyan athletes missing out – Henry Rono, three-
time world record setter, ‘said his dream was to win gold in Moscow. Unfortunately, he won’t 
be able to’.757 However, reaffirming the boycott had failed, listeners were told that, ‘the best 
athletes have come from a majority of countries. Only a few have fallen victim to the actions of 
politicians who got into line behind the Government of the United States’.758 The quantity and 
quality of attendees was being reused to frame the boycott as a failure. The boycott itself was 
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framed as the project of politicians and the US government, not a project of the people, and one 
that only had success with a few athletes. 
How the boycott had harmed athletes was reiterated in the days before the opening ceremony. 
On the 14
th 
July, Soviet listeners heard Lord Killanin express ‘hopes for the success of the 
Olympics’, that Moscow had received the Games ‘in connection with the fact that this city, and 
Soviet sportsmen, had made a great contribution to the development of sport’.759 Interwoven in 
this praise was also criticism of the boycott, Killanin regretting ‘that many sportsmen are unable 
to take part in these Games, due to political pressure…’, but the IOC President concluded with 
‘gratitude to all Soviet and Moscow organisers of the Olympics’.760 On 18th July, Home service 
listeners heard Lord Killanin again stress ‘that Moscow had been chosen as the venue for the 
22
nd
 Olympics because of the USSR’s outstanding contribution to the development of sport and 
not for any political considerations’.761 However, the World Service reported that the athletes 
from boycotting states were disappointed and depressed, US athletes were ‘apparently 
demoralised’, whilst a West German hammer thrower was reported as saying that ‘the boycott 
of the Olympics is like a lump constantly felt in the throat’.762 North American audiences even 
heard that there would be a film made which would ‘probably include a story on the 
sportsmen’s struggle for their rights’.763  
Both the British and Irish teams were attending, so these reports were not heard in broadcasts to 
the region. However, an argument that was not heard before, and really did not gain mention 
anywhere else, appeared as an off-the-cuff remark via the British airwaves on the 14
th. ‘There 
was no call for a boycott of the Montreal Games despite the bombing of Vietnam’ – this 
statement appeared in an interview with two Scottish brothers who had cycled from Glasgow to 
Moscow.
 764
 This created a direct comparison between events in Afghanistan and US actions in 
Vietnam and was not repeated in any other broadcast.  
It was not only the technology that Radio Moscow used to promote the Games, and the Soviet 
Union, to the world. The facilities were also mentioned in the days before the Games opened, in 
some cases contrasting them with those at Lake Placid or Montreal to show Soviet ability. 
World Service listeners heard the IOC Director, Monique Berlioux, praising the Games in much 
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the same manner – ‘she is deeply impressed not only with the good organisation of the Games 
but also with how preparations for the IOC session were carried out’.765 There was also praise 
for the facilities – ‘she says she has seen the Olympic swimming pool and has seen nothing like 
it in her life’ – and that there was a ‘wonderful atmosphere’.766 As with the comments by 
Killanin though, there was some criticism of the boycott interwoven with the overwhelming 
praise – ‘She expresses belief that the Moscow games will contribute greatly to the development 
of the Olympic movement and regrets that “athletes from some countries will be unable to take 
part…”’.767 
This frame also appeared elsewhere. British and Irish listeners heard praise for the Moscow 
organising committee from the French Olympic attaché, and, by the 18
th
, heard reports from 
British journalists in admiration of the Olympic village.
768
 Making the Olympic village ‘the best 
of any Olympic village so far’ were commodities such as televisions and video players, but also, 
to really put a scale of excellence on the village, only ‘6-8 people to an apartment unit. This 
compares with Montreal’s intolerable 15 to a unit’.769 The British Soviet historian, Jim Reardon, 
was even cited as regarding ‘the host of the Moscow Games as having done everything to 
enable the competitors to show their best results’.770 Radio Moscow was weaving criticism of 
North American Games’ in amongst praise for the Moscow Olympiad, effectively contrasting 
the two cold war adversaries by comparing Olympics. In this instance, Canadian Montreal bore 
the brunt of the criticism, though more usually, as seen in chapter five, the Lake Placid Games, 
and therefore the US as hosts of the 1980 Winter Olympics, were the ones being criticised.  
Lake Placid was lambasted in broadcasts to North America, with Radio Moscow commenting 
that ‘virtually nothing had been done for newsmen and their work’, a part of the ‘organisational 
shortcomings’ of the Games.771 This commentary, on 12th July, including a rare analysis of the 
Soviet defeat to the US at ice hockey in the 1980 Winter Games (the ‘miracle on ice’), preceded 
the more common praise for the organisation and facilities of the Moscow Games. By the 16
th
, 
Radio Moscow’s North American service was in line with its other services, publicising praise 
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for the facilities from foreign sports delegations.
772
 On the 17
th
, listeners were told Moscow was 
ready for the Games, and by the 19
th
 that Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, was putting on extra 
flights due to the Olympics.
773
 Linking back to supposed lies in the foreign press, on the 19
th
 
July Radio Moscow was also ridiculing stories North American listeners may have seen in the 
media about security issues surrounding the Games.
774
 Pozner, the commentator, claimed that 
‘what really keeps astonishing me is the way most of the Western media reports are out and out 
lies’.775 This criticism of foreign media lies was linked in with praise for the facilities Moscow 
was providing for journalists – ‘huge TV screens…for watching different events 
simultaneously’.776 Therefore, with these facilities available, why did the foreign press have to 
print ‘false things’?777 Radio Moscow was trying to undermine claims listeners may have heard 
in the foreign media with examples that highlighted Soviet superiority – as if the provision of 
huge television screens was proof that claimed security issues were clearly imagined.  
Promotion of the facilities, and praise from foreign dignitaries, athletes and spectators, is not 
something that was solely restricted to the Moscow Games; it makes up a sizable amount of the 
media coverage and self-promotion in any Olympics. However, what can be seen in the Radio 
Moscow broadcasting is that it was also used as a means to attack previous Olympics, to dispel 
myths in the foreign press, and in many ways was promoting the Soviet system. This was the 
first international sporting event on this scale to be held in the Soviet bloc, and, as such, it was 
hardly surprising that they praised everything from the televisions, videos and spaciousness of 
the Olympic village, through to the state of the art media centre. Framing the boycott campaign 
around harming the athlete, and other broadcasts about the boycott campaign itself had taken a 
backseat, there was now an emphasis on the technology and facilities on offer at Moscow. 
Framing the Games in this positive manner, Radio Moscow had effectively ignored the boycott 
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9.2 THE GAMES BEGIN!  
On the 19
th
 July 1980, the Moscow Games officially opened. Radio Moscow described the event 
in the Central Lenin Stadium, ‘where 100,000 people are awaiting the opening’, in minute-by-
minute detail.
778
 Amongst the pageantry were allusions to and attacks on the boycotting states – 
at 1315 (GMT) with the arrival of the Afghan team into the arena, Radio Moscow reported that, 
‘The President of the Afghan NOC speaks at the microphone, expressing delight with the 
opening of the Games; Western attempts to undermine the Games, he says, have ended in 
failure’.779 There were no mentions of those not attending, or of the weakened teams 
representing some states, or of representation by national Olympic committees, and not states, 
in some instances. The IOC chairman, Lord Killanin, spoke briefly of the boycott –  
‘I welcome all the athletes and officials here today, especially those who demonstrated 
their complete independence to travel to compete, despite many pressures placed on 
them… I must repeat that these Games belong to the International Olympic Committee 
and are allocated purely on the ability of the host city to organise them. I ask you all to 
compete in a true spirit of mutual understanding, above all differences of politics, 
religion or race, in the wonderful facilities provided here’.780  
After the opening ceremony ended, the BBC Monitors recording the event noted that,  
‘Throughout this three and a half hour reportage, no mention was made of the presence 
of a British delegation, or of the absence of any delegation. The only mention of adverse 
reaction to the Olympics in the West came in the brief interview early in the reportage 
with the Afghan representative and in Killanin’s speech. The announcers commented only 
on the magnificence of the occasion’.781 
Whist this was true about the opening ceremony, in the days that followed Radio Moscow did 
not shy away from mentioning negative coverage of the Games, or the restrictions placed by 
foreign states on some athletes and spectators trying to attend. Even the lack of certain flags was 
mentioned. However, these tended to come up in interviews with athletes or spectators, and the 
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word boycott was not prominent – there was perhaps an attempt to suggest that a few states here 
and there were not attending, not an organised mass. There was far more reporting of praise for 
the Games, the athletes, and the events though. 
On the 20
th
 July, Home service audiences heard acclaim for the opening ceremony and sports 
facilities from Presidents of various delegations.
782
 Following this was comment on the boycott, 
but as was usual for Radio Moscow at this time, the criticism came from foreign voices – in this 
instance the ‘Vice-President of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship’.783 He was 
reported to have claimed ‘the peoples of the whole world, including Americans, support the 
Olympic movement… The majority of Americans are not in agreement with the Olympic 
boycott policy which the Washington Administration attempted to foist’.784 This comment on 
the boycott, suggesting failure through the phrase ‘attempted to foist’, also included lauding of 
the facilities and a hope that the Games will be the best and most successful, was hardly a 
commentary focused solely on the negatives of the boycott campaign – although it did fit with 





, the editor of the French sports paper L’Equippe was cited as praising the opening 
ceremony, ‘a great success’, a Polish cycling official praised the organisation of the cycling as 
‘exemplary’, a Tanzanian official thanked the Soviet Union for help given to his team, and the 
Executive-Director of the Spain-USSR Association also praised the Games, noting ‘everything 
is excellently organised’.786 On the 23rd, the head of the Jordanian Olympic delegation 
‘expressed his delight at the organisation of the Games… and his gratitude for the conditions 
provided for the Jordanian sportsmen and officials’.787 Soviet listeners heard on the 24th, via 
Pravda Review, how foreign participants in the Games had described Moscow fans as fine 
judges of sport, and then, on the 25
th
, not only was there praise for the organisation of the 
Games, but for the tidiness of Moscow and the low pollution levels, compared to other cities 
around the world such as London and New York.
788
 Again, Radio Moscow was reporting praise 
from foreign delegations and specific visitors, the quotes were not coming from Soviet citizens. 
The acclaim continued unabated over the following days, Radio Moscow informing listeners of 
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the positive experiences of athletes from Australia, Poland, Lebanon and France.
789
 As with 
before the opening ceremony, Radio Moscow was concentrating on reporting praise for the 
facilities the Soviet Union had provided for the Games, rather than continue criticism of the 
boycott campaign itself.  
The World Service heard more mention of politics in amongst the praise for the opening 
ceremony, the facilities, and the organisation of the Games.
790
 The head of the British Olympic 
Association was amongst those the World Service reported as praising the Games – ‘…they’re 
excellent… very homely…’ – but he also alluded to the boycott campaign in Britain –  
‘there was very little real delay in England because we took the decision [to attend] very 
early. In point of fact we had taken the decision in September, 1978, but in the ultimate it 
was for the individual to decide whether he or she wanted to come here’.791 
There was no mention of the British Olympic Association vote in March under considerable 
government pressure in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Following this was an 
interview with the Vice-President of the International Union of Students, a Ghanaian who was 
disappointed that his team would not be at the Games.
792
 Far more focused on the boycott than 
any other interviews, it accused the Ghanaian government of being a puppet for the US, without 
mentioning why the US had pushed for a boycott, whilst also continuing to praise the effort and 
organisation put into the Moscow Olympiad.
793
 
The ‘Olympic Report’ of 21st July claimed the opening ceremony had ‘…left an indelible 
imprint on virtually everyone who saw it’.794 As with broadcasts to Home service listeners, 
reporting after the ceremony concentrated on telling listeners all about the positive comments 
made by foreign journalists, audiences, and athletes. Listeners heard claims such as ‘I think it 
was a fantastic performance… it was one of the best opening ceremonies… it was a grandiose 
spectacle, colourful, never to be forgotten… the wonderful spirit of cooperation and peace that 
was so evident’.795 On the 22nd, Yasser Arafat was quoted also praising the Games – 
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‘The opening ceremony of the 1980 Olympic Games was a grandiose demonstration of 
sports and art combined… I would also like to note the Olympic village – an outstanding 
village of sports and joy, a really unique place’.796 
This interview was swiftly followed by further praise for Olympic facilities, this time for the 
swimming pool from a member of the Dutch Olympic team.
797
 Even including a brief mention 
of the boycott campaign in Holland, although using the phrase ‘certain difficulties’ and not the 
term ‘boycott’, the Dutch interviewee explained that ‘…the Olympics in particular help to 
cement friendship and cooperation…’.798 The Games were being framed around the ideas of 
friendship and peace, the opposite of how the boycott campaign was portrayed, whilst again 
highlighting the Soviet facilities. The Lake Placid Games were also reported in this way, as an 
event that spread peace and cooperation, and the facilities were also highlighted, but whereas 
Soviet facilities garnered praise, the New York facilities were condemned. However, the 
sanctity of the Olympics remained.  
There can be no doubt that Radio Moscow was determined to put across the opinion that the 
Moscow Games were well organised and technically impressive. There was an element of 
localisation with this praise. British & Irish listeners heard comments made by two Scottish 
brothers, an interview with a BBC London correspondent, praise for the swimming facilities 
from the former British swimmer David Wilkie, and a favourable comparison with Montreal 
from another British Olympic swimmer.
799
 Asian audiences heard only the briefest of praise for 
the Games, from a local source – on the 24th July hearing about Indian praise for the opening 
ceremony: ‘Head of Indian parliamentary delegation visiting Moscow said it was hard to find 
words to describe the opening ceremony…’.800 African service listeners received broadcasts 
more like those to Britain and the World Service, with far more comment from different groups 
praising the Games. These ranged from statements such as, ‘Yesterday’s opening ceremony has 
been called the finest in Olympic history’, and, ‘high praise is given by journalists from Finland, 
Australia, India, Switzerland and Mexico’, through to support from the aforementioned praise 
from David Wilkie, from Sebastian Coe, and finally from African states such as the Seychelles 
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 Portuguese and French language African broadcasts also heard praise – in the 
Portuguese broadcasts praise for the facilities came from both the British swimmer David 
Wilkie, the head of the Tanzanian delegation, and an unnamed ‘sports observer’ – the latter 
claiming ‘the excellence of the sports facilities is conducive to record-breaking exploits in the 
current Olympic Games’.802 French language listeners heard a Mozambique swimmer and a 
Senegalese basketball coach, again, both full of praise.
803
 This localisation of the praise 
contrasted with the comments from boycott supporters who were either from local ‘pariah’ 
states, or from states far removed from the target audience, either ideologically or 
geographically.  
Localisation of praise also occurred in Europe. Listeners in France heard Radio Moscow cite the 
French press and other European bodies for examples of praise for the Games –  
‘the Soviet Union, writes the special correspondent of ‘Le Matin’, has made enormous 
efforts…  the chairman of the European Sports Press Association said… the inauguration 
of the Games conferred on the entire Olympics a radiant atmosphere, enthusiasm shared 
by guests and participants’.804  
Radio Moscow’s Spanish audience were told that interest in the Games was ‘intense’, that the 
foreign media ‘enthuses’ over the Olympics, and, in an implicit attack on the boycotters, that 
participation in the Games showed support for the Olympic ideals.
805
 Greek listeners heard an 
interview with the head of the Greek delegation, who claimed that the ‘best facilities have been 
made available… food is very good, similar to Cypriot food… Moscow and its people are 
excellent…’.806 A Swedish author was heard via the Swedish service giving his ‘positive 
opinions concerning the organisation of the Moscow Olympics’, a Portuguese team 
representative gave his ‘favourable impressions of the atmosphere in the Olympic village…’, 
and an Italian newspaper director was heard via the Italian service, ‘expressing his admiration 
for the work put into the preparations for the Games…’.807 These reports were as much to frame 
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the Olympic Games positively as they were to frame the Soviet Union. After all, it was the 
Soviet Union that supplied the facilities for the Games, and these reports, alongside the 
reporting of the technology available for reporters, heaped praise on the Soviet Union.  
Eastern European broadcasts also heard reports on the Games from local commentators. 
Bulgarian listeners heard a regionalised approach, with comment by a Yugoslavian coach and 
praise for the friendship the Games bring from a Latvian Chess grandmaster and a Russian 
ballet dancer.
808
 Finnish listeners heard praise for the Games ‘magnificent sports premises’ from 
a Finnish trade union group, listeners to the German service heard praise from the chairman of 
the Austrian Communist Party and Hungarian listeners heard praise from a Hungarian 
gymnast.
809
  Czech service listeners also heard praise from the chairman of the Czechoslovakian 
National Olympic Committee, however this was more focused on the failure of the boycott 
campaign –  
‘We are first and foremost pleased that the attempts to boycott the Olympic Games, 
conducted most of all by Carter and the American administration, have failed and the 
progressive forces in the Olympic movement have prevailed…’810   
This statement effectively framed the boycott campaign in ideological terms. As the Soviet 
Union liked to view itself as progressive against a reactive west, claiming that the ‘progressive 
forces in the Olympic movement have prevailed’ suggests a Soviet victory, and suggests an 
Olympic movement far more political than it claimed to be. As a statement it does not 
acknowledge that many refused to boycott over sporting, rather than political, principles.  
Even languages such as Arabic stuck to the localisation frame, citing local or regional leaders 
and states to create a picture of localised support for the Olympic Games, and, on occasion, 
local disregard for the boycott campaign. One interviewee claimed ‘the games allow youth from 
over the world to compete and establish friendships… he was impressed by the Moscow sights 
he had seen.’811 A Kuwaiti Olympic official said the opening ceremony was ‘impressive’ with a 
large number of participants, both showing the boycott had failed.
812
 Yasser Arafat was also 
quoted in depth on the Arabic service, again praising the organisation and facilities – apparently 
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pointing out that it was important that the facilities would eventually be available for the 
working people.
813
 He also called the ‘Olympic session in Moscow [a] fete of peace and 
solidarity among the people of the globe’ and strongly condemned the boycott.814 Not only was 
praise for the Games localised through quoting high profile figures close to a state or region, but 
criticism of the boycott was also framed in this manner.   
The exception to this appears to have been North America. Only on 22
nd
 July was there a brief 
roundup of comment and praise from others.
815
 Instead, Games commentary concentrated on the 
quality of the Games themselves, what the US team were missing out on, and more general 
criticism of the restrictive coverage of the Olympics.
816
 Home service listeners also heard 
reports that framed foreign press coverage in this manner. Amongst reports about the wide 
coverage of the Games, and how ‘all events in the world have been pushed into the background 
by the opening of the 22
nd
 Olympic Games in Moscow,’ were reports about restrictive media 
coverage abroad.
817
 There were no examples of this restrictive coverage, but listeners heard that, 
for example, the FRG public were ‘indignant’ over the restrictive coverage, and ‘Americans 
enjoy what little of the Olympics they have been allowed to see on TV’.818 Additionally, they 
heard French complaints over the lack of a French flag at the Olympics –  
‘Over 300 French tourists in Moscow have sent President Giscard d’Estaing a protest in 
connection with the absence of the country’s national flag and team from the ceremony of 
the opening of the Olympiad. Their letter handed to the French Embassy in the USSR 
assesses this as a betrayal of the Olympic ideals of Pierre de Coubertin’.819 
The reporting was framed by these comments, giving the impression of a general public desiring 
to see the Games, and of government and media actively trying to prevent them. Radio Moscow 
again created two levels within a state – the people, supportive of peace and freedoms, and the 
government and media, who seemed to be in a permanent state of conflict, or desiring of one.  
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Previously, the Britain & Ireland service had also attacked the reporting of the ITV 
correspondent Martin Lewis and the BBC’s Christopher Morris.820 Both, in claiming that 
members of the Afghan team wanted to defect to Pakistan and were worried about going back 
home after the Games, had nasty cases of ‘Afghanistanitus’ according to the Radio Moscow 
correspondent.
821
 More to the point, this discussion of how these British journalists were 
reporting the Afghan Olympic team was used as, in the words of the commentator, an 
‘indication of the quality of the Olympic reports audiences in the West are going to be treated 
to’.822 Rather than talk about the Afghan team, Radio Moscow was reporting what it claimed 
were distortions about the team and was projecting the reporting as potentially typical of the 
coverage British & Irish viewers could expect from their correspondents in Moscow. 
Attacking American journalists, the Home service claimed there were no truths in any of the 
rumours about Afghan delegates intending to quit the Games (‘someone’s groundless, malicious 
fantasies’).823 The World Service, and broadcasts to Eastern Europe, reported that the Afghan 
athletes themselves had refuted allegations claiming they wanted to emigrate to the West – but 
this was not reported to those listening to the Britain & Ireland or North American services.
824
  
There were further examples of foreign press restrictions and disruption. Soviet listeners heard 
that one British newspaper, The Daily Mail, ‘almost openly incited the staging of terrorist 
actions during the Olympic competitions…’.825 This was not broadcast elsewhere over the 
Radio Moscow international network. Other examples used to frame Western media reporting 
as distorted did appear elsewhere though. The World Service told listeners that US 
correspondents had been given instructions making clear,   
‘the need for reports that the press and government in the countries boycotting the 
Olympics are ignoring it, and that interest in the games is declining because of the 
absence of athletes from these countries’.826  
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African listeners heard L’Humanite had reported that ‘French radio and TV censored coverage 
of the Olympic opening ceremony: full coverage would have shown the failure of the anti-
Olympic campaign in France’.827 Listeners in mainland Europe heard much the same; it seems 
criticism of the reporting of the Games was a priority for Radio Moscow at this time, as this 
excerpt from the Arabic service shows – 
‘There is not a single newspaper, radio or TV in the world today which does not cover the 
Moscow Olympic Games. But amidst this orchestra of praise and commendation, a shaky 
frivolousness is but natural since the Olympic boycott movement has dramatically 
failed…’828 
There was no difference in this line of argument in broadcasts to Britain & Ireland or North 
America. Listeners to the British & Irish service heard that, ‘despite all the attempts of the 
Carter administration to discredit the Olympics in Moscow and belittle their sports significance 
the Games are evoking large-scale interest in all countries’.829 Within this phrase it is worth 
noting the focus is on the idea that President Carter was apparently attempting to discredit and 
belittle the ‘sporting significance’ of the Games, there was not a hint of any other reason for 
non-attendance. Interestingly, unlike previous broadcasts to Britain, this one attacked President 
Carter for the boycott campaign, not Margaret Thatcher. It is also another example of how 
Radio Moscow framed interest in the Games – the people wanted to see it, but governments and 
media were colluding to try and prevent this. North American service listeners heard a similar 
argument put to them – on 22nd July, listeners heard that whilst the view of the Chicago Tribune 
and other ‘leading American newspapers’ was that ‘attempts by the Carter Administration to 
stage a boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow had been a total failure’, some were still 
pursuing an ‘anti-Olympic campaign…clearly slanted in nature’.830 The boycott had failed, but 
governments and media were still trying to prevent the people from having access to the Games.  
In an attempt to counter this, Radio Moscow informed its listeners about those attending the 
Games, about the quality of the athletes and about the avalanche of world records being set. 
Listeners in North America heard about the ‘Niagara Falls of records in just the first three 
days…’, an argument that fitted the framing of the boycott as doomed to failure because it 
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would not affect the quality of the Games.
831
 A comparison with Montreal was made a few days 
later – ‘there is a feeling that competitors have trained better for these Games than for those at 





 Radio Moscow was framing the Games as a success through reporting the quantity 
of viewers and the quality of the athletes in attendance. These did not directly attack the boycott 
campaign, but they clearly fitted the framework portraying it as a failure. Straight to the point, 
listeners in Britain and Ireland heard ‘the Olympic flame has put out the boycott’, and the 
Games were ‘evoking large-scale interest in all countries’.834 The problems Radio Moscow were 
trying to make clear though, were that this large-scale interest was being hampered by foreign 
governments and media trying to restrict coverage, not only because the boycott campaign had 
failed, but also because they did not want the public to be aware of the impressive technology 
and facilities available in Moscow. There was no mention of the effect the invasion of 
Afghanistan had on this sporting event.  
9.3 REPORTING AFGHANISTAN  
In the background to the Olympic pageantry, Radio Moscow continued to report events in 
Afghanistan. The framing of these reports remained consistent with previous months; the Soviet 
broadcaster was telling the world that all was well in Afghanistan, the intervention was 
welcomed by the Afghan people, and any reports that said otherwise were false. There was 
persistent coverage of misleading foreign press reports and Western lies, and, somewhat 
contradicting each other, reports that Afghanistan was stable and making statements on the 
world stage whilst the West was supplying arms into Afghanistan and militarising the whole 
region.  
The Home service persisted in telling listeners about the different countries supplying arms to 
the Afghan ‘counter-revolutionaries’, from on the 13th July that Pakistan was expanding its 
military aid, through to the 27
th
, citing the British Sunday Telegraph as a source, that British 
arms were travelling to Afghanistan through intermediaries.
835
 However, within this period, it 
was the United States, and the CIA, who were accused most often of supplying arms into 
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 These reports fitted within the frame of foreign involvement in regional 
militarisation, providing yet more justification for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The US 
magazine Counterspy reported on CIA involvement in Afghanistan, accusing the CIA of 
‘organising training of terrorist bands in Pakistan’, so Radio Moscow used it as a source for one 
of its own bulletins.
837
 Home service listeners heard Indira Gandhi, the Indian Premier, express 
concern over Pakistan’s militaristic policies, and The New York Times was cited in a report 
about the United States continuing to arm ‘mercenaries’ in Pakistan for action in Afghanistan.838  
It was not just Pakistan that was host to the counter-revolutionary militants, Iran also had anti-
Afghan bases, according to a TASS report repeated by the Home service.
839
  However, pushing 
the emphasis for militarisation back to Pakistan, on 20
th
 July, it was reported that in Iran, ‘an 
Afghan counter-revolutionary organisation has been placed under a ban’ – nothing like this was 
reported about Pakistan.
840
 China was also reported as stepping up supplies to Afghan anti-
revolutionaries, with assistance from Pakistan.
841
 Radio Moscow reported that there were, 
according to The New York Times, about 80 camps in Pakistan for training ‘anti-Afghan bandit 
formations… these bands receive money and arms directly from the United States of 
America’.842 The Pakistan press was also reported as sharply stepping up ‘anti-Afghan and anti-
Soviet propaganda’.843 This was a rare example of Radio Moscow reporting ‘anti-Soviet’, rather 
than just ‘anti-Afghan’, propaganda surrounding Afghanistan. 
The English language World Service carried reports framing events in Afghanistan in a similar 
fashion – Pakistan was the bridgehead, the US and the CIA the funding bodies – with the 
addition of some criticism of NATO interference in Asia and an attack on the hypocrisy of the 
United States.
844
 The North American service also carried claims made by Pashtun chiefs that if 
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the Soviet Union’s ‘response to requests for help had been three days late then the USA and 
Pakistan would have mounted aggression against Afghanistan’.845 Not only did this accuse the 
USA of long-term aggression in Afghanistan, but it was a way of reinforcing in the mind of the 
listener the idea that the Afghan leadership had ‘requested’ Soviet assistance. This assistance 
was required, ‘as a result of the undeclared war by the United States from the territory of 
Pakistan’.846  
Again, the role Pakistan played in these assaults on Afghanistan was played down in Arabic 
language broadcasts, surely due to religious considerations. Instead, it was the United States 
imperialists and Chinese hegemonists,  
‘against Arab and Muslim peoples. It is known that Peking fully supports the US 
subversive activities against [the] regime in Iran and both China and USA waged 
undeclared war against Afghanistan’.847 
Alongside this lack of criticism of Pakistan were stories about religious tolerance in the Soviet 
Union – how Muslims had freedom to worship – or about the role Israel or ‘Zionism’ was 
playing in world intrigues at this time.
848
 The situation was again being framed carefully to 
avoid any overtones that might link the intervention in Afghanistan with conflict with Islam.  
Reports that portrayed the situation in Afghanistan in a way that conflicted with the official 
Soviet line continued to be framed in reports as lies or deception. Arabic and Turkish listeners 
were told that ‘the more the situation is normalised the greater is the frenzy of US propaganda to 
turn facts upside down’.849 The view was put to listeners that the negative news they may have 
heard was a distortion of reality –  
‘Reports of thousands of villages destroyed are 100% fabrication… Any fighting is due to 
the aiding and abetting from abroad. Carter and Hua discussed this in Tokyo. They do 
not want to reconcile themselves to the loss of this important support point after the loss 
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of Iran and they are trying to prevent the normalisation of the situation in Afghanistan 
with all their power’.850  
The day before this commentary appeared over the airwaves, the broadcaster was telling 
listeners worldwide that ‘TASS has refuted allegations by US news agencies re – military 
operation near Kabul’, ‘TASS denies US press reports of massacres in Afghanistan’ or, ‘TASS 
denies reports by American news agencies about the killing of thousands of people and the 
destruction of villages in Afghanistan’.851 Radio Moscow told Soviet listeners, North American 
listeners, British & Irish listeners, even World Service listeners, that TASS had denied the 
killings and destruction claimed by United Press International (UPI) and Associated Press 
(AP).
852
 These were evidently important enough claims to need refuting across the network – 
they needed to tell the world that, in keeping with other Western broadcasts that differed from 
Soviet sources in their portrayal of the situation in Afghanistan, these were lies.  
Contrasting the ‘lies’ of the foreign press, listeners also heard about Afghan stability and steps 
on the international stage. These ranged from citing statements made by the Soviet installed 
Afghan Premier Babrak Karmal, claiming Afghanistan was ‘a stable state, supported by the 
mass of the people’, through to statements that the Afghan army, ‘the popular armed forces’, 
were ‘eliminating bandit formations of foreign mercenaries one after the other’.853 The Afghan 
government was in control. World Service listeners were told that the Afghan Central 
Committee had discussed ‘measures to step up the struggle against the counter-revolutionaries’, 
and that, 
‘The situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably since large bands of 
mercenaries have been put out of action… the emergence of a united national patriotic 
front shows that the people are determined… [to stamp out the entire counter-
revolutionary  movement and save the freedom and independence of their country]’.854  
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Fitting the frame of harming innocent people, British & Irish listeners heard the words of a 
Soviet historian, Vladimir Iordanskiy [BBC Monitoring phonetic spelling], criticising the 
‘bandits’ for attacking progressive women, destroying schools, and disrupting the economy.855 
Not that this would have been reported in the foreign press - ‘Western news media make no 
mention of the crimes of the bandits… If they did the world community would see that the so-
called defenders of Islam are doing anything but defending Islam’.856 Once again, reporting of 
the situation was being framed in a manner that tried to move away from the opinion that the 
Soviet Union might be involved in a war around religion, and suggested that US funding was 
going to groups who were directly harming innocent people. The commentary went on to 
explain how, ‘in many villages, provincial centres and larger cities, volunteers have formed 
armed gangs to protect public property’.857 The Afghan people themselves were fighting back. 
Listeners heard in conclusion that,  
‘The Government of Babrak Karmal has set the goal of giving the Afghan people peace 
and prosperity. The bands that Washington and Peking are sending in to Afghanistan are 
trying to make this impossible’.858 
Unlike in broadcasts to the Soviet Union, and even those via the World Service, this did not 
paint a picture of a peaceful neighbourhood. Whilst dismissing claims of destruction and murder 
made by the Western press, Radio Moscow was reporting its own stories of destruction and 
murder, albeit this time involving those it claimed were funded by the United States, Britain, 
and various other anti-Soviet groups. It may have been framing events as improving, but there 
was always a background of tension – which was needed to help continue to justify the Soviet 
involvement in the region.  
9.4 SUMMARY 
The link that President Carter had made between the Olympics and Afghanistan was barely 
mentioned by Radio Moscow six months later, with only the interview with the Afghan NOC 
President briefly bringing this to attention. It had divided the two, and reporting was taking two 
very different paths - the Afghan situation was improving, the boycott campaign was failing. 
The success Jimmy Carter could claim though was that whilst the Olympic Games clearly 
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dominated the broadcasting at this time, there was a constant undertone that worked every 
message to show how the boycott campaign had failed – which is perhaps evidence that it 
achieved something.  
Reporting on Afghanistan continued to frame the situation as one the government was in control 
of, and that the people were also working for the same goal as the government – to defeat the 
foreign-backed insurgents. As with previous chapters, there was an underlying theme in some 
broadcasts that tried to remove religion from the conflict, or tried to frame the US as the 
aggressor against Islam elsewhere. In a similar fashion to foreign coverage of the Olympics, 
anything that could be deemed critical of the situation in Afghanistan was reported as lies or 
deception by Radio Moscow. Reporting was strangely stagnant though, as no new frames 
appeared to cover events in the country. There was no development in the criticism directed 
toward those standing against the Soviet line, reporting had stabilised and was just continuing to 
frame the situation in Afghanistan as improving or normalising, highlighted through reports of 
the Afghan government taking control of domestic and international issues and the Afghan 
people actively battling the bandits themselves. This could be a sign of how reporting of the 
invasion of Afghanistan had developed had the world reaction remained just words, as with 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, rather than add the boycott campaign and grain embargo.  
There was a shift in how the boycott was reported in the build-up to the Games though, and it 
revolved around the facilities and technology available at the Games. There was much praise of 
these via the Radio Moscow network, from explanations about how the new technology centre 
would present many radio and video outputs to the world, through to praise for the Soviet 
facilities from non-Soviet sources. This praise was then linked to the reasons behind the boycott 
campaign and a desire, Radio Moscow claimed, by some governments and media groups to 
restrict access and coverage – they were worried that if the general public saw the Games 
without restriction they would be overly impressed with Soviet life and culture, and would see 
that some domestic reporting of the situation was a lie. The boycott campaign was framed as 
another example of trying to restrict access to the realities of Soviet life, not as a reaction to the 
invasion of Afghanistan.  
There was a noticeable drop at this time in reports that concentrated on framing the boycott 
campaign around non-Afghan reasons, instead, even more so than after deadline day, Radio 
Moscow just focused on showing it was a failure. Whether this was through telling listeners of 
the amount of spectators, the new teams appearing at the Games (or alluding to the sizes of 
teams), or the amount of records broken in just the first few days, there was a clear pattern to 
not only emphasise the Moscow Games were a success, but to show the boycott campaign was, 
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in Radio Moscow’s view, a failure.  The Games, it was emphasised across the network, would 
boost mutual understanding, cooperation and peace – none of which the boycott campaign 
achieved. This was highlighted through reports that quoted some athletes praising the spirit at 
the Games, whilst others bemoaned the boycott campaign restricting their own chances. The 
boycott campaign was presented as a policy that harmed the athlete and divided governments 
from people. All these claims were to an extent localised, but the reporting surrounding the 
Games seems to be less localised than in previous months. With the Games now open and 
records tumbling, Radio Moscow had what it deemed irrevocable proof that the boycott had 
failed – a successful Games praised by people from all over the world. It did not need to localise 
this in the way that the reaction to the on-going boycott campaign required comment and 
rejection that could relate more easily to a listener. However, as they had split the issues of the 
Olympic boycott and the invasion of Afghanistan, they could not claim that the success of the 
Olympic Games was vindication for Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  
 CHAPTER 10  
RADIO MOSCOW, AFGHANISTAN, THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS 
AND THE WORLD 
By using frame analysis this thesis has demonstrated how Radio Moscow reported key 
moments after the invasion of Afghanistan and throughout the 1980 Olympic boycott campaign 
to different audiences across the world. Through this, it has explored what the frames were, how 
they were incorporated into events coverage, and how they were localised to best appeal to the 
targeted audience. In a field dominated by research into the broadcasts of Western stations, such 
as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America and the BBC, it has added to the small 
field of literature that currently exists on Radio Moscow broadcasting, and is the first work to 
examine and compare the frames used across the Soviet broadcaster’s network to determine 
how it went about getting the Soviet message across to audiences worldwide. This thesis has 
demonstrated that Radio Moscow was not a one-message monolith, pumping out one line of 
Soviet propaganda worldwide. It took into account regional and local domestic issues in an 
attempt to produce news reporting that was considered relevant to the listener. However, there 
can be no getting away from the ever-present Cold War – Radio Moscow was set up to extol the 
virtues of Soviet society, and that is what it did on a daily basis, often in tandem with attacks on 
the United States and its allies, and actions Radio Moscow claimed resulted from harmful 
imperialist ambitions.  
The frames discussed in the case studies can inform about more than just how Radio Moscow 
wanted the situation in 1980 presented. The variation and emphasis (or lack of) on frames in 
different regions can inform about the issues the broadcaster perceived were important to people 
and should be important to people. However, they can also tell us about how Radio Moscow, 
and therefore the Soviet leadership, viewed the world at this time and where they saw the fault 
lines in international and domestic politics, economics and society. They even suggest potential 
directions the Soviet Union may have followed when trying to expand its international 
influence.  
The first section of this conclusion will bring together the frames seen throughout the case 
studies to discuss what these show about the Soviet world view in 1980. It will explore how the 
frames differed between regions, and how Radio Moscow evolved and even changed them as 
the situations in Afghanistan and surrounding the Olympic Games developed. The second 
section will explore the methods it used to do this, considering whether Eisenhower’s claim that 
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Soviet broadcasting was ‘weaving a fantastical pattern of lies and twisted facts’ runs true.859 
Finally, this conclusion will comment upon the usefulness of the Imperial War Museum’s BBC 
Monitoring Archive for detailed exploration of 20
th
 Century radio broadcasting, and suggests 
opportunities for further research in this and related areas.  
10.1 FRAME ANALYSIS AND THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE WORLD IN 1980  
However Radio Moscow presented the situation in Afghanistan or the Olympic boycott 
campaign, the reporting could always be linked to the Cold War. Whether the frames used 
concentrated on international or domestic issues (insurgency, electioneering, imperialism) or 
concentrated on factors that can be deemed human interest (e.g. the religion or personification 
frames) they all supported Radio Moscow’s Cold War message. The four frames that news sits 
in, as proposed by Valkenburg et al, and discussed in the introduction (conflict, human-interest, 
responsibility and economic consequences) are clearly observable throughout the case studies. 
However, it is perhaps more pertinent to place Radio Moscow broadcasts within two broader 
themes – both very closely aligned to the overall Cold War frame. These are divisive frames and 
reinforcing frames. The divisive frames presented splits between groups, for example the 
electorate and the elected, or the United States and an ally. Other frames were used to reinforce 
views the Soviet Union broadcaster had already put across – historical frames linking current 
events to past endeavours, or a previously explained agenda or mentality (imperialism, 
aggression, electioneering, pretexts). When presented to different audiences, the balance of 
these frames provides insight into both where Radio Moscow thought they could build upon or 
begin to create divisions that would boost Soviet popularity, and where it considered the Soviet 
Union had enough influence that they could concentrate on reinforcement frames. 
The balance of frames is also intricately linked with what the broadcaster considered targeted 
listeners thought important, and what the broadcaster considered people ought to know. These 
could range from discussing domestic concerns, such as in Britain unemployment issues or the 
troubles in Northern Ireland, through to emphasising how current international events would 
have a specific effect on the local region, for example how grain restrictions to the Soviet Union 
would harm food aid to Africa or export profits for North American farmers. Whether 
presenting an issue as divisive or as an example designed to reinforce previous claims/views, 
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Radio Moscow localised reporting to best appeal to the target audience. Localisation was 
important for all broadcasters – an internal BBC report in 1979 made this clear: 
‘Voice of America, though much easier to hear [than the BBC] is not widely regarded by 
the intelligentsia because it seems too concerned with domestic American politics and 
affairs which are of little interest to an educated Soviet audience.’860 
Without doubt, Soviet broadcasting was aware of the need to appeal, evidently more so than its 
rival Voice of America. Even using localisation though, Radio Moscow made sure the Soviet 
Cold War message was still evident. 
Some clear themes can be picked up from the frames used to report the changing nature of both 
events. Of particular note is the emphasis on religion when localising world events in broadcasts 
via the Arabic service or to regions with large Muslim populations. It is apparent that the 
broadcasting tried to move away from any religious connotations in the Afghan conflict, for 
example by accusing those leading the Kabul uprising of being mercenaries, and emphasising 
that the Soviet backed Afghan regime was supporting Islam through continuing daily prayers 
and defending Islamic laws. This supports views that there were fears of religious upheaval 
linked to the invasion – particularly the fear that Islamic nationalism could spread from Iran, 
through Afghanistan, and into the Soviet Central Asian republics.
861
 Additionally, it also shows 
an appreciation of the strength of religious feeling within Afghanistan, with many writers 
subsequently arguing that the Afghans were encouraged to fight a ‘jihad’ against ‘hordes of 
infidels from the north’.862 Even broadcasts about the Olympic facilities made mention of the 
prayer rooms and of taking into account religious holidays and practices. Not only were these 
attempts to break any ideas of a Soviet war against a group concentrated around religion, they 
were also useful as a means of trying to show which side of the Soviet-US divide Islam should 
fall.  
In comparison, the United States was accused of exploiting the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers for its, and Israel’s, own ends, and acting against the wishes of local states in its quest 
for oil from the Persian Gulf. Whilst this highlights the overall Cold War message of Radio 
Moscow, it also quite clearly showed that the broadcaster made especial effort to avoid blaming 
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Islamic fundamentalism, or any religious connotations, for the problems in Afghanistan. The 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was also accused of acting out US desires, but the way 
in which Radio Moscow discussed this also shows a clear attempt to avoid direct criticism of 
Islam. Radio Moscow criticised its resolutions, but provided excuses for these based on heavy 
US influence of a small selection of influential members. Rather than try and divide the Arab 
people from the body representing them, Radio Moscow tried to put across divisions within the 
body itself – those who wanted to discuss Arab well-being versus those who wanted to act out 
US desires that would harm Arab well-being. Clearly Radio Moscow felt that emphasising the 
harm caused by the United States could only be beneficial to Soviet standing amongst members 
of a transnational body that had only recently condemned its actions. From a world view 
perspective though, it all supplies evidence to support claims that the Soviet Union hierarchy 
were in fact mindful of the potential strength of the Islamic religion in 1980.  
Whilst Radio Moscow was willing to blame US influence on the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers Resolution, it was not ready to do the same regarding the United Nations. The only 
comments on the UN recorded by BBC Monitoring relate to the initial Security Council 
rejection of complaints over Soviet actions in Afghanistan, there was no mention of the 
Emergency Session resolution condemning foreign interference. This silence suggests that for 
Radio Moscow, the United Nations could not be attacked, and any suggestion that US 
interference was winning over Soviet influence would look like defeat for Moscow. So there 
was silence – the United Nations could not be criticised. 
Conversely, and unsurprisingly, the frames demonstrate how Radio Moscow was persistently 
trying to isolate the United States from allies such as Britain, West Germany, Italy or France. 
This was not done through telling listeners that the leaders were in dispute with the US, but by 
presenting a ‘them and us’ attitude – a division between the needs of the people and the wants 
and actions of the leadership. Radio Moscow tried to place itself, and the Soviet Union, very 
firmly on the side of the people. This is evident in broadcasts explaining the reasons behind the 
reaction to the invasion – President Carter was electioneering, Margaret Thatcher was trying to 
distract from domestic woe, the Italian Foreign Minister was allowing Italy to be exploited by 
the US – nowhere were the actions of the leadership presented as being in the interests of the 
people. The leadership had imperialist/colonialist/aggressive ambitions that the people lacked. 
The frames used to portray the anti-Soviet measures tried to emphasise the divides between the 
policies of Western European governments and the needs and desires of their people.  
Whereas the focus on religion had blamed ‘America’, the closer to the US a targeted audience 
was both geographically and politically, the more the blame for problems was placed on the US 
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leadership. Western Europe heard much about the US Administration and about President 
Carter, whereas Asian and African listeners tended to hear about the aggression or imperialist 
motives of the United States as a whole. This can be seen to link to an acceptance of US and 
Soviet spheres of influence, and also of where the Soviet Union felt it could make the most 
gains in the future. Broadcasts to Western Europe concentrated upon blaming the leadership, 
suggesting an acceptance that this was primarily within the US sphere of influence – thus the 
only way forward was to try and engineer and emphasise divisions between the state leadership 
and the people. The same argument could be applied to Radio Free Europe and their own 
broadcasts to Eastern Europe, which also pursued the practice of trying to highlight divisions 
between the people and the leadership.
863
 Outside of what Radio Moscow saw as this sphere of 
influence, there were more generalised attacks on states as a whole – broadcasts to Africa and 
Asia, and in the Arabic language, all talked of US aggressive policy rather than US 
Administration aggressive policy. It was these areas where the Soviet Union perhaps considered 
itself stronger and with more opportunities for increasing influence – it was not looking to 
divide people from governments here, but entire states from the United States. 
There was also a demonstrable Cold War attempt to attack western democracy. Leaders were 
presented as issuing anti-Soviet messages to boost their own chances of domestic electoral 
success, and the undercurrent argument here was that western elections caused aggression. The 
broadcasts of Radio Moscow made Margaret Thatcher and Jimmy Carter in particular the 
embodiment of all that was wrong with the Olympic boycott campaign, and much of this was to 
do with a desire to hide domestic discontent and boost their own popularity. Listeners were 
meant to believe that not only were the leaders not acting in the interests of the people, but the 
system was designed in such a way as to exacerbate this. Again, Radio Moscow evidently 
viewed the alliance between the US and its key allies as difficult to break, therefore the attempt 
was not to split state governments from the United States, but to divide people from state 
governments and even get the listener to reconsider the political system. Of course, Radio 
Moscow never sought to explain that the anti-Soviet policies being pursued to distract and win 
votes may have been pursued because they appealed to voters – and therefore the same people 
Radio Moscow wanted to appear on the side of were actually happy with anti-Soviet rhetoric.  
For listeners in Western Europe and North America, Radio Moscow directed criticism onto 
leaderships, or even specific leaders in collaboration with President Carter. These leaderships 
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were acting out foreign policy to hide domestic policy failings, and were far too concentrated on 
their own ambitions, in the form of elections and appealing to the electorate, to act in the best 
interests of those they represented. Outside of these areas, broadcast technique was slightly 
different, with a lot more focus on what the foreign policy actions of the US were leading to, 
and who else was involved. For example, Soviet listeners heard a lot more about US ambitions 
in the Persian Gulf and Washington-Peking alliances than were heard via broadcasts targeted at 
North America. The same applied for broadcasts into Asia, which concentrated on informing 
about the potential repercussions of US-Chinese ambitions, rather than explaining that it was 
domestic concerns that fuelled foreign policy ambition. The regional variations in this respect 
were based around who was in alliance with, or being exploited by, the United States, and what 
the localised motive was. Linking back to how the Soviet Union perceived the world at this 
time, it can be seen that there was a divide between those broadcasts which reinforced the 
aggressive foreign policy message, for example broadcasts into the Soviet Union, Asia, Africa 
and Eastern Europe, and those broadcasts which pushed the divisive frames, into Western 
Europe, Britain & Ireland, and North America. This is where the strongest divide in Radio 
Moscow broadcasting lay, and this division can be seen as NATO (plus France) versus the 
world. Radio Moscow was primarily trying to highlight divisions between the people and the 
governments in NATO states, whilst reinforcing claims of aggression and imperialism on the 
part of the US and its regional allies in broadcasts elsewhere. The overall argument remained 
constant, but the way it was framed very clearly varied by region.  
The grain embargo and how some states went about preventing their athletes attending Moscow 
were both used to further push both the idea of divisiveness and to reinforce pre-existing 
opinions. Radio Moscow localised the grain embargo by either focusing on the producer or the 
consumer, depending on the target audience. So African service listeners were told about how 
the policy would cause starvation, North American service listeners about how it would cause a 
dent in profits. Both however, demonstrate how Radio Moscow was trying to divide the people 
from the United States by blaming local hardship on Washington policy. This was clearly a 
Cold War argument, but it was also evidence of how Radio Moscow went about localising 
reporting. Compared to other trade restrictions enacted on the Soviet Union at this time, the 
attention given to the grain embargo also demonstrates that Radio Moscow considered it 
something that was both important to the listener and something they should be told about 
regularly – especially as in doing this they could emphasise how it was United States policy 
apparently causing harm to local groups.  
The reason that Radio Moscow emphasised the grain embargo, and equally continuously 
discussed the boycott threat, was that both could bring international politics into realms that 
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most directly affected the ‘typical person’. People need food and income, and, Radio Moscow 
claimed, the US led grain embargo would bring about damaging decreases in both. With the 
athletes, Radio Moscow liked to interview local athletes or discuss how they were missing out 
on the pinnacle of their profession – again bringing international politics to a more human level. 
This was also an opportunity to engage with human rights debates, and link this to other 
supposed human rights indiscretions caused by the United States and its supporters across the 
world. The overall portrayal was of policies being acted out by the leadership of the United 
States and its supporters with no regard for the human implications – both domestically and 
internationally. 
Conversely, and to both frame the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan positively and counter 
claims made in foreign media, Soviet reporting of Afghanistan emphasised rebuilding, praise 
from Afghans, and in no instance made reference to Soviet troops actively engaging in combat 
operations. This contrasted with the United States and its allies, who were accused of pursuing 
policies of starvation, restricting the travel of athletes and supporting the destructive acts of 
mercenaries in Afghanistan. Radio Moscow put forward a picture of Soviet assistance in 
Afghanistan, of being in the background supplying support to a new leadership compatible with 
rural traditions, of offering help to Africa and being opposed to starvation policies. The Soviet 
broadcaster tried to project the view that US influence was based on hard rather than soft power 
– contrasting nicely with the view they tried to present of Soviet international influence. This 
was very definitely an example of the Cold War being at the heart of all the frames used to 
cover the situation. Radio Moscow wanted to project a world view of the United States pursuing 
policies that were directly harmful to people, and localised this throughout the course of the 
invasion and boycott campaign, whilst highlighting the good that the Soviet Union did – again 
placing a focus on more everyday results such as building houses or schools rather than 
debating high politics. 
The broadcasts show that Radio Moscow believed that rather than discuss divisions between 
states and the US, it had to place emphasis on divisions between people and governments when 
appealing to listeners in Western Europe, Great Britain and North America states and the United 
States. The broadcasts to Britain very clearly told listeners that their government was a puppet 
of the US administration, copying its actions with no regard for domestic concerns. Evidently, it 
did not see a way of gaining influence in any other manner – the Soviet Union had to appeal 
directly to the workers and not the leadership. This in itself is perhaps a damning indictment of 
the communist parties in these regions, particularly France and Italy. Elsewhere, this was not the 
case. Broadcasts to African or Asian listeners concentrated more on blaming the United States 
Chapter 10: Radio Moscow, Afghanistan, the Olympics and the World 
228 
 
rather than the local leaderships, suggesting that the Soviet Union considered these leaderships 
potentially open to working more closely with Moscow.  
Even as events evolved and changed, affecting what was reported, the overall frames remained 
relatively constant. Coverage of Afghanistan in particular went from persistent claims of quiet 
and calm to repeated reports of the situation slowly improving. Not only did this demonstrate 
Radio Moscow’s capability to evolve the frames it used as stories developed, but these 
evolutions also demonstrated how it adapted to events that did not fit the previous frames – 
what can be termed ‘frame ruptures’. For example, Radio Moscow had persistently told listeners 
across the world about how many states would appear at the Olympics, and when the official 
announcement was considerably lower than this, it was clear they had been mistaken. However, 
there was no admission of this mistake, merely a subtle shift in the frames used and a silent 
dropping of previous claims. Instead of discussing the number of states attending, the quantity 
frame, Radio Moscow shifted to discuss the quality frame – how good the athletes attending 
were, how many of the top 20 medal winning states from the previous Games would appear, 
and how these demonstrated boycott failure. They also whittled down the states not attending, 
providing non-boycott reasons for non-attendance – an inverse quantity frame. With 
Afghanistan the same actions applied – the February uprising seemed to show that all was not 
well, and thus Radio Moscow reporting had been erroneous, but the broadcaster merely changed 
the frame or did not mention it. Rather than everything being back to normal, Radio Moscow 
reported it was normalising, and used the Kabul uprising as justification for Soviet involvement 
in the region. It demonstrated that they were not afraid to report what could be perceived as 
Soviet failings, provided these perceived failings could be framed in such a way as to either 
reinforce previous Soviet actions or suggest divisions in the US camp.  
A final comment to be made regards the subdivisions discussed by Paulu, and mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis. His proposal that Radio Moscow broadcasting was divided into 
sections concentrating on North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Near and Middle 
East, Southeast Asia, the Far East, Africa, and the other socialist countries is certainly true.
864
 
However, the localisation that occurred in the broadcasts within many of these regions ran far 
deeper. Radio Moscow took close account of the local concerns of people from different states, 
and so the broadcasting within these regions would vary – French, British, Italian and Spanish 
broadcasting all differed from one another in both content and concentration, as did 
broadcasting within the other regions listed – with the exception of the North American service, 
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which largely bypassed Canada and concentrated on the United States. Radio Moscow was 
trying to present the Soviet system and win as many supporters as possible, and to do this it 
needed to present arguments that were both relevant and targeted – and that is what it attempted 
to do.    
10.2 RADIO MOSCOW METHODS 
Eisenhower accused Soviet broadcasting of ‘weaving a fantastic pattern of lies and twisted 
facts’, and as this thesis has demonstrated, there is some merit in his claim.865 However, in the 
Cold War ether the Soviet Union was not the only state who could be accused of ‘twisting facts’ 
to support an argument. The former Radio Free Europe Bureau Manager, Arch Puddington, 
wrote in his book ‘Broadcasting Freedom’ that,  
‘There is, of course, a risk in broadcasting even straight news reports to societies under 
totalitarian control, whose only recourse to misrule is resistance, violent or otherwise. 
Under totalitarian conditions, people are prone to hear what they want to hear’.866 
This is a clear reference to the Hungarian Uprising, and what many saw, and still see, as an 
episode in which Radio Free Europe encouraged citizens to revolt, with claims of broadcasts 
suggesting militant acts and implying Western military support. However, the point is quite 
clear – western broadcasters did not present the news as it was, they also twisted the facts – 
even if, as Puddington makes clear, the reason for doing so was to prevent bloodshed rather than 
incite. However, as RFE had a limit, so it seems did Radio Moscow. Even though the research 
from this thesis is based on material collected by monitors who concentrated on recording 
primarily political reports, the evidence supports Smith’s claim that Radio Moscow was not as 
overtly doctrinal as western media led people to believe.
867
 The broadcasting of Radio Moscow 
was far more succinct in fitting current events around the Soviet viewpoint. There were a 
number of ways it achieved this, with four of the most significant uncovered in this thesis 
outlined below.  
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10.2.1 The Grey Area 
The overlying tendency when reporting events, such as the speeches made by President Carter, 
was not to repeat what was said or the facts of what had happened, but rather to discuss what it 
meant, the effects, and in some cases how a speech was delivered. In this manner the 
broadcaster could avoid the hard facts and instead focus upon the grey area of opinion – the US 
President may have made it clear in his speeches that the reason for trade restrictions and an 
Olympic boycott was the Soviet invasion, but by instead focusing on how these actions would 
affect others, Radio Moscow could bypass this criticism. Instead of reporting what was 
happening in Afghanistan, Radio Moscow reported opinions on what was happening. 
Additionally, the station could offer up reasons for the current events, ‘real’ reasons that 
avoided mention of Afghanistan and for the uninformed may have seemed accurate – especially 
if the reasons were grounded in some sort of historical truth. This tactic of discussing speeches 
and events, without directly referencing quotes or facts, allowed Radio Moscow to broadcast in 
the abstract. Opinion rather than fact allowed the broadcaster to fit events into the required 
frames. This was an important factor in the way Radio Moscow applied frames to their 
reporting, it attempted to shift the way listeners thought about events by trying to shift the main 
thrust away from what was said and onto why it was said. 
10.2.2 Selective Reporting  
Some regions did not receive coverage of certain events. This in itself could be explained as the 
‘silence frame’ – a method of avoiding discussion of an event and trying to shift listeners’ 
minds onto something else. For example, the Afghan uprising in February 1980 does not appear, 
according to the BBC Monitoring information surveyed here, to have been reported in 
broadcasts to North America or Great Britain at the time. Now this could have been because 
Radio Moscow did not want to spread news that could highlight discord in Afghanistan at the 
time, although they did report this on other networks. More likely perhaps is that the reasons 
they claimed were behind the uprising when reporting to other regions, the instigators from the 
CIA and the secret services of Britain and others, would not be believed – they could not 
broadcast a claim to North American listeners that US instigators had incited an uprising 
without conclusive proof, and even then there may be an element of self-appreciation here. 
Radio Moscow was perceived as overly-doctrinal, as Smith’s 1974 study demonstrated, and the 
broadcaster may have avoided reporting anything too extreme to certain regions where it feared 
for its credibility. Which suggests Radio Moscow felt it needed some sort of credibility, and 
thus had to be selective in the reports it gave to specific regions. 
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10.2.3 Selective Sources 
Credibility seems to have underlined the method of using sources to support the claims made by 
Radio Moscow. Pravda may have been the favoured newspaper for rebroadcasting opinion, but 
various other news sources from outside the Soviet Union also appeared. Choice quotation by 
Radio Moscow may have given the impression to foreign groups that these newspapers were 
siding with the Soviet Union, but it may have damaged Radio Moscow credibility had they 
broadcast claims about a certain newspaper to the area of that newspapers readership, and been 
proved to be misinterpreting or falsifying their claims. Credibility was important, and the 
tendency to cite newspapers from foreign sources, rather than local ones, suggests they were 
trying to get around this by providing quotes from unobtainable sources. 
10.2.4 Misrepresentation 
To help support the frames, Radio Moscow can also be seen to have misrepresented facts and 
quotations when necessary. From exaggerating the number of participants planning to attend the 
Olympics, to stretching the truth and altering how statements were made, Radio Moscow used 
some practices that can at best be perceived as mistaken and at worst deliberately misleading. 
Some of the claims the broadcaster made, such as how many teams would be attending the 
Games, were misrepresenting the reality, however in the months of uncertainty before the 
Olympic deadline it was not clear how many teams would eventually agree to attend. The 
division between the national Olympic committees and the local governments added to this 
uncertainty, but aided Soviet radio. To boost the quantity Radio Moscow claimed would be 
attending, the broadcaster would quote sports officials, but these did not mean the team were 
officially attending. However, claiming President Carter asked rather than told US athletes that 
they were boycotting was extremely, and probably intentionally, misleading. It was not beneath 
Radio Moscow to misrepresent the truth and on occasion tell outright lies to get its point across 
when trying to frame an argument appealingly.   
Occasionally, the broadcaster referenced what they deemed to be anti-Soviet material in the 
foreign press, such as a claim that the Daily Mail had promoted terrorist activities against the 
Soviet Union.
 868
 However, many of the foreign sources Radio Moscow referenced were, if not 
completely favourable, at least partial to Soviet arguments. Whilst the Soviet state-controlled 
Pravda and Izvestiya regularly appeared in broadcasts to Eastern Europe and via the Moscow 
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Home service, and on occasion to other audiences elsewhere, European audiences could hear 
the opinions of the French communist party newspaper L’Humanite, and audiences elsewhere 
heard from sources such as the official newspaper of the Ethiopian communist party and media 
sources from around Vietnam, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and others. All had one thing in 
common – they were either the official news source of a communist party, or they were 
communist supporting newspapers.  
Using sources foreign to the target audience was not only a good way of avoiding possible 
accusations of misrepresentation, but it could also provide the perception that there was wide 
ranging discord over the anti-Soviet measures – which for many would have tied in with what 
existed domestically, for example in Great Britain and Australia. A further method to suggest all 
round discord over the measures was through a section of broadcasting devoted to letters sent in 
by listeners. The names, and often the rough address, of the letter writers would be read out to 
give a more localised feel to the comments, and then the broadcaster would comment on the 
letter contents. Often these were praising the Soviet Union or condemning the acts instigated 
against it. So not only would listeners hear reports from foreign media, politicians or other 
groups supporting the arguments Radio Moscow put forward, but also comments from the 
general public in the local area. Coupled with the occasional letter criticising the Soviet Union, 
presumably to add balance and often swiftly dealt with by turning the complaint back on the 
United States or an ally, this method helped create a broad image of the unpopularity of the anti-
Soviet actions.  
Additionally, and perhaps something that can be a source of further investigation using the BBC 
Monitoring Archive, is a broader method Soviet foreign broadcasting was believed to use. Simo 
Mikkonen argues that,  
‘especially in Europe, [Radio Moscow] had negotiated a delicate distribution of labour 
with other socialist countries. Thus, letting other East European broadcasters carry part 
of the burden in Europe, Radio Moscow was able to concentrate on global affairs, as well 
as distance the more dirty campaigns from Radio Moscow.’869    
To an extent it explains how Radio Moscow could appear not overly doctrinal, despite the clear 
Cold War frame running throughout the broadcasting. However, as Mikkonen himself points 
out, Radio Moscow was the station with the ‘best audibility in all wavelengths… which made it 
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the most widely heard foreign radio station beyond the borders of the Soviet Union’.870 So, 
whilst the ability to distance the more overtly doctrinal broadcasts may have been useful, the 
question again arises – how many people would actually have listened to these broadcasts? 
The ability to shift debate away from the intended target by avoiding discussion of its source, 
the careful selection of foreign source material, and the selective reporting of events each helped 
create the freedom Radio Moscow needed to work on the frames required to report the two fluid 
situations. However, these were by no means the only methods Radio Moscow employed. 
Wordplay could also help when framing a speech to expand upon some of the points made and 
also to try and leave more of an impression in the mind of a listener. When discussing the 
Olympic boycott, Radio Moscow occasionally used sporting metaphors to describe the actions 
of President Carter, and some of the military aspects of his speeches were expanded to make 
them sound more menacing – rather than just sending troops to the Persian Gulf, the station in 
one instance listed the different types of unit and their capabilities, which not only took longer 
to read out but also left the listener without a doubt as to the US military menace. However, the 
methods of misrepresentation, careful selections of audience and source, and the concentration 
on the grey area of opinion rather than fact, were the most effective and most regularly 
employed methods used by Radio Moscow as a basis for creating the frames it hoped would win 
the arguments against the boycott campaign and get listeners to understand and support Soviet 
actions in Afghanistan. 
To summarise, Radio Moscow used a variety of frames and methods in an attempt to achieve its 
aims. The frame analysis has highlighted that these aims were at a basic level very clear – to 
build support for the Soviet Union and weaken support for the United States. However, this was 
attempted through the intricacies of localising the output, finding what was thought to be a 
major concern in a region and relating it to the international politics of the Cold War – whether 
it was the human rights of athletes, domestic concerns regarding employment, local damage 
caused by policies such as the grain embargo, or impending elections. The case studies 
demonstrate how Radio Moscow persisted with its defence of Afghanistan and attack on the 
boycott campaign by using localised arguments such as these to distract from any accusations 
levelled at the Soviet Union itself. In bringing these together, this section has shown how these 
localised arguments actually demonstrate a Soviet view of the world and geopolitics at the time. 
There was a clear concern with religion, and there appears to have been an understanding that 
the Soviet Union could not feasibly appeal to governments in North America or Western Europe 
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– they had to concentrate their arguments on the people. In Africa and Asia it is evident that 
they felt more capable of appealing to the state as a whole, with fewer frames designed to 
divide, and more on reinforcing previously made anti-US views. Equally, a study of frame 
analysis has demonstrated just how much information Soviet radio was willing to provide to 
listeners within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They were not starved of news, even 
news that could portray Moscow negatively. However, this was the case because of the ability 
of Radio Moscow to focus situations on the Cold War, and to frame even bad situations such as 
the reaction to Afghanistan in a manner that suggested it was the rest of the world, led by the 
United States, who were in the wrong.  
The goal of framing situations to best portray the Soviet Union and discredit the United States 
was achieved through questionable means however. There can be no doubt that Radio Moscow 
localised reports, but it also often avoided using local sources to corroborate its stand. Quotes on 
the international situation were somewhat questionable and may have been taken out of a 
broader anti-Soviet context. Combined with Radio Moscow’s apparent aversion to reporting 
‘straight facts’ and its preference for reporting opinion, it is hardly surprising the broadcaster 
was able to develop a strong case for Soviet actions in Afghanistan and against the US-led 
boycott campaign. However, this again does show how developed Radio Moscow was, the 
reporters read local news and highlighted when they found supporting statements, using these 
on various broadcasts – Radio Moscow did its research and adapted reporting where necessary. 
This thesis has demonstrated not only that Radio Moscow did not broadcast one line of 
argument worldwide, but that it took approaches relevant to the target audiences. It also targeted 
specific sectors of society depending on the perceived strength of Soviet support in the region. 
The invasion of Afghanistan and the Moscow boycott provided examples of how Radio 
Moscow both reported Soviet international actions that required a defensive approach and how 
it reported US-led actions that required an offensive approach. As this thesis has shown, there 
were a variety of methods used and a number of frames employed by a broadcaster that was not 
afraid to adapt, evolve and even change its line of argument as the events of 1980 changed. 
Radio Moscow was not a beacon of truth, nor was it a broadcaster of lies. Radio Moscow knew 
its audience, knew what it wanted to tell its audience, and knew how to frame events to achieve 
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10.3 THE BBC MONITORING SERVICE ARCHIVE AND THE FUTURE 
The Imperial War Museum’s BBC Monitoring Service Archive has provided the vast majority 
of material used throughout this thesis. Without it, such in-depth analysis of previous 
broadcasting would not be possible. This thesis has demonstrated the extent to which BBC 
Monitoring recorded international radio broadcasting – however, it has only used Radio 
Moscow material, which is but a portion of the total radio material available in the collection. 
The archive provides vast potential for expanding current understanding of what was actually 
broadcast by state radio stations to audiences throughout the world during both the Cold War 
and the Second World War.  
Use of the collection has however provided a set of unique challenges and important 
considerations that have had a bearing on how this research has been carried out. The advantage 
to using the Duxford material over the more commonly available digests is that it provides far 
more material to analyse – a digest by definition is merely a summary of information, and it is 
also something that has been previously examined and edited, thus being a further step away 
from the original broadcast. However, it must also be remembered that the information at 
Duxford is not a complete record of what was broadcast by the radio stations monitored – not 
everything could be recorded or needed to be. Even with this concern, it is the closest one can 
get to the original broadcasts currently known. It is also possibly unique in supplying English 
language coverage of translated broadcasts made by multiple states, and it must be remembered 
that the monitors themselves were employed to listen for how events were framed, and recorded 
in detail broadcasting of major events and other points of interest. They did not know what the 
editorial team would require, so they recorded more than necessary – the difference between the 
transcriptions and the actual broadcasts is likely to be unimportant news reports – reports on 
major events such as Afghanistan or the Olympic boycott would have been recorded in full.  
Another consideration when using the archive material is that much of it has been translated, 
and so meanings can be lost or changed accidentally. However, it has to be remembered that this 
is shortwave broadcasting being noted down, and the technical issues that can arise using a 
medium that does not always provide the clearest broadcasting will have meant that the 
broadcasters themselves will have had to keep their broadcasting language clear and 
understandable – making it easier for listeners to hear even when words drop out, and thus 
making it easier for monitors to listen to and translate. For Radio Moscow in particular, there 
are many instances of the same broadcast being played out across regions, which allowed for 
checking and can be seen throughout the archive – at first glance one series of broadcasts may 
look less than another but may actually contain similar levels of material, just noted as 
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repetitions of previous broadcasts from another language service. This cross referencing in itself 
can provide a challenge, as it requires delving further into the archive to find material than may 
at first be expected.  
With these thoughts in mind, further research into the archive can still provide great 
opportunities to further understanding of what was broadcast by international radio stations 
throughout the Cold War and the Second World War. As this conclusion has demonstrated, this 
source also provides another gateway to exploring how different states viewed global politics 
and the domestic concerns of their rivals during this time. Further use of the archive and the 
many different international broadcasters it holds would supply the opportunity to explore these 
themes in more detail.  
Importantly, there is still comparatively little research into Radio Moscow compared with 
research into the likes of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. One reason being a lack of 
information on what was broadcast – raising awareness of the archive will allow for further 
research into this area. Equally, it raises the possibility of comparative research, only previously 
explored by Robert Fortner, into how Radio Moscow directly compared in its reporting of 
events to Western broadcasters at the time. Moving away from Radio Moscow, examination of 
the archive holdings of broadcasters from the Second World War and other state broadcasters 
from the Cold War, such as Communist China, can build upon existing knowledge in a way that 
has yet to be achieved, and could not be achieved without the existence of archives such as the 
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